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RICHARD HANSEN 
Foreword by s·enator Estes Kefauver 
$3.50 
THE 
YEAR.W E HAD 
NO PRESIDENT 
' During the weeks after President 
Eisenhower was disabled by a heart at-
tack, Vice President Nixon tells that "the 
possibility of an attack on the United 
States was always hanging over us." If it 
came, nuclear retaliation might be a 
requisite for survival. But-"Would the 
President be well enough to make a de-
cision? If not, who had the authority to 
push the button?" The terrifying ahswer: 
no one. Since there is no legal provision 
for the delegation of presidential author-
ity, no one, not even the Vice President, 
can exercise the President's powers when 
the Chief Executive is unable to do so. 
As a consequence of this alarming gap 
in our laws, the country has been with-
out the services of its President for days, 
weeks, even months at a time. 
The historical and legal background 
of presidential inability-the complex 
interplay of events, politics, and person-
alities during the series of power vac-
uums that comprise "the year we had no 
President" -is set forth in Part I of this 
timely and engrossing study. The origin 
of the precedent that the Vice President 
succeeds on the President's death; tem-
porary inability and related problems 
d uring the administrations of Garfield, 
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To Dwight D. Eisenhower 
The first President to take positive 
action on presidential disability 
Foreword 
The subject of this book is as important as the office ol 
the United States Presidency itself. The constitutional un-
certainties of presidential inability cause it to be one of the 
few areas where there is general agreement among legisla-
tors, palitical scientists, and constitutional lawyers that there 
is a need for corrective action by constitutional amendment. 
Nevertheless, no proposed amendment has ever been 
brought to a vote in either house of the Congress. Since the 
illnesses of President Eisenhower, no session of Congress 
has passed without the introduction of one or more pro-
pased amendments dealing with this problem. In 1958 and 
again in 1959, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Amendments favorably reported proposed 
amendments but no further action was taken. 
I do not believe that the failure of Congress to ap-
prove a constitutional amendment and present it to the 
states for ratification is due to indifference or apathy. It is 
due instead to disagreement and doubt as to the form which 
a constitutional amendment should take. Any proposal is 
necessarily a procedure which would divest a duly elected 
President of the powers of that office. We wrestle with 
delicate problems touching upon the fundamental prin-
ciples of separation of powers and the coordinate inde-
pendence of the separate branches of government. This is 
all the more reason to continue and step up the quest for a 
constitutional solution. The demands of the nuclear age 
upon the office of President require that the discharge of 
its duties never be in suspension or uncertainty. 
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments, I have observed increased interest in this 
question, but there continues to be wide variation in the 
approaches taken by those who work for a solution. The 
Year We Had No President is a unique and valuable con-
tribution to the literature of this subject and it should in-
crease public awareness of the implications of this serious 
vii 
constitutional vacuum. The historical, political, and legal 
analysis which Mr. Hansen has made will certainly be of 
great assistance to those in government who seek to resolve 
this issue. 
ESTES KEFAUVER, Chairman 
Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments 
Committee on the Judiciary 
United States Senate 
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The Year We Had No President 
Chapter I 
The Gap m the Constitution 
Thirty-four men have held the office of President of the 
United States. Pick up any American history, any standard 
reference work, and you will see their names, starting with 
George Washington in 1789 and ending with the present 
incumbent, john Fitzgerald Kennedy, inaugurated on 
January 20, 1961. The line of presidential succession is 
consecutive and continuous for the 173 years of this re-
public's existence. When was the year we had no President? 
The year we had no President is the sum total of the 
periods-hours, days, weeks, even months-when the man 
in the White House was too sick to be capable of exercising 
the powers vested in him by the Constitution as Chief 
Executive and Commander in Chief. These power vacuums 
-during which for all practical purposes our country had 
no President-have occurred in seven administrations. The 
figures are as follows: 
William Henry Harrison Bedridden for 7 days before his 
death 
Zachary Taylor Bedridden for 5 days before his 
death 
Jam es A. Garfield Bedridden for 80 days before his 
death 
William McKinley Bedridden for 8 days before his 
death 
Woodrow Wilson 280 days from his stroke until he 
resumed cabinet meetings 
Warren G. Harding Semi-invalid for 4 days before his 
death 
Dwight D. Eisenhower 143 days from his heart attack 
until his announced recovery 
Confront the man in the street with this rundown• and 
•This calendar does not take into account the nine hours and 
twenty-seven minutes that Abraham Lincoln was unconscious before he 
died; or the period of Grover Cleveland's incapacity during and after 
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the chances are better than even that his reaction will be: 
"So what? We've got a Vice President, haven't we?" Like 
the majority of his fellow citizens, he subscribes to the com-
forting fallacy that when the President is disabled, the Vice 
President can step in and act as a sort of substitute Presi-
dent. But can he? In 1955 President Eisenhower was strick-
en by coronary thrombosis. His Vice President, Richard M. 
Nixon, has written of the ensuing weeks during which "the 
possibility of an attack on the United States was always 
hanging over us." If the attack came, nuclear retaliation 
might be a requisite for survival. "Would the President be 
well enough to make a decision? If not, who had the 
authority to push the button?"l As the law now stands, 
the answer is-no one: 
The President stands alone as the supreme authority of the 
Executive branch of government. The Cabinet and National 
Security Council can advise him but cannot act for him. 
They cannot become a collective commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces, or sign legislation into law, or appoint 
judges, or decide high policies of government .... Consti-
tutionally, the Vice President is designated by the voters 
to take over only "in case of the removal of the President 
from office, or of his death, resignation or inability to 
discharge the powers and duties of said office .... " The 
Constitution does not make clear what it means by "in-
ability to discharge the powers and duties of said office." It 
does not say who shall decide when a President is disabled, 
whether the Vice President assumes the "powers and duties" 
of the presidency or the "office" itself, and just how a Presi-
dent who recovers his health can recover his office .... • 2 
his secret operation for cancer of the jaw; or the two hours and fifteen 
minutes that Franklin D. Roosevelt was comatose before his death; or 
the two hours and five minutes that Dwight D. Eisenhower was under 
anesthesia during an operation for intestinal blockage; or the period of 
Eisenhower's incapacity following his stroke. 
•No clear distinction has been made between the terms inability 
and disability, and they appear to be used interchangeably by most of 
the authorities who have written about presidential succession. In this 
study unless otherwise specified both inability and disability refer to 
any factor or situation, whatever its cause or duration, which renders 
a President unable to exercise his powers at a time when there is any 
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Since there is literally no one who can take the Presi-
dent's place, his serious illness can mean-and historically 
has meant-paralysis to a greater or lesser degree in every 
branch of the government. But the past damage resulting 
from this gap in the Constitution is insignificant compared 
to its potential for catastrophe in the age of the H-bomb 
and rocket weaponry. Herbert H. Brownell, Jr., who as 
Eisenhower's Attorney General attempted in vain to secure 
legislation which would repair the alarming breach in our 
laws, has summarized the present situation: 
The realization has grown among thoughtful people that 
our very survival in this age may rest on the capacity of 
the nation's chief executive to make swift and unquestioned 
decisions in an emergency. As a result, a major constitu-
tional problem, previously glossed over, has been brought 
to the fore. The problem is that posed by temporary presi-
dential inability to discharge the powers and duties of the 
presidency at a time when emergency action is required. It 
has been emphasized during the Eisenhower administration 
by the President's three periods of temporary physical in-
capacity, even though, fortunately, no crisis required presi-
dential action during those periods. Now that the issue is 
so forcefully upon us, with our future existence possibly 
depending on the forethought that we exercise in resolving 
it, failure to take proper steps to answer promptly the con-
stitutional question would be the height of irresponsibility.a 
That we are today unprotected from the consequences of 
a lapse in executive power is at least in part a result of the 
American public's misunderstanding-or even total un-
awareness-of this admittedly complex problem. At present 
only specialized studies on presidential inability are in 
print. It is hoped that this book, addressed to the general 
reader, will serve to clarify the issues involved for a wider 
audience than political scientists and students of constitu-
tional law. An informed and aroused electorate is the best 
possible guarantee that our representatives in Washington 
public business requiring his penonal attention. See the discussion in 
Ruth Silva, Presidential Succession (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1951), pp. 88-100; also pp. 83-85. 
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will enact legislation to insure the continuity of leadership 
essential for the welfare of our nation and of the entire 
free world. 
The interplay of events, personalities, and partisan poli-
tics during the series of emergencies which comprise "the 
year we had no President" is intricately woven into the 
fabric of American history, and cannot be adequately under-
stood outside that larger pattern. The next three chapters 
of this book are, therefore, devoted to a chronological ac-
count of the "year" -the historical and legal background of 
the situation in which we find ourselves today. Chapter V 
considers the stopgap measures taken by Presidents Eisen-
hower and Kennedy to provide for delegation of executive 
powers in the event of temporary presidential inability; 
Chapter VI reviews pertinent colonial and state legislation; 
and Chapter VII proposes a basis for action which would 
permanently resolve the question. 
Although the problems of presidential inability have 
their origin in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the 
first of the emergencies which focused attention on the gap 
in the presidential succession law occurred in 1841, and the 
following survey opens in that year. 
Chapter II 
A Violation of Grammar 
I. TIPPECANOE AND TYLER, TOO 
After fifty years of national existence our country was 
a lusty and rapidly growing youngster, still a long way 
from attaining the stature of a world power. We were 
not much concerned either in or with foreign affairs: the 
dispute with England over the Oregon border was about 
our only real problem in the international sphere. 0£ the 
twenty-six states in the Union, none lay west of the ninety-
fifth parallel, but even though settling the mighty stretch 
of land beyond the Missouri was still largely unfinished 
business, migration westward already had begun on a 
measurable scale. 
The population was nearly eighteen million-mostly 
farmers, many of whom were also pioneers with some record 
of military service. This combination of factors had led to 
the political ascendancy of President Andrew Jackson, 
soldier and pioneer. For a time some of Jackson's popu-
larity seemed to have rubbed off on his hand-picked suc-
cessor, Martin Van Buren, who followed him into the White 
House in 1837. But in the spring of that year a depression 
hit the land: banks closed, credit was tight, there were crop 
failures in many areas; and the citizenry, needing a scape-
goat, turned on Van Buren. "Old Kinderhook," as he was 
called, was accused of being an aristocrat-a no-account 
fop who laced himself up in corsets, scented his whiskers 
with cologne, and loved old silver and good wine more than 
he did the common man. 
Guided by this caricature-which amounted to a blue-
print of the type of candidate most unlikely to be the peo-
ple's choice in 1840-the Whig party bosses came up with a 
nominee whose public image was the diametric opposite: 
General William Henry Harrison, a military hero from the 
West, who had defeated the Indians at the Battle of 
Tippecanoe. Hoping to win over some opposition votes, the 
Whigs chose as Harrison's running mate a renegade Demo-
5 
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crat, John Tyler of Virginia. But the party was split on a 
multitude of issues, and despite the widespread dislike of 
Van Buren, the Whigs might well have lost the election had 
it not been for the unwitting help of a Democratic edi-
torial writer. His sarcastic suggestion, appearing in a Balti-
more paper, that General Harrison "upon condition of his 
receiving $2,000 and a barrel of cider ... would no doubt 
consent to withdraw his pretensions and spend his days in 
a log cabin on the banks of the Ohio" was political dyna-
mite.1 Playing up the contrast between the wine-sipping 
aristocrat in the White House ("Van, Van is a used up 
man") and the sturdy, red-blooded son of the frontier, the 
Whigs rolled out the cider barrel, built log-cabin floats, 
donned coonskin caps, and went into action to the rollick-
ing strains of "Tippecanoe and Tyler, Too." 
The Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign has been 
characterized as "an exhibition of abuse, evasion, and ir-
relevancies on a scale unparalleled in United States history 
up to that time."2 But it enabled Harrison and Tyler to 
carry nineteen of the twenty-six states-and incidentally en-
riched American political iconography with a flock of still-
potent symbols. That Harrison had never lived in a log 
cabin and detested hard cider is probably quite beside the 
point. 
The sixty-eight-year-old President-elect arrived in Wash-
ington on a wet, cold February day. It was raining, with 
the rain fast turning into snow, but he walked bareheaded 
up Pennsylvania Avenue to his rooms. There he immediate-
ly began to work on his Inaugural Address. Running some 
eight thousand words, this document is remarkable only 
for being the longest and, without question, dullest In-
augural Address on record. Its delivery on March 4, 1841, 
consumed an hour and a half, during which the President 
stood in the rain, without a hat or topcoat. 
The country was still deep in the financial slump, and 
the people had been anxiously awaiting a statement of the 
new administration's policies. Harrison's mammoth oration 
did little to reassure or enlighten them. His only memor-
able campaign utterance had been the promise that if 
elected he would never use the veto and would strive to 
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diminish the influence of the executive branch. In his In-
augural Address he harped on this theme ("it is preposter-
ous to suppose ... the President, placed at the capital, in 
the center of the country could better understand the wishes 
of the people than their own immediate representatives 
who spend a part of every year among them ... "),3 out-
lining a program which would leave the initiative in govern-
ment to the Congress and, more specifically, to his friend 
Henry Clay, then senator from Kentucky. 
It may be conjectured that one of the more restive listen-
ers-at least, inwardly-was the new Vice President, John 
Tyler. He had quite different views from Harrison on the 
role of the Chief Executive in government; if it had been 
left up to him, there would have been no talk of surrender-
ing the presidential prerogatives to the legislative branch. 
But in 1841 very little was left up to the Vice President. 
The office was regarded as "a comfortable sinecure with 
which to honor some of the country's more able politi-
cians."4 On state occasions such as this one a good Vice 
President was seen and not heard. 
The one immediate result of the President's speech was 
that he came down with a chest cold. Combined with an 
already existing digestive weakness, probably duodenal 
ulcers, the cold weakened the old soldier. But he refused to 
favor himself-was he not, after all, a hardy son of the 
frontier?-and would not allow any curtailment of his 
crowded schedule of appointments. 
During his first days as President he was pestered by 
swarms of party workers clamoring for federal appoint-
ments. Although it was Andrew Jackson who first applied 
on a national scale the maxim "To the victors belong the 
spoils," the Whigs evidently felt that what had been good 
enough for Old Hickory would be good enough for Old 
Tippecanoe. At all hours of the day office seekers thronged 
the White House, hounding the President until he was 
bone-weary and sick. 
One morning they jammed all the lower floor of the 
White House. Harrison, coming back from a before-break-
fast walk with the District marshal, found himself sur-
rounded by a clamoring mob. He appealed to them to leave 
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their recommendations and letters with his secretary. 
The marshal tried vainly to clear the stairway to the second 
floor so the aged President could go to his rooms. But the 
crowd refused to budge until the Chief Executive agreed to 
take all the letters and recommendations with him per-
sonally. With his pockets bulging, and his arms heavily 
laden, the weary President mounted the stairs.5 
All during March, Harrison continued his early-morning 
walks. They often took him to the downtown Washington 
stores, where he indulged his domestic side by buying all 
the White House supplies, including the groceries. In the 
late evenings, though exhausted by the demands of his daily 
schedule, he paid visits to the various governmental depart-
ments. 
One morning on his way to market-as usual, wearing 
neither cloak nor topcoat-the President was drenched by 
a heavy rain. His wet clothes gave him a chill, the chill ag-
gravated his cold, the cold developed into pneumonia, and 
exactly one month after taking office President ·William 
Henry Harrison was dead. 
The President's illness had first been diagnosed as pneu-
monia in the lower right lobe of his lung, complicated by 
congestion of the liver. Suction cups and stinging oint-
ments were applied to his right side, the doctors apparently 
theorizing that this would draw the infection out through 
the skin. They also dosed him with laxatives-calomel and 
castor oil, rhubarb and emetic ipecac-and the resultant 
vomiting and diarrhea soon dissipated the patient's remain-
ing strength. When his physicians finally realized that their 
"treatments" had brought the President to the threshold 
of death, they administered such antidotes as opium, cam-
phor, and brandy. But it was too late: " ... profuse diarrhea 
came on, under which he sank at thirty minutes to one 
o'clock on the morning of the fourth .... " The President's 
last words, obviously addressed to posterity, were as high-
ftown and as innocuous as his Inaugural Address: "Sir, I 
wish you to understand the true principles of Government. 
I wish them carried out. I ask nothing more."6 
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All the members of the Cabinet had been present when 
the President passed away; Vice President Tyler, however, 
was at his home in Williamsburg, Virginia. That same 
night an official message notifying him of the President's 
death was composed and signed by the Cabinet members, 
and entrusted to Fletcher Webster, the son and assistant of 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster.7 He was on his way be-
fore dawn via stagecoach and chartered boat. The boat took 
him as far as Yorktown; there he transferred to horseback 
and galloped hell-for-leather the last ten miles to Williams-
burg. 
His arrival put an end to a happy, boisterous family 
scene: the Vice President was hunkered down on a gravel 
walk, shooting marbles with his two sons. In high good 
humor, he was heckling the youngsters, who were losing to 
him. That marble game was probably the last time John 
Tyler enjoyed himself for four years. 
There was a few hours' delay while Tyler, who was short 
of funds, arranged to borrow several hundred dollars; then 
the two men started back to Washington on the govern-
ment-chartered boat. While young Webster slept, the Vice 
President paced the deck in solitude. He was confronted 
with one of the most momentous decisions in American his-
tory, and he was called upon to make it under circumstances 
in which neither he nor any other man could be expected 
to maintain an objective point of view. 
The situation was without precedent. Never before had 
a Chief Executive died in office. The country had, in effect, 
been without a President for two days. What happened 
next depended on the construction Tyler put on Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution-the clause which 
deals with the succession in the event of presidential in-
ability.• The relevant passage reads as follows: 
•There has been inconsistency in citing this provision of the Con-
stitution. Some authorities refer to the passage as Clause 6, instead of 
Clause 5, as it is designated in this book; others use "Paragraph" in 
place of "Clause." The irregularity may be ascribed to the fact that in 
the original document the part under number "2" of Article II, Section 
l contained two paragraphs, the second of which was superseded by the 
Twelfth Amendment. Regardless of the method of reference used in 
Lhe sources the intention in every instance is unmistakable. 
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In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or 
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the 
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall de-
volve on the Vice President. ... 
At first glance this may seem clear enough, but there is an 
ambiguity in the wording. Does "the Same" refer to the 
"Powers and Duties" of the presidency, or to "the said 
Office" itself? 
If Tyler interpreted "the Same" as referring to "Powers 
and Duties," he would remain the Vice President exercising 
the powers and duties of the dead President. If he decided 
that "the Same" referred to "the said Office," he would 
become the tenth President of the United States. 
On his arrival in Washington, Tyler was met at the dock 
by the Cabinet and escorted to Brown's Indian Queen Hotel 
on Pennsylvania Avenue. A note was sent to Judge William 
Cranch, Chief Justice of the Circuit Court of the District 
of Columbia, summoning him to the hotel. Cranch was 
taken to Tyler's rooms, where in the presence of the Cabi-
net, of Fletcher Webster, the tavernkeeper Jesse Brown, and 
some hotel guests, he administered the Presidential Oath 
of Office. 
Directly after the ceremony the seventy-two-year-old 
jurist signed the following affidavit: 
I, William Cranch, . . . certify that the above-named 
John Tyler personally appeared before me this day, and 
although he deems himself qualified to exercise the powers 
and office of President on the death of William Henry 
Harrison, late President of the United States, without any 
other oath than that which he has taken as Vice President, 
yet as doubts may arise, and for greater caution, took and 
subscribed the foregoing [Presidential] oath before me.8 
Who decided that Tyler should become President in-
stead of Acting President? Was it his decision alone or 
reached in consort with the Cabinet? When was the de-
cision made? These are questions to which we may never 
have a clear answer. All that can be stated with certainty 
is that the Cabinet publicly announced the President's 
death, sent a notification addressed to "John Tyler, Vice 
President of the United States,"9 and was present when he 
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was sworn in on April 6, 1841. None of the published 
papers of Tyler or of the five Cabinet members present-
Secretary of State Daniel Webster, Secretary of the Treasury 
Thomas Ewing, Secretary of \Var John Bell, Attorney 
General John ]. Crittenden, Postmaster General Francis 
Granger-sheds any light on the matter.• 
There are three schools of thought: (1) Tyler himself 
decided he would have presidential status, promptly claimed 
it, and was unopposed by the Cabinet; (2) Daniel Webster 
thought that Tyler's action violated the Constitution, but 
did not make an issue of it because they belonged to the 
same political party; and (3) Webster, far from opposing 
Tyler's assumption of office, was the one who decided that 
he should become President. According to this third ver-
sion, only Webster among those in official circles thought 
that President Harrison would die, or at best would be dis-
abled for a long period; he discussed these contingencies 
with the Cabinet, giving it as his opinion that in either 
event Tyler would be President, and urged that he be sent 
for. But no record of such a discussion can be found. After 
Harrison's death, Webster had the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court write to Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, who was in 
Maryland, asking him to come and confer on the question 
of whether or not Tyler should take the Presidential Oath. 
Taney refused to do so without a formal invitation from 
the Cabinet or from the Vice President, and further ex-
plained that he didn't want to appear to be intruding in 
the business of a coordinate branch of the government. 10 
Who, then, did decide that Tyler should take the oath 
of office? On the face of it, the affidavit signed by Judge 
Cranch would seem to indicate that Tyler thought the oath 
was unnecessary-that he believed the office of President 
automatically devolved on him when Harrison died.11 On 
the other hand, if he thought that he had become "no more 
than Acting President, the oath he had previously taken to 
discharge the duties of the Vice President would cover the 
whole ground, as one of the prescribed duties of that office 
•The sixth member of the Cabinet, Secretary of the Navy George 
Ticknor Curtis, was absent from Washington at this time. 
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... is that of acting as President in the event of the Presi-
dent's death."12 There is still a third possibility: if Tyler 
was uncertain of his status-if he was not sure that he auto-
matically succeeded to the Presidency-but wished to lay 
claim to the office 
it would appear from a plain reading of the Constitution 
that he was legally enjoined to subscribe to the oath pro-
vided especially for the President. For Article Two, Section 
One, provides that: "Before he enter on the Execution of 
his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation . 
. . . " The act of taking the oath marks the President's first 
official act in office. The doubts that might arise, then, 
would have been well founded, as Cranch said, if Tyler laid 
claim to the presidential office without ever taking the 
presidential oath. The "greater caution" appears to have 
been the mark both of prudence and of necessity.13 
In short, all that can be said without fear of successful 
contradiction is that Tyler or somebody decided he should 
be President; Tyler or somebody decided he should take 
the oath of office; Tyler or somebody decided he should put 
it on the record that he did not believe the oath was 
necessary. However, since the Cabinet was present when he 
took the oath and since no evidence to the contrary exists, 
it can be asserted with some confidence that Webster and 
the other Cabinet members did not regard Tyler as a 
usurper. 
Newspaper opinion was divided. Those holding that 
Tyler's decision (as it will be referred to for convenience) 
was right included the Boston Courier (Whig), the Wash-
ington Globe and the Pennsylvanian (both Democratic), 
the Raleigh Register (Whig), and the principal Whig 
paper, the National Intelligencer (Philadelphia and Wash-
ington). Among those holding that Tyler should remain 
Vice President or Acting President were two other Boston 
papers (one Whig, one Democratic), the New York Post 
(Democratic), a Harrisburg paper (Whig), and the Rich-
mond Enquirer (Democratic). None of the major news-
papers suggested that a special election be called.14 
Other dissident parties included an elder statesman, 
former President John Quincy Adams, and not unexpected-
A VIOLATION OF GRAMMAR 13 
ly, Henry Clay. On April 9, 1841, Tyler made an Inaugural 
Address, and on April 14 he moved into the White House. 
Two days later Adams wrote in his diary: 
I paid a visit this morning to Mr. Tyler, who styles him-
self President ... and not Vice-President acting as Presi-
dent .... But it is a construction in direct violation of both 
the grammar and context of the Constitution ... a strict 
constructionist would warrant more than a doubt whether 
the Vice-President has the right to occupy the President's 
house, or to claim his salary, without an Act of Congress.U• 
Clay picked up Adams' argument that Tyler was Acting 
President only and carried it a step farther, declaring that 
he did not have all the powers of a regularly chosen Chief 
Executive,16 but by the time the matter came up in the 
Senate (June), 1841), he either had changed his mind or had 
decided it was no use to fight a fait accompli: at any rate, 
he voted to give Tyler the presidential title. A somewhat 
longer debate in the House the day before had ended with 
the defeat of a resolution that Tyler be styled "Acting 
President." This congressional action appeared to close the 
succession issue, and by the end of June "even John Quincy 
Adams referred to Tyler as 'the President.' "17 
And yet Adams had been right. Tyler's accession to the 
office of President was contrary to the Constitution. 
2. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TYLER 
PRECEDENT 
Memorable details are sometimes misleading. History 
has recorded that John Tyler was playing marbles with his 
two boys when he received word of President Harrison's 
death. The picture evoked is that of an innocent bystander 
caught up willy-nilly in the tide of great events-a man 
upon whom (in the words of a later Vice President who 
acceded to the Presidency) "a bull or a load of hay" has 
suddenly fallen.is But Tyler was a long way from being an 
innocent bystander, and there is evidence that he was not 
unprepared for the news that Fletcher Webster brought 
him. In a letter dated some six months after he took over 
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the Presidency, he wrote to his friend and confidant Little-
ton W. Tazewell: 
I well remember your prediction of Gen. Harrison's death, 
and with what emphasis you enquired of me whether I had 
thought of my own situation upon the happening of that 
contingency. You declared in advance much of the difficulty 
by which I have already been surrounded.19 
It is a good deal more than a reasonable supposition 
that Tyler had given some thought to his "own situation": 
it would be incredible if he had not. A Jeffersonian Demo-
crat and an extreme state rights man, he had little in com-
mon with the Whigs except their announced opposition to 
the consolidation of power in Washington. During his 
thirty years in public office, he had served in both houses 
of Congress and as governor of Virginia. The record showed 
that he was independent, stubborn, outspoken, and courage-
ous; he knew what he was against but not always what he 
was for. Although he had stood with Jackson against a re-
charter of Nicholas Biddle's Bank of the United States, 
Tyler felt that when the President removed the govern-
ment's deposits from the bank he had (in the terms of the 
resolution censuring Jackson) "assumed upon himself 
authority and power not conferred by the Constitution"; 
and rather than vote to expunge this censure from the 
record, Tyler resigned from the Senate in February, 1836. 
Having thus cut himself off from his own party, he allied 
himself with the newly formed Whig party, and in 1838 was 
again a candidate for the Senate. This ran counter to the 
plans of Henry Clay, who was conniving to obtain the 
senatorship for William C. Rives. Tyler's friends "demanded 
a showdown. At first, Clay pleaded 'not guilty' to the 
charge of intrigue. But finally ... the Kentuckian ad-
mitted his activities in behalf of Rives, and offered a com-
promise: Rives would be elected to the Senate, and Tyler 
would be given the Whig vice-presidential nomination in 
1840."20 
Whether or not Clay actually intended to keep his end 
of the bargain, when convention time came nothing could 
stop the movement for Tyler. As consolation for Clay, there 
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was the knowledge that Tyler would attract votes of the 
Southern state rights faction, and that once he was "safely 
embalmed" in the Vice Presidency, he would present little 
threat to Clay's legislative program. With President Harri-
son already committed to a role of passive approval while 
his friend Harry Clay did the wheeling and dealing, and 
with four of the six Cabinet members "Clay pigeons," it 
must have seemed to the crafty, craggy senator from Ken-
tucky that he had the executive branch well under control. 
While there is no way of knowing how much thought 
Tyler gave to the presidential succession clause, the possi-
bility that it might be evoked, as his letter to Tazewell 
shows, was certainly not unforeseen, and his actions seem to 
indicate that he was predisposed to take advantage of the 
opportunity offered him by its ambiguous wording. For one 
thing, as previously noted, the official message which in-
terrupted his marble game was addressed to "John Tyler, 
Vice-President of the United States"-an indication that the 
Cabinet members did not consider he had automatically suc-
ceeded to the Presidency on Harrison's death. Nevertheless, 
and with a minimum of delay, Tyler put himself on record 
to the contrary-he deemed himself qualified to exercise the 
powers and office of President "without any other oath than 
that which he has taken as Vice-President, [but] as doubts 
may arise and for greater caution" consolidated his position 
by taking the Presidential Oath. Moreover, his "whole 
course of conduct in the first few days after he arrived in 
the capital demonstrated plainly that he acted with con-
scious deliberation to establish himself as President in his 
own right and not as a mere caretaker for the departed 
Harrison."21 
Whether or not his decision had been weighed in ad-
vance of the contingency or was only reached after discus-
sion with the Cabinet, it certainly appears, as one writer put 
it, that Tyler did not enter into any abstract reasoning 
about the Constitution.22 The wording of the succession 
clause gave him an opening, and he took it. But assuming 
that he had been determined to be guided by the intent of 
the framers of the Constitution, what might he have done 
to ascertain it? 
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For one thing, he might have studied the records of the 
Cons ti mtional Convention of 1787: Madison's N ates had 
been published in 184.0. However, there is no evidence 
that Tyler referred to them or that he even knew of their 
existence.23 As a lawyer he would be aware that pre-
cedents would, at least to some degree, affect the thinking 
of the delegates, but locating historical materials on the in-
ability provisions of colonial and state charters would have 
required months of research, for records were scattered and 
libraries few. And he could not consult any of the men 
who had drafted the Constitution; the youngest of the 
signers, James Madison, had died six years before. Of course, 
old John Quincy Adams was still alive. He had been 
twenty when the Constitutional Convention was held, and 
although he had not signed the Constitution, as the son of 
the second President and himself a former President, he 
must have heard the matter discussed. But Adams, though 
a fellow Whig, had little use for Tyler-and Tyler knew it. 
Adams' opinion of him is summed up in diary entry 
made on the day of Harrison's death: 
Tyler is a political sectarian of the slave-driving, Virginian, 
Jeffersonian school, principled against all improvement, 
with all the interests and passions and vices of slavery rooted 
in his moral and political constitution-with talents not 
above mediocrity, and a spirit incapable of expansion to 
the dimensions of the station upon which he has been cast 
by the hand of Providence .... This day was in every sense 
gloomy.24 
Ironically enough, the one man who might have told Tyler 
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was about the 
last man he would have wished to consult. 
The historical materials bearing on the presidential 
succession clause were first put into focus by a brilliant 
Washington lawyer, Henry E. Davis, in a monograph, In-
ability of the President, written in the summer of 1881 
while President Garfield lay ill in the White House.• It 
remained unprinted until 1918, at which time it appeared 
in the Congressional Record.25 Davis' monograph offers 
proof, never rebutted, that the Vice President was never 
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intended to be more than Acting President. In summary, 
this is what Davis found: 
The Constitutional Convention of 1789 was organized in 
the same manner as conventions held today, with most of 
the work parceled out to committees. Davis discovered 
that two resolutions regarding presidential inability (or 
disability: both words were used) were presented to the 
Convention as a whole. Both resolutions provided that the 
Vice President would act as President during the disability 
of the Chief Executive. Both resolutions gave only the 
right to exercise the powers and duties of the office to the 
Acting President. 
The general idea was approved by the entire Conven-
tion, and the two resolutions were referred to a five-man 
committee "to revise the style and arrange the article 
agreed to by the House."26 The sole function of this com-
mittee was to combine the resolutions, polish their lan-
guage, and fit them harmoniously into the body of the 
Constitution. It had no power to alter or amend any of the 
sections sent to it. But in combining and condensing, the 
committee changed the intended sense, as a comparison of 
the two texts makes clear. 
Articles Originally Agreed to by 
the Convention 
Article X, Section 2: ... and in 
case of his removal as aforesaid, 
death, absence, resignation or in· 
ability to discharge the powers or 
duties of his office, the Vice Presi· 
dent shall exercise those powers 
and duties until another President 
be chosen, or until the inability 
of the President be removed. 
Article X, Section I: The Legisla-
ture may declare by law what 
officer of the United States shall 
act as President, in case of the 
death, resignation, or disability of 
the President and Vice President; 
After Consolidation by the Com-
mittee on Style and Later Adopted 
Article II, Section I, Clause 5: In 
case of the removal of the presi-
dent from office, or of his death, 
resignation, or inability to dis-
charge the powers and duties of 
the said office, the same shall de-
volve on the vice-president, 
and the Congress may by law pro-
vide for the case of removal, 
death, resignation or inability, 
both of the president and vice-
president, declaring what officer 
shall then act as president, 
•The unabridged text of the monograph is given in Appendix I. 
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and such Officer shall act accord-
ingly, until such disability be re-
moved, or a President shall be 
elected. 
and such officer shall act accord-
ingly, until the disability be re-
moved, or a president shall be 
elected. 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy has analyzed the 
changes as follows: 
When we refer to the provlSlons before and after the 
Committee on Style had combined them, it appears that 
the Committee did several things: consolidated two pro-
visions into one and introduced the words "the same shall 
devolve on the Vice President"; omitted reference to "ab-
sence" as an occasion for operation of the succession rule; 
used the adverbial clause "until the disability be removed," 
o·,1ly once instead of using it to modify each of the preced-
ing clauses separately; substituted "inability" for "dis-
ability" in the clause referring to succession beyond the 
Vice President, possibly as being more comprehensive and 
covering both absence and temporary disability; and 
changed the semicolon after "Vice President" to a comma 
so that the limited beginning, "and such Officer" clause 
would refer to both the Vice President and officer desig-
nated by Congress. Thus the evolution of this clause makes 
clear that merely the powers and duties devolve on the 
Vice President, not the office itself.27 
The proceedings of the Federal Convention offer fur-
ther proof that the delegates never intended the Vice Presi-
dent to become President during a temporary or permanent 
inability of the President. James Wilson, Gouverneur 
Morris, and James Madison objected strongly to a proposal 
for election of the President by Congress because they feared 
the Congress would purposely delay in filling any vacancy 
in order that its own presiding officer could act as Presi-
dent during the interim.2s Charles Warren, in The Making 
of the Constitution, stresses the delegates' repeated refer-
ence to the idea that "the Vice President would only per-
form the duties of President until a new election for Presi-
dent should be held; and that he would not ipso facto be-
come President."20 This interpretation was carried over 
into the ratifying conventions of the states, at which the 
delegates spoke of the "Vice President, when acting as Presi-
dent."30 
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Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy has presented an 
irrefutable argument in support of this general thesis by 
looking at the Constitution in its entirety. If the Tyler in-
terpretation is applied to both temporary and permanent 
inability, certain other sections become inconsistent. For 
example: 
1. Article I, Section 3, Clause 5 says the Senate shall 
choose a President pro tempore in the absence of the Vice 
President or "when he shall exercise the Office of President 
of the United States." 
2. The twelfth amendment provides that if, in case of 
a contested presidential election, the House of Representa-
tives shall not choose a President before Inauguration Day, 
"then the Vice President shall act as President in the case 
of the death or other constitutional disability of the Presi-
dent."31 This wording assumes even greater importance 
when it is recalled that the twelfth amendment was adopted 
on September 25, 1804. 
3. Section 3 of the twentieth amendment recognizes the 
distinction between permanent and temporary inability by 
providing that if, at the time fixed for beginning the term 
of the President, the President-elect has died, then the Vice 
President "shall become President." But the amendment 
further provides that if a President has not been chosen by 
the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the Presi-
dent-elect fails to qualify, then the Vice President-elect 
shall "act as President until the President qualifies .... "a2 
The records and history of the Constitutional Conven-
tion and consideration of other provisions in the Constitu-
tion establish indisputably that it was the intention of the 
framers for the Vice President to be Acting President in the 
event of presidential inability. He was not to succeed to 
the Presidency on the death of the President; he could be-
come President only by being elected to the office. As Ed-
ward S. Corwin puts it, 
That Tyler was wrong in his reading of the original in-
tention of the Constitution is certain.• It was clearly the 
•"One may logically ask why doubt and controversy over the mean-
ing of this clause has arisen in the past, if the framers' intent is so clear 
and certain. The answer is simply that a great deal more is now known 
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expectation of the Framers that the Vice-President remain 
Vice-President, a stopgap, a locum tenens, whatever the 
occasion of his succession .... 3s 
The misinterpretation of the Constitution in 1841, in 
the words of John Quincy Adams, placed "in the Executive 
chair a man never thought of for it by anybody."34 During 
the next twenty-five years two Presidents died in office-
Zachary Taylor on July 9, 1850, and Abraham Lincoln on 
April 14, 1865. On both occasions the precedent set by 
Tyler was followed and on both occasions John Quincy 
Adams' remark applied: Vice Presidents Millard Fillmore 
and Andrew Johnson took the oath of office and became, 
respectively, the thirteenth and seventeenth Presidents of 
the United States. Thus, in the twenty-eight-year period 
between the inauguration of President Harrison in 184 l and 
the inaguration of President Ulysses S. Grant in 1869, dur-
ing more than a third of that time-ten years and five 
months-presidential powers were exercised by men who 
had received no popular mandate to do so. 
However, "the more pernicious consequences of the pre-
cedent ... do not manifest themselves in cases of vacancy, 
but appear in cases of inability."35 The nature of these 
consequences first became apparent in 1881 when the Tyler 
precedent, which previously had been followed in cases of 
the death of the President in office, was applied to a basical-
ly different situation-that of prolonged presidential in-
ability. 
about what went on at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 than was 
known in the past, even in the years immediately after the Convention. 
It was conducted in secrecy, and not until Madison's notes were pub-
lished posthumously in 1840 was a fair picture available, although still 
not a complete one. Farrand's work, Records of the Federal Convention 
of 1787, the definitive source on the subject, did not appear until 1911. 
Other important data have come to light subsequently through the 
research of biographers and historians dealing with persons and actions 
of the time. Understandably, it has taken years for scholars to bring 
the information together. Furthermore, confusing precedents have been 
established by officials who did not have access to this information" 
(Brownell, "Presidential Disability," pp. 192-193). 
Chapter Ill 
Practical Politics 
Practical politics consists in ignoring the facts. 
-The Education of Henry Adams 
1. THE GARFIELD INTERREGNUM 
Unparalleled prosperity in the South and West-a na-
tional surplus of $145,000,000-a reduction in postal rates: 
the jubilant tone of such headlines as these reflect the state 
of the nation at the opening of the 1880's. Railroad con-
struction had expedited the settling of the Trans-Missouri 
West; telegraphic communications united the remote sec-
tions of the country; and the Atlantic cable linked us to the 
Old World. There were thirty-eight states in the Union 
now, and the population had risen to fifty million. Cities 
were growing in size and influence. Farming was still the 
leading occupation, but the tide was shifting from country 
to city as factories and offices drew into their orbit not only 
immigrants but thousands of native-born Americans from 
small towns and villages. 
The 1870's had been a period of federal and municipal 
corruption, with the big city bosses muscling into control 
of the Republican party. Graft and grabbing had reached a 
climax during President Grant's second administration; but 
reform was under way by the time his successor, Rutherford 
B. Hayes, took office. At the Republican Convention of 
1880, the reform element of the party, the "Halfbreeds,'' 
fought it out with the "Stalwarts," the faction of the bosses 
and spoilsmen. The resulting ticket-James A. Garfield for 
President; Chester A. Arthur for Vice President-obviously 
represented a marriage of convenience. 
When the convention opened, Garfield, then senator-
elect from Ohio, and his fellow Halfbreeds supported James 
G. Blaine, the senator from Maine and former speaker of 
the House. Arthur was aligned with the Stalwarts, who 
were backing former President Grant for a third term. 
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When Grant and Blaine were deadlocked after twenty-eight 
ballots, a swing toward Garfield began, climaxed by his 
nomination on the thirty-sixth ballot. Since Garfield was 
only forty-nine and in good health, the Halfbreeds saw no 
risk in appeasing the Stalwarts with the vice presidential 
nomination. So it came about that Garfield, a Civil War 
hero and a man of notable integrity, was paired off with 
"Chet" Arthur, whose name was associated with bossism 
and machine politics. 
Party unity endured only until the election campaign 
had been won. Signs of a new split appeared when Garfield 
appointed Blaine his Secretary of State. Blaine's bitterest 
foe was the Stalwart boss, Senator Roscoe Conkling of New 
York, and Conkling quarreled violently with the President 
over the appointment. Unperturbed, Garfield continued 
with his program for civil service reform, naming a Con-
kling opponent to be Collector of the Port of New York. 
This was a patronage-rich job on which the Stalwarts had 
depended for much of their strength in the state, and 
Conkling and Platt-the junior New York senator-resigned 
their offices in protest. They counted on being immediately 
re-elected,• a demonstration of strength which they figured 
would serve as a "Keep Off" sign if Garfield and Blaine 
planned on any futuce meddling in New York State poli-
tics. It was a good idea, but it backfired: New Yorkers had 
not forgotten the scandals of the Grant administration. 
When it became apparent that the issue was in doubt, Vice 
President Arthur-in direct opposition to the President's 
wishes-came to the support of his old cronies. In spite of 
his efforts, they were defeated, and now there could be no 
concealing the hostility between the President and the Vice 
President. 
The defeat of Conkling and Platt on their home 
grounds, combined with the paralyzing setbacks the Presi-
dent had handed the Stalwarts in Congress, measurably in-
creased Garfield's stature as a politician as well as his 
reputation for integrity. Seldom had a presidential admin-
istration opened more auspiciously; at this juncture, three 
•senators were elected by the state legislature at this time. 
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months after Garfield's inauguration, a disappointed office 
seeker belonging to the Stalwart faction, a lawyer named 
Charles Guiteau, changed the course of history with a 
bullet. 
At 9:20 on the morning of July 2, 1881, the President 
arrived at the Baltimore & Potomac station en route to 
commencement exercises at his alma mater, Williams Col-
lege. He was accompanied by Secretary of State Blaine. Near 
the door as the President's party came in was Guiteau, 
armed with an English Bulldog 44-caliber revolver. Garfield 
and Blaine started walking briskly through the waiting 
room, and Guiteau rushed after them. Coming up behind 
the President, he fired twice at his back before the crowd 
closed in and seized him. 
The President cried out, and then slumped to the floor. 
He was placed on a mattress and carried to an office on the 
second floor of the station. Within minutes several doctors 
had gathered. According to the report of Dr. D. W. Bliss, a 
well-known Washington surgeon who was later placed in 
charge of the case, they found that the President exhibited 
all the symptoms of shock and internal hemorrhage. The 
second bullet had only grazed his right coat sleeve, but the 
first had entered his back about four inches to the right of 
the spinal column at the height of the eleventh rib. In an 
attempt to locate the bullet, the wound was explored with a 
probe, the probe being turned this way and that to find the 
channel carved by the bullet. The instrument became stuck 
in the shattered fragments of the rib, and was only with-
drawn with great difficulty. The doctor then inserted his 
little finger in the wound but still was unable to locate the 
bullet, and concluded that it had probably entered the 
liver. At 10:20 A.M. the President was taken by horse-drawn 
ambulance to the White House. 
Although he had not been expected to live through the 
night, the President was much improved the next day. How-
ever, the exploration of the wound had been conducted 
under far from sterile conditions and, not surprisingly, an 
infection developed. From July 2, the date of the shooting, 
to August IO, the President's condition varied: one day he 
would feel fairly well, the next he would run a high tern-
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perature and have difficulty keeping his food down. On 
August IO he felt strong enough to sign an extradition 
paper, the first and last official act he performed during his 
long illness. On August 18 "a swelling of the right parotid 
gland [the salivary gland below the ear] was noted, accom-
panied by restlessness and wandering of the mind. These 
were ominous signs, indicating that the septic bacteria had 
broken into the blood stream, producing blood poisoning."1 
As the infection spread, abscesses formed in various parts of 
his body and he was affiicted with facial paralysis. But he 
rallied again, and at his insistence was taken to a cottage 
by the sea at Elberon, New Jersey. 
While the President lingered between life and death, 
only routine business was transacted by the government. 
The Cabinet had no authority to act on many of the mat-
ters that came up, and the President was too ill to he 
consulted. 
Although [Garfield's] mind was clear during the first weeks 
of his invalidism, the daily bulletins of the physicians are 
sufficient evidence that he was physically unable to dis-
charge the duties of his office. During these eighty days a 
great deal of urgent business demanded the President's im-
mediate attention: there were postal frauds; officers did not 
perform their duties because they had not been commis-
sioned; the country's foreign relations were deteriorating . 
. . . Nearly every day the newspapers mentioned some im-
portant matter which was ignored simply because it re-
quired the President's personal attention. At one time there 
was a rumor that the Central Pacific Railway would bring 
action for a writ of mandamus directing Vice President 
Arthur to assume the President's powers and duties during 
Garfield's illness [Boston Evening Transcript, August 25, 
1881], but no action was taken. The Cabinet continued to 
conduct the affairs of government as best it could without 
an active Chief Executive.2 
Public opinion, as reflected in the newspapers, indicated 
that there were some who felt governmental business was 
being handled satisfactorily, but "New York's two leading 
papers, the Times and the Herald, objected editorially to 
having the affairs of state managed by the Cabinet, a body 
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unknown to the Constitution, [and] particularly disap-
proved of Secretary of State James G. Blaine's activities-
activities which made him a kind of de facto President [New 
York Times, August 11, 1881; New York Herald, September 
5, 1881]."3 
In the first days of September, the Cabinet called a 
meeting to consider the possibility of asking Vice President 
Arthur to act as President. At this time Garfield's condition 
had taken a turn for the better, and it was believed that he 
would recover. But in the physicians' opinion at least an-
other two months would elapse before he would be back at 
his desk, and already his long illness had paralyzed the 
transaction of government business in every executive de-
partment. It was essential that the Cabinet take steps to 
relieve the situation. 
Except for Secretary of State Blaine and the young Sec-
retary of ·war, Robert T. Lincoln (who was the lone Stal-
wart present at the meeting), the names of the Cabinet 
members are forgotten by all save historians. But with the 
President incapacitated, these men were, in effect, "running 
the country," and a brief consideration of the composition 
of the Garfield Cabinet may provide some insight into their 
qualifications to do so. 
The Garfield administration, so far as its Cabinet was 
concerned, was completed during the last twenty-four hours 
preceding the inauguration. There was great difficulty in 
filling the post of Secretary of the Treasury .... [The Presi-
dent] made the first offer to Senator Allison of Iowa. He ... 
finally declined, preferring to stay in the Senate .... Senator 
Windom, whose term was about to expire, was offered the 
place, and he accepted the night before inauguration. He 
had been associated with Mr. Garfield in the Senate, was in 
the confidence of Mr. Blaine, and was very intimate with 
the latter in the Senate . . .. The entire Cabinet was made 
up in accordance with the wishes of Mr. Blaine; not a single 
element antagonistic to him was admitted .... 
Mr. Windom in the Treasury gave satisfaction as a good 
business administrator. He was a safe, careful man, but he 
was not original. He would have been incapable of outlin-
ing any determined or bold policy, but he was very faithful 
and discreet in carrying out the orders of a superior mind. 
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In the War Department, Mr. Lincoln, then a young lawyer 
without the slightest experience in public affairs, began to 
learn his duties. In the Navy Department was W. H. Hunt, 
a former Judge of the Court of Claims. He was a well-
equipped lawyer with a good knowledge of affairs, but he 
was comparatively unknown to the public, and represented 
no active element in political life, although he was put in 
as the representative of the South. In the Interior Depart-
ment was Mr. Kirkwood, a former Senator. He was an 
amiable old gentleman, very slow and lethargic in his move-
ments, possessing strong common sense and good abilities, 
but having none of the executive qualities of an administra-
tor necessary for a great department .... The Attorney 
General was Wayne MacVeigh, of Pennsylvania, a corpora-
tion lawyer without any previous public experience. He 
owed his election to the fact that he was a son-in-law of 
Simon Cameron. He made no record for himself during the 
brief period of his career, except as a disorganizing element . 
. . . The Post-office Department was given to Thomas L. 
James of New York City, another gentleman wholly un-
known to public life, and whose experience had been en-
tirely in commercial affairs.4 
The account concludes with the observation that except 
for Blaine the Cabinet was generally considered a weak one, 
and it was said that the Secretary of State "had the admin-
istration so completely under his will that the President was 
virtually his private secretary and the Cabinet a board of 
recording scribes." 
Three reasons are generally assigned for Arthur's not 
being asked to take over the powers and duties of the Presi-
dent. First, there was Arthur's political position: he be-
longed to the wrong wing of the party; he had campaigned 
for Blaine·s dearest enemy; he was identified with "Boss" 
Conkling and the scandals of the Grant administration. In 
the Cabinet's view, if Arthur once took over executive 
power the President's civil service reform program would be 
washed down the drain in a flood of patronage. (As later 
events proved, Arthur was neither a "tool of the bosses" nor 
a saboteur of reform; when he finally did become President 
he showed himself to be an able and courageous adminis-
trator.) The other two reasons referred to the presidential 
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inability clause. There was no agreement either on what in-
ability meant or how it should be established; and it was 
not certain that if the powers and duties of the President 
devolved upon Arthur that they could be returned to Gar-
field when he recovered. 
Leading journals and periodicals queried outstanding 
legal figures on the constitutional problems involved. 
The answers to the questions were conflicting and confus-
ing. Many thought that mental inability was the only one 
covered by the Constitution .... Other equally competent 
legal authorities thought the word "inability" covered any 
case in which a duty should be discharged but which the 
President was unable to perform, whatever the reason. A 
number of lawyers and legislators held that disability must 
be permanent and must extend throughout the entire term 
in order to be "inability" in the constitutional sense .... 
One cause for inaction was that no one knew exactly 
how the existence of inability should be established. Legal 
opinion on this question was just as conflicting as opinion 
on the meaning of "inability." Although some thought that 
the courts, the Congress, or the Cabinet should decide that 
the President was disabled, or even that the irrational Presi-
dent (Garfield was then having hallucinations] should do 
so, most informed opinion supported the position that the 
Vice President should determine that the President was in-
capacitated .... 
Would Vice President Arthur become President for the 
remainder of the term if called to act as such during the 
period of Garfield's recuperation? Some respected lawyers 
and jurists held that he would succeed to the presidential 
office just as in the case of vacancy, and that, once the pow-
ers and duties devolved upon him, they could not be re-
turned to the President when he recovered. Although most 
lawyers thought that the President would resume his powers 
and duties when he regained his health, the Cabinet was 
impressed by arguments to the contrary.5 
Newspapers on September 2, 1881, carried the story that 
in the opinion of a majority of the Cabinet assigning the 
exercise of presidential power to Arthur would amount to 
ousting Garfield; and that they should not propose Arthur's 
succession without first letting the President know of this 
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possible consequence. But the President, they felt, was too 
ill for such a matter to be brought before him; and if they 
went ahead, they feared the shock might be fatal. Action 
was postponed. 
The President's death on September 19 resolved the 
stalemate. During the last days of his illness, his disability 
was mental as well as physical: on September 16 even the 
Boston Evening Transcript, "which resisted any suggestion 
that Arthur might act for Garfield," admitted that he was 
having hallucinations. An autopsy showed that the doctors 
in their several attempts to locate the bullet had succeeded 
only in opening new cavities in the President's back and 
abdomen, helping along the spread of the infection. 
A wire from the Cabinet informed Vice President Arthur 
of the President's death and advised him "to take the oath 
of office as President of the United States without delay."6 
The oath was administered by a New York State judge early 
in the morning of September 20, 1881, in New York; and 
the ceremony was repeated in Washington the next day, this 
time by the Chief Justice, so that it would appear in the 
records of the Supreme Court. Then, at last, Arthur was free 
to start clearing away the log jam resulting from eighty 
days without a President. 
In four successive State of the Union messages, President 
Arthur urged the Congress to consider the "intendment of 
the Constitution" in regard to presidential inability ques-
tions-"questions which concern the very existence of the 
Government and the liberties of the people .... "7 After 
that, nobody bothered Congress with the matter again for 
thirty-five years. 
The next interregnum was of relatively brief duration 
beginning on September 6, 1901, when President William 
McKinley was shot by the anarchist Leon Czolgosz, and end-
ing on September 14 with McKinley's death and the acces-
sion of the Vice President, Theodore Roosevelt. But it was 
followed by the most protracted instance of presidential 
disability which has yet occurred in our history: the tragic 
illness of President Woodrow Wilson, with its incalculable 
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consequences not only for our country but for nations all 
over the globe. 
2. THE "MRS. WILSON REGENCY" 
A conflict between a President and a Vice President can 
have its amusing aspects-until the President falls ill. The 
breach between Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Riley Mar-
shall was unlike that between Garfield and Arthur in that 
no overt or active hostility was involved. Marshall always 
felt kindly toward the President, although he didn't like 
some of his policies; Wilson superficially reciprocated Mar-
shall's good will, but thought him "a small caliber man," 
more of a court jester than a potential successor. 
The few accounts concerning the choice of Marshall as 
Wilson's running mate in 1912 have one point in common: 
they all agree that Marshall was second choice, the first be-
ing Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama, who declined. Albert 
S. Burleson, one of Wilson's managers, relates that after 
Wilson's nomination, he called him at his summer home in 
Seagirt, New Jersey, to report that the convention was "lean-
ing toward Marshall" for the Vice Presidency. "But he is a 
very small-caliber man," Wilson said. According to William 
G. McAdoo, later Wilson's son-in-law as well as his Secre-
tary of the Treasury, it was he who suggested Marshall to 
Wilson, and Wilson said that Marshall would "be accept-
able." However, a third version-that of William F. Mc-
Combs, Wilson's floor manager at the convention-is given 
as the correct one in a recent authoritative study of the Vice 
Presidency.s According to this account, McCombs tele-
phoned Wilson that the three top candidates were Governor 
Burke of North Dakota, Mayor Preston of Baltimore, and 
Governor Marshall of Indiana. Wilson left it up to Mc-
combs, who decided on Marshall. McCombs then convened 
eleven leading Wilson supporters, including Burleson, Mc-
Adoo, and A. Mitchell Palmer, the future Attorney General. 
Palmer's name was mentioned for the office, but he was a 
Pennsylvanian and McCombs objected that he would not 
draw needed votes from the Middle West and the Far West. 
When he realized that the group would back Palmer any-
way, McCombs quickly announced that it wouldn't be fit-
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ting for a mere eleven men to choose the Vice President. He 
took the battle to the convention floor and Marshall was 
unanimously nominated. 
All three accounts make it clear that the selection of 
Marshall was not welcomed with much enthusiasm by Wil-
son. But the Vice Presidency was the price of Marshall's 
support,9 and Wilson's remarks while in office show that he 
regarded Marshall as a necessary evil, harmless if humored. 
When Wilson was up for his second term in 1916, a 
"Dump Marshall" movement got under way. McAdoo and 
Henry Morgenthau felt that the Vice President had not 
made the most of his opportunities as Presiding Officer of 
the Senate: in their opinion he should have used his power 
to force passage of the administration's program. But Mar-
shall was an experienced and skilful politician. Although 
his omission of whip-cracking tactics in the Senate may have 
displeased the more partisan Democrats, he nonetheless had 
managed to maneuver the President into a position that 
would have made it extremely embarrassing to drop him 
from the ticket. "The pleasure of being associated with 
you," Wilson wrote Marshall at the end of the 1914 session, 
"grows as the months pass." And the "Dump Marshall" 
movement notwithstanding, Wilson's pleasure was to have a 
chance to grow some more. In the 1916 election Indiana was 
a key state, and this insured Marshall's renomination. 
When John Tyler made his decision to take over the 
Presidency, the dispute with England over the Oregon bor-
der dominated our foreign policy. By the time Woodrow 
Wilson had completed half of his second term in office, he, 
as President of the United States, had played a major role 
in determining the boundaries of nearly every European 
nation. America was not only a world power but a world 
leader. The forty-eight states had a population of more than 
a hundred million; overseas we had become the guardians 
of Filipinos, Samoans, Hawaiians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans. 
The increase in presidential responsibility from Tyler's time 
to Wilson's can be suggested, though very inadequately, by 
comparing the office space used by each. Two or three rooms 
on the second floor of the White House sufficed for Tyler; 
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Wilson's executive offices occupied the entire West Wing, 
which had been constructed during Theodore Roosevelt's 
administration. 
The natural corollary of increased responsibility was 
increased strain on the incumbent. Wilson's health was 
good during his first term: he paced himself well, having 
his meals on time, taking short naps, and getting close to 
eight h<;mrs of sleep at night. After the outbreak of the First 
World War in August, 1914, the President gradually altered 
his daily routine to allow more time on the job. As the 
pressure mounted he became increasingly irritable, and by 
December, 1918, when he sailed to Europe to attend the 
peace conference, he was suffering from a recurrence of the 
nervous stomach that had troubled him in law school. 
In Europe the American President was treated like a 
Messiah-his pathway from the English Channel to Charing 
Cross was strewn with roses; in Italy candles were lighted 
in front of his picture. He carried this burden of adoration, 
this awareness that millions of people looked on him as 
their champion, to the "Big Four" conference table, where 
he was subjected to the wily diplomatic in-fighting and rab-
bit punches of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando, 
practical men who had little use for the starry-eyed idealism 
of the man from the New World. 
It was at the Paris Conference that the terrible pressures 
and responsibilities overwhelmed the President. He col-
lapsed completely, and was confined to his bed with what 
was described as a severe case of influenza. That the strain 
had told in other, more disturbing, ways was evident to 
members of his entourage. 
Even while lying in bed he manifested peculiarities, one of 
which was to limit the use of all the automobiles to strictly 
official purposes, when previously he had been so liberal in 
his suggestions that his immediate party should have the 
benefit of this possible diversion, in view of the long hours 
we were working. When he got back on the job, his peculiar 
ideas were even more pronounced. He now became more 
obsessed with the idea that every French employee about 
the place was a spy for the French Government. Nothing we 
could say would disabuse his mind of this thought. He in-
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sisted they all understood English, when, as a matter of 
fact, there was just one of them among the two dozen or 
more who understood a single word of English. About this 
time he also acquired the peculiar notion that he was per-
sonally responsible for all the property in the furnished 
palace he was occupying. He raised quite a fuss on two occa-
sions when he noticed articles of furniture had been re-
moved. Upon investigation-for no one else noticed the 
change-it was learned that the custodian of the property 
for the French owner had seen fit to do a little re-arranging. 
Coming from the President, whom we all knew so well, 
these were very funny things, and we could but surmise that 
something queer was happening in his mind.10 
Americans are often shocked at the idea that some of 
our Presidents have exhibited the neurotic symptoms we 
associate with unstable personality, or have suffered so-
called nervous breakdowns. John Adams, for example, had 
such a suspicious disposition that it would be diagnosed as 
a persecution complex if he lived today. There is no doubt 
that his inordinate distrust of people affected his judgment 
at times, particularly in connection with this country's rela-
tions with England. Abraham Lincoln was in such an acute 
depressive state after the death of Ann Rutledge that his 
friends stayed constantly by his side lest he take his own life. 
Later on, during his term of office, tension manifested itself 
in migraine headaches of such severity that his eyeball on 
the affected side would turn back into his head. In short, 
we need to remember that our President, whoever he may 
be, is a human being, and that the office does not carry with 
it immunity from the ills, physical and mental, to which 
mortals are subject. 
President Wilson was still recuperating from the effects 
of his illness in Paris when he returned home in July, 1919, 
to face Senate opposition to American participation in the 
League of Nations. Wilson was in no condition to do battle, 
but he decided to make a trip out West to arouse public 
sentiment in support of the League. According to Joseph P. 
Tumulty, the President's private secretary: 
Admiral Grayson, the President's physician and consist-
ent friend, who knew his condition and the various physical 
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crises through which he had passed here and on the other 
side, from some of which he had not yet recovered, stood 
firm in his resolve that the President should not go West, 
even intimating to me that the President's life might pay 
the forfeit if his advice were disregarded. Indeed, it needed 
not the trained eye of a physician to see that the man whom 
the senators were now advising to make a "swing around the 
circle" was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. More than 
once since his return from the Peace Conference I had urged 
him to take needed rest; to get away from the turmoil of 
Washington and recuperate; but he spurned this advice and 
resolved to go through to the end.11 
After a speech at Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25, 
1919, the President again collapsed and was brought back 
to Washington. The nature of his illness has been charac-
terized variously as a "nervous collapse" and a "stroke."12 
We have it on the authority of former President Herbert 
Hoover that some of the facts of Wilson's illness were sup-
pressed.18 At any rate, whatever the cause, the President was 
incapacitated and was kept in seclusion at the White House. 
On October 2, 1919, a cerebral thrombosis partially para-
lyzed Wilson's left side. Apparently on rising he had gone 
into the bathroom and was stricken there. Mrs. Wilson 
dragged him to his bed and called for Dr. Grayson. Ike 
Hoover, Chief White House Usher, who was in and out of 
the sickroom several times, has described his condition: 
He just lay helpless. True, he had been taking nourish· 
ment, but the work the doctors had been doing on him had 
just about sapped his remaining vitality. All his natural 
functions had to be artificially assisted and he appeared just 
as helpless as one could possibly be and live.14 
For almost a week the President's life hung in the bal-
ance. Then he began a slow recovery. When spring came, 
he was taken for occasional rides in the country, but was 
so debilitated that, as Ike Hoover notes, he had to sit in the 
front seat of the car, where he could be propped up. If 
placed in the back, "he would slide down and topple over 
as the car rolled along." 
As a result of the President's illness our country passed 
through a period which has been called by some "The Mrs. 
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Wilson Regency." Why it should be so described will be 
apparent from the following account written by Edith 
Bolling Wilson herself: 
Once my husband was out of immediate danger, the burn-
ing question was how Mr. Wilson might best serve the 
country, preserve his own life and if possible recover. Many 
people, among them some I had counted as friends, have 
written of my overwhelming ambition to act as President; 
of my exclusion of all advice, and so forth. I am trying here 
to write as though I had taken the oath to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth-so help me God. 
I asked the doctors to be frank with me; that I must 
know what the outcome would probably be, so as to be 
honest with the people. They all said that as the brain was 
as clear as ever, with the progress made in the last few days, 
there was every reason to think recovery possible .... But 
recovery could not be hoped for, they said, unless the Presi-
dent were released from every disturbing problem during 
these days of Nature's effort to repair the damage done. 
"How can that be," I asked the doctors, "when every-
thing that comes to an Executive is a problem? How can I 
protect him from problems when the country looks to the 
President as the leader?" 
Dr. Dercum• leaned towards me and said: "Madam, it 
is a grave situation, but I think you can solve it. Have every· 
thing come to you; weigh the importance of each matter, 
and see if it is possible by consultations with the respective 
heads of the Departments to solve them without the guid-
ance of your husband. In this way you can save him a great 
deal. But always keep in mind that every time you take him 
a new anxiety or problem to excite him, you are turning a 
knife in an open wound. His nerves are crying out for rest, 
and any excitement is torture to him." 
"Then," I said, "had he better not resign, let Mr. Mar-
shall succeed to the Presidency, and he himself get that com-
plete rest that is so vital to his life?" 
"No," the Doctor said, "not if you feel equal to what I 
•Who's Who for 1910-11 lists Francis Xavier Dercum: "Neurologist 
to Philadelphia Hospital since 1887; consulting physician Asylum for 
the Chronic Insane, Wernersville, Pa., since 1895; instructor nervous 
and mental diseases, Uni. of Pa., 1885-92; Editor, Textbook on Nervous 
Diseases by various authors" (Author's note). 
PRACTICAL POLITICS 35 
suggested. For Mr. Wilson to resign would have a bad effect 
on the country, and a serious effect on our patient. He has 
staked his life and made his promise to the world to do all 
in his power to get the Treaty ratified and make the League 
of Nations complete. If he resigns, the greatest incentive to 
recovery is gone; and as his mind is clear as crystal he can 
still do more with even a maimed body than any one else. 
He has the utmost confidence in you. Dr. Grayson tells me 
he has always discussed public affairs with you; so you will 
not come to them uninformed." 
So began my stewardship. I studied every paper sent 
from the different Secretaries or Senators, and tried to digest 
and present in tabloid form the things that, despite my vigi-
lance, had to go to the President. I, myself, never made a 
single decision regarding the disposition of public affairs. 
The only decision that was mine was what was important 
and what was not, and the very important decision of when 
to present matters to my husband .... 
These instructions from the medical men were far from 
easy to carry out .... Upon all sides I was literally besieged 
by those who "must" see the President. But I carried out 
the directions of the doctors-and my heart was in it. 
Woodrow Wilson was first my beloved husband whose life 
I was trying to save, •.. after that he was the President of 
the United States.iii 
Or, to put it less winsomely: My husband first; what hap-
pened to the country was a secondary consideration. 
Wilson's collapse on his Western trip was, of course, 
widely reported, but there was a complete news blackout 
after his return to the White House on Sunday, September 
28. Vice President Marshall, close to tears, called in person 
to inquire about the President's condition, but was told 
nothing. David F. Houston, who served nearly eight years 
in Wilson's Cabinet as Secretary of Agriculture and briefly, 
in 1920, as Secretary of the Treasury, wrote that "there was 
nothing to go on except rumors. There was no direct or 
authoritative word even to members of Cabinet from the 
White House or from the physicians .... We canvassed the 
matter among ourselves but none of us could furnish any 
light." 
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On Saturday, October 4, Houston saw Wilson's private 
secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, at the Shoreham. 
He gave me the first direct word I had had concerning the 
President. He said that the President was paralyzed in one 
leg and one arm. He expressed grave alarm over the sit-
uation .... 
Sunday I happened to lunch at the Shoreham. I saw the 
Vice President and Mrs. Marshall sitting at one of the ta-
bles .... The Vice President was evidently much disturbed 
and expressed regret that he was being kept in the dark 
about the President's condition. He asked me if I could give 
the real facts, which I was unable to do. I could not even 
repeat what had been told me, because it had been said in 
confidence. The Vice President expressed the view that he 
ought to be immediately informed; that it would be a 
tragedy for him to assume the duties of President, at best; 
and that it would be equally a tragedy for the people; that 
he knew many men who knew more about the government 
than he did; and that it would be especially trying for him 
if he had to assume the duties without warning ... . 1a 
On Friday, October 3, Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
called a Cabinet meeting for the following Monday. "The 
summoning ... was the outgrowth of an apprehension, in 
circles very close to the President, that unless there was evi-
dence that the Executive was functioning, Congress might 
insist upon investigating the President's condition and per-
haps upon installing Vice President Marshall in his place. 
The call for the meeting was issued only after Mr. Lansing 
had conferred with Secretaries Baker [War] and Lane [In-
terior]."17 
According to Houston: 
When we met, Lansing said that it was necessary to decide 
whether or not we should continue to carry on the govern-
ment-that there was nothing to guide us as to who would 
decide the question of the ability of the President to dis-
charge the duties of his office. 
After the Secretary of State had outlined the situation, 
someone suggested that, if it was necessary to take the mat-
ter up at all, we should do so only after we had secured 
direct information as to the President's condition and that 
we should first consult the President's physician. It was de-
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cided to ask Doctor Grayson to meet us and to tell us every-
thing he could. While we were waiting we talked informally 
about the legal situation. There were no pressing matters 
requiring the President's decision and signature, and, there-
fore, there was no need for haste. Garfield was incapacitated 
from July 2d to September 19th, and no action was taken. 
Doctor Grayson and Mr. Tumulty soon came into the 
Cabinet room. Doctor Grayson stated that the President's 
condition had improved over Sunday, but that he could not 
say when he would be out of danger-that the scales might 
tip either way. He added that they might tip the wrong way 
especially if he was harassed by business matters, and that 
he should be bothered as little as possible. He told us that 
he was suffering from a nervous breakdown, from indiges-
tion and a depleted nervous system .... 
The words "stroke," "apoplexy," or "cerebral hemor-
rhage" had not been spoken by Dr. Grayson, and he was 
asked if he could tell the Cabinet more exactly what was 
the trouble. 
He replied that he could add nothing to what he had al-
ready said. He added with a sort of twinkle in his eye: "The 
President asked me what the Cabinet wanted with me and 
by what authority it was meeting in Washington without a 
call from him." He said that the President showed no little 
irritation when he heard that we were holding a Cabinet 
meeting. 
After some further discussion of the matter, the Secre-
tary of State asked Doctor Grayson to tell the President that 
we met primarily to express our interest in his condition, to 
get information about him, to extend our sympathy, and to 
consider such departmental matters as needed attention, as 
there had been no Cabinet meeting for a month. 
This seemed to me an inadequate statement. It looked as 
if the Secretary of State for some reason had changed his 
mind as to the purpose of the meeting since the members 
had begun to gather. If he had called the meeting at a 
regular time it might have been sufficient and reasonable 
for him to say that we had held Cabinet meetings at the 
request of the President during his absence, that we had 
held no meeting for a month and that, since he was ill, it 
seemed not inappropriate or in any way at variance with his 
views that we should meet. Our meeting at the regular time 
38 THE YEAR WE HAD N 0 PRESIDENT 
would have been reassuring to the public, properly creating 
the picture in their mind that the government was going 
ahead. But the message the Secretary sent was hardly a satis-
factory explanation for our meeting at an unusual time.18 
Lansing's failure to take a stand was not solely because 
of the Cabinet's obvious reluctance to go into the inability 
question, or because of Grayson's incomplete and toned-
down report. Probably a more important factor was a pri-
vate conversation between Lansing and Tumulty on the 
preceding Friday-the day that Lansing had decided to call 
the Cabinet meeting. There are two versions-Tumulty's 
and Lansing's-about what passed between them. According 
to Tumulty: 
[Lansing] informed me that he had called diplomatically 
to suggest that in view of the incapacity of the President, we 
should arrange to call in the Vice-President to act in his 
stead as soon as possible .... 
Lansing then read Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the 
Constitution from a book which he had brought from the 
State Department, and Tumulty 
coldly turned and said: "Mr. Lansing, the Constitution is 
not a dead letter in the White House. I have read the Con-
stitution and do not find myself in need of any tutoring at 
your hands on the provision you have just read .... You 
may rest assured that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the 
White House on the broad of his back, I will not be a party 
to ousting him." 
At that point, according to Tumulty, Grayson came in and 
"left no doubt in Mr. Lansing's mind that he would not do 
as Mr. Lansing suggested." Tumulty added that if anyone 
outside the White House circle attempted to certify to the 
President's disability, Grayson and he would "stand together 
and repudiate it."19 
Lansing's version is given in Josephus Daniels' Life of 
Woodrow Wilson: 
[Tumulty] told me that on Wednesday, October I, the 
President had become much wone. I asked him in what 
way. He did not answer me in words, but significantly put 
his right hand to his left shoulder and drew it along his left 
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side. Of course, the implication was that the President had 
suffered a stroke and that his left side was paralyzed. 
Lansing confirms that Grayson came in, but 
was extremely reticent as to the President's malady, giving 
no indication of any trouble other than a nervous break-
down. We decided that the Cabinet ought to meet and 
confer about the matter.20 
It would be interesting to know where Tumulty got the 
idea that to determine the President was disabled would 
amount to ousting him. Was it from the Tyler precedent? 
The decision of the Garfield Cabinet? He mentions neither 
in his book. More likely the notion was Wilson's, not Tu-
multy's. The President was familiar with the history of the 
succession. As early as 1885, four years after Garfield's death, 
Wilson wrote that the importance of a Vice President came 
from the fact that "he may cease to be" Vice President.21 
It was a conviction that he reaffirmed as soon as he recov-
ered: "When Lansing sought to oust me, I was upon my 
back. I am on my feet now and I will not have disloyalty 
about me."22 
On February 10, 1920, Lansing told the Cabinet that the 
President had written to say he objected to Cabinet meet-
ings being called except at his personal summons, and they 
were not to meet again unless Wilson personally convened 
them. Since October 6, 1919, they had met twenty-one times, 
and had sent Wilson memoranda of important discussions 
or decisions, but he had never indicated that he disapproved 
of the meetings. The President also taxed Lansing with 
having called the heads of executive departments into con-
ference-and this, Wilson said, was an act none but the 
President had constitutional authority to perform. Lansing 
replied that he had met with department heads in regard to 
matters which could not be postponed until the President's 
recovery. He denied all thought of acting unconstitutionally 
or of assuming powers which belonged only to the Presi-
dent. On February 11, the President wrote characterizing 
Lansing's calling the Cabinet meetings as "an assumption 
of Presidantial authority," and indicated that it was his 
pleasure that the Secretary of State resign. Lansing did so 
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"with a sense of profound relief."23 "Editorial comment and 
interviews with members of Congress show that Congress 
and the press supported Lansing almost unanimously."24 
Although the President had by now recovered some of 
his power of decision and action, "he showed marked emo-
tional instability, which made rational cooperation with his 
staff and his Cabinet almost impossible. After awhile, one 
after the other of his aides and Cabinet members could no 
longer take their chief's emotional outbursts and deserted 
him."25 
And what were the Vice President's feelings as week 
after week went by with the country leaderless and uneasy 
with rumors? We know from Marshall's Recollections that 
Those were not pleasant months for me. The standing 
joke of the country is that the only business of the vice-
president is to ring the '-\!bite House bell every morning 
and ask what is the state of health of the president. If there 
were a soul so lost to humanity as to have desired his death, 
I was not that soul. I hoped that he might acquire his 
wonted health. I was afraid to ask about it, for fear some 
censorious soul would accuse me of a longing for his place. 
I have never wanted his shoes. Peace, friendship and good 
will have ever been more to me than place or pomp or 
power.2<l 
(To this catalog, the Vice President might fittingly have 
added that "good five-cent cigar" he declared the country 
was in need of-a remark which is likely to remain his sole 
bulwark against oblivion.) The "censorious soul" Marshall 
refers to could very well have been Tumulty, whose per-
sonal loyalty to the President obscured everything else. 
Tumulty and others of the White House circle, instead of 
looking to Marshall to lighten '"1ilson's burden, felt increas-
ing antagonism toward him.27 
So the government limped along, barely functioning for 
a year and a half. When Wilson finally did meet with the 
Cabinet, others took the initiative; his mind wandered and 
Mrs. ·Wilson stood by to call a halt when the President 
tired.28 While the exact degree of Wilson's disability cannot 
be positively stated, 
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There can be no doubt concerning [his] inability to per-
form the duties of his office during much of the time after 
his collapse on September 25, 1919 .. . . During the special 
session of the Sixty-sixth Congress twenty-eight acts of Con-
gress became law because of the President's failure to pass 
on them within the requisite ten days. He did veto the 
Prohibition Enforcement Act on October 27, but from 
October 28 to November 18 he passed on only one of six-
teen acts presented to him. He did not meet his Cabinet for 
eight months during his illness. The Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations was unable to get action or information 
on the Shantung Settlement, a situation which caused Sena-
tor Albert B. Fall to suggest that if the President was too ill 
to discharge these duties, the Senate ought to recess until 
he was able to resume the responsibilities of his office. Al-
though the Constitution says that the President shall receive 
the representatives of foreign states, ... the British ambassa-
dor spent four months in Washington without seeing the 
President even once .... 
Nearly every student of the period, whether scholar, 
Cabinet member, or journalist agrees that public business 
in general, and the Versailles Treaty in particular, was af. 
fected by the President's illness. In November of 1919 Sena-
tor Gilbert M. Hitchcock, the Democratic leader in the 
Senate, believed that he could get the Republicans to com-
promise on the treaty. But Wilson's physicians would not 
allow him to see the President .... Many feel that Wilson's 
isolation from public opinion, from his advisors, and from 
congressional leaders was one of the principal causes for 
defeat of the treaty.211 
Mrs. Wilson. and Dr. Grayson effectively protected the 
President from any problems which might cause anxiety; he 
lived out his term and achieved some measure of recovery. 
But there can be no doubt either that the national interest 
suffered or that the President's wife and his physician "did 
determine many questions of public policy ... by deciding 
whom the President might and might not see, by deciding 
how long he might converse with those whom he was per-
mitted to see, and by deciding what papers should be pre-
sented to him and what should not:•ao 
Wilson accepted the loss of prestige and the failure of 
his dearest hopes with great dignity. His term of office ended 
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on March 4, 1921, and he lived in retirement until his death 
on March 3, 1924. 
3. TEMPORARY INABILITY AND THE 
TYLER PRECEDENT 
The power vacuums during the illnesses of Garfield and 
Wilson were not primarily caused by the Tyler precedent. 
It was an element, certainly, in barring Arthur and Mar-
shall from temporarily exercising the presidential powers 
and duties, but more than that it was a convenient smoke 
screen. After all, the Cabinet could scarcely be expected to 
announce that such-and-such steps were taken (or not taken) 
because the Vice President belonged to the wrong faction of 
the party, or because the President thought the Vice Presi-
dent was an intellectual nonentity, or because the two men 
disliked each other. And these were the true reasons for the 
Cabinet decisions in both the Garfield and Wilson cases. In 
both cases the governing conditions were the same: (1) a 
supposed threat to the President's program and thus to the 
political lives of the Cabinet members and (2) a conflict of 
personalities between the President and the Vice President. 
One condition resulted from the other; neither sprang full-
fledged into being the instant the President was incapaci-
tated. They had been latent for a long period of time, and 
the President's illness only brought them out into the open. 
Wilson was incapacitated much longer than Garfield, 
and the question of presidential disability was considered 
by all three branches of government. Political motives were 
a deterrent to action by Congress. The Democrats, not wish-
ing to publicize the President's illness any more than they 
had to, took no steps to secure the installation of Marshall 
as President; the Republicans saw the President's inability 
as an embarrassment to the Democrats and hoped for some 
scandalous disclosure-for example, that someone was forg-
ing Wilson's signature (which was rumored at one time). In 
any case, it was uncertain if Congress had the constitutional 
power to declare the President disabled. 
There were other possible remedies. Vice President Mar-
shall, upon whom presidential power devolved, might have 
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undertaken to exercise this power and thereby have indi-
rectly determined that Wilson was disabled. But Marshall 
refused to act as President. Some thought a writ of manda-
mus directing him to act as President was the answer. Al-
though [a story appeared] in the Christian Science Monitor 
saying that the Supreme Court was ready and willing to 
issue such a writ, it is difficult to believe that the Court ever 
contemplated this. For the Supreme Court does not have 
original jurisdiction in such cases; and it is at least doubtful 
whether the question of inability is justiciable. The matter 
of Wilson's inability was actually brought up in courts once, 
but the courts did not take cognizance of it.Bl 
Since the legislative branch, the judiciary, and the Vice 
President either would not or could not pass on the Presi-
dent's inability, that left the first step up to the Cabinet or 
the White House. The reasons for inaction already have 
been discussed in detail. In summary, usage had established 
the Tyler precedent, which transforms a Vice President into 
a President when the powers and duties of the higher office 
devolve upon him. But if the President were not dead but 
temporarily disabled when the powers and duties passed to 
the substitute President, then "either there must be two 
Presidents at once or the elected incumbent must be dis-
placed. Since it is agre«d that there cannot be another 
President until an elected President dies, resigns, or is 
removed, a disabled President's friends naturally have op-
posed any move to bring about the Vice President's suc-
cession."82 
Henry E. Davis' discussion of this dilemma was written 
during Garfield's illness: it appeared in the Congressional 
Record while Wilson was incapacitated. Davis reviewed the 
wording of the original resolutions of the 1787 Constitu-
tional Convention and the final draft which the delegates 
approved. In both cases, situations causing vacancy in office 
-death, resignation, removal from office (following im-
peachment), and inability-are grouped together. The first 
three are irreversible conditions: a President who is dead, or 
who has resigned, or who has been removed by impeachment 
obviously cannot resume office. Inability, on the other hand, 
is not necessarily permanent: a sick President may recover. 
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As the clause is worded, however, there is no apparent dis-
tinction between permanent and temporary inability. The 
status of the Vice President would seem to be the same 
whether the vacancy in the President's office is caused by 
death, resignation, removal by impeachment, or illness. 
As Davis points out, this leaves unresolved the following 
questions: 
What is inability in the sense of the provision; and what 
is its effect as to the Executive and the executive duties? 
Each of these questions includes another: Who shall decide 
when the inability occurs, whether it is continuing at a 
given date, when it has ceased? And, in case of inability of 
the President, does the Vice President become President or 
merely acting President for the time being? And at the 
termination of the inability shall the President and the 
Vice President resume their normal functions?SS 
That these questions exist is no reflection on the work of 
the framers of the Constitution. As Davis has demonstrated, 
the delegates were justified in thinking the inability pro-
vision "self-explanatory, self-operative, and sufficient."34 But 
because it has repeatedly been construed on the basis of 
language alone, and without regard to the intent of the 
Constitutional Convention, there have been serious lapses 
in executive power, and the Tyler precedent "must today 
be regarded as having become the law of the land for those 
instances in which the President, through death, resigna-
tion, removal, or other cause, has disappeared from the 
scene."81! 
One of the most fascinating tricks of time-abetted by 
chauvinistic historians-is the way in which it magnifies the 
qualities of a nation's founding fathers. This is shown in 
the tendency to regard the men who drafted the Constitu-
tion as omniscient, and the Constitution itself as an in-
violable body of sacred writings. But the delegates to the 
Federal Convention were under no such illusions. They 
knew that they were fallible human beings, not all-seeing 
gods, and they worked hard to make the Constitution flex-
ible. "Interstate and foreign commerce," for example, is a 
concept broad enough to be applied to jet transportation 
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as well as travel by barge and clipper. But it was impossible 
to anticipate the radical changes the years would bring, and 
the drafters of the Constitution looked to their descendants 
to adapt the basic instrument to new situations and new 
conditions. Had they intended otherwise, no means of 
amendment would have been provided. 
Veneration for the Constitution which blindly ignores 
this fact, or which consists of worshiping the word and ig-
noring the intent, is at best a poor compliment to our fore-
fathers; and it becomes the reverse of a virtue when it is 
made the excuse for avoiding responsible action. When the 
Garfield and Wilson Cabinets were confronted with the 
problem of temporary presidential inability, they refused to 
consider adapting the constitutional provision to meet an 
emergency for which it supplied no specific directive. Lack-
ing the moral stamina and the intellectual stature to with-
stand political pressure and to look beyond the exigencies 
of the moment, they gratefully reverted to the Tyler prece-
dent-a ready-made alibi for inaction. 
Chapter •v 
Mr. President, How Is Your Health? 
An aspect of presidential inability highlighted during 
President Wilson's illness concerns the importance of trust-
worthy information about the Chief Executive's health. 
The atmosphere of secrecy that enveloped the White House 
during the "Mrs. Wilson Regency" was responsible for 
swarms of dark rumors about the nature of the President's 
illness. Radio, television, and the keyhole columnist had 
not yet come into being, but even so the stories reached 
every comer of the country. "The less the public knew, the 
more gossip was invented. It was whispered that the Presi-
dent had a venereal disease, even that he was insane. The 
rumor in medical circles was that Wilson's left knee had 
been deformed by Charcot's disease, a consequence of loco-
motor ataxia."•1 At the very least, such stories are an em-
barrassment to the administration, impair national morale, 
and lend aid and comfort to our enemies. 
I. PRESIDENT CLEVELAND HAS A TOOTH OUT 
In attempts to justify withholding information about 
the President's health, it is customary to cite the case of 
President Grover Cleveland. Soon after he was inaugurated 
in 1893, the country was gripped by a major financial panic. 
The gold reserve had dropped below a hundred million 
dollars, national and state banks were failing, and on June 
27 the bottom fell out of the stock market. It was thought-
and written-that "Mr. Cleveland is about all that stands 
between this country and absolute disaster." On June 30, 
as part of his major strategy in fighting inflation, the Presi-
dent summoned an extra session of Congress to convene on 
August 7, at which time he would request the repeal of the 
Sherman Silver Act. 
•Locomotor ataxia is a chronic disease of the nervous system, which 
often results from syphilis. 
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At this moment, when the curtain was about to rise 
upon a battle royal in Congress, there occurred one of the 
dramatic minor episodes of American history. The whole 
strength of the assault upon the Sherman silver-purchase 
clauses lay, as everyone realized, in the grim determination 
of Cleveland's purpose. His weight of character could force 
enough members of his party into line, and nothing else 
could. Even temporary incapacitation might be fatal to his 
aims, while if any accident suddenly removed him from the 
scene, all would be lost; for the Vice President, Adlai E. 
Stevenson, would infallibly bring the nation to the silver 
standard. [Stevenson had secured the vice presidential nomi-
nation as a sop to the silverites.] An unhappier time for the 
development of a dangerous malady was hardly conceivable. 
Yet on May 5 Cleveland discovered a rough spot on the roof 
of his mouth. It gave him increasing discomfort, and on 
June 18 he had it examined by the White House physician, 
Dr. O'Reilly. The latter found a malignant growth as large 
as a quarter of a dollar .... An immediate operation was 
imperative. Yet it had to be kept a complete secret, for the 
knowledge that Cleveland's life was in danger would have 
precipitated a new and fat greater panic. The most urgent 
work on the President's desk was hastily dispatched. Dr. 
Uoseph D.] Bryant took complete charge of the case, writ-
ing [Secretary of War Daniel S.] Lamont that he could not 
assume the responsibility for any delay until even August 
lst if the growth progressed as it commonly did in such 
cases.2 
On the evening of June 30, the same day that he issued 
his call to Congress, President Cleveland boarded Commo-
dore E. C. Benedict's yacht Oneida, anchored in New York's 
East River. The crew had been told that he was to have two 
teeth extracted, and an operating room had been prepared 
in the below-deck salon. Here, on July I, while the yacht 
cruised slowly in Long Island Sound, the President under-
went surgery to remove a cancerous growth from his jaw. 
The entire operation was done from within the mouth, so 
as to leave no external scar. All went well and on July 5 the 
President went to his summer home to recuperate. But it 
was feared that not all the cancerous tissue had been re-
moved. A second operation was necessary; it took place on 
July 17, also on board the Oneida. Equipped with an arti-
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ficial jaw, the President kept his date with Congress on 
August 7. The story did not become public knowledge for 
more than twenty years.a 
It is hard to quarrel with success, yet even though the 
gamble came off this is not to say that it was the wisest 
course. If the President had failed to survive the operation, 
his death in such melodramatic, cloak-and-daggerish circum-
stances-aboard the yacht of a plutacrat-would have been 
far more demoralizing to the nation than if the public had 
been kept informed. It should be noted, moreover, that 
neither the Vice President nor any member of the Cabinet 
except Lamont knew anything of the real situation, let 
alone being provided with the briefing necessary to insure 
the continuation of orderly processes of government.• 
In fairness to Cleveland, however, it must be remem-
bered that in 1893 news coverage of the President was not 
nearly so intensive as it has since become. In our day Wash-
ington is teeming with people who are concerned, directly 
or indirectly, with collecting and disseminating the news. 
As well as accredited reporters for newspapers, magazines, 
radio and television networks, and other communications 
media, there is a whole host of subcategories-publicity men, 
professional tipsters, lobbyists, and representatives of pri-
vate business and of special interest groups. In addition, 
there is the large segment of the capital's population (at a 
rough estimate, just about everybody) who wish to appear 
"in the know" for prestige reasons and who can repeat or 
even invent a story without any fear that they will be held 
to account for it. 
The lives of people in high places always are a subject 
of gossip and speculation, and usually the speed with which 
•"I can't recall precisely any conversations bearing on ... the rela-
tions of Grandfather and Grover Cleveland at the time of the latter's 
operation .... Relations with Cleveland and his family were always 
very cordial and friendly, and, I had assumed, intimate .... But I can 
recall nothing specific about any briefing at the time of Cleveland's 
operation. Indeed, I was rather under the impression that no one knew 
about it, including most of his cabinet" (Adlai E. Stevenson to Richard 
H. Hansen, April 26, 1962. See also Nevins, Grover Cleveland, pp. 5!12-
5!1!1, and Nevins [ed.], The Letters of Grover Cleveland, p. !170). 
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rumors about them spread is in direct ratio to the sensa-
tional or scurrile character of their content. In respect to 
the President's activities, and particularly his health, the 
least suggestion of a mystery-any hint that not all the cards 
are on the table, that news is being withheld-becomes a 
cue for rumor-mongers to swing into action. The death of 
President Wilson's successor, Warren G. Harding, is a case 
in point. 
2. "THE STRANGE DEATH OF 
PRESIDENT HARDING" 
By the summer of 1923, the third of President Harding's 
administration, it was becoming uncomfortably apparent 
that the highest office in the land had been bestowed on a 
man wholly unqualified to hold it. The exposure of the 
venality and corrupt practices of a cluster of Harding's free-
wheeling associates already had begun, and details of the 
President's private life-his speculations on the stock mar-
ket, his gambling and drinking, rumors of a mistress and an 
illegitimate daughter-were openly circulated in many quar-
ters. But it was not generally known that the President's 
health had been poor for more than a year. Except when he 
was flat on his back, the President was always represented 
to the public as the picture of health.4 
In January of 1922, Harding had been seriously ill with 
what was diagnosed as influenza, but probably was an un-
recognized attack of coronary thrombosis. Dr. Emmanuel 
Libmann, the famed heart specialist and diagnostician, met 
the President at a dinner party in the fall of that year; he 
subsequently told a friend that in his opinion the President 
was "suffering from a disease of the coronary arteries of the 
heart and would be dead in six months." Actually, it was 
eight. 
On June 20, 1923, the President and Mrs. Harding left 
for a trip to Alaska. On July 28, while in Seattle on their 
return trip to Washington, the President had a severe seiz-
ure which was diagnosed as cardiac by Commander Joel T. 
Boone of the Navy Medical Corps, one of the three doctors 
in the President's entourage. However, Dr. Boone was out-
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ranked by Brigadier General Charles T. Sawyer, Surgeon 
General of the United States and a personal friend of the 
President's. Sawyer diagnosed the illness as an "acute gastro-
intestinal attack," probably caused by "crabmeat-copper pto-
maine poisoning," and this is what the official bulletin said, 
although as it happened the President had not eaten any 
crabmeat. 
In view of this diagnosis, the President was permitted to 
get up and no strict bed rest was enforced. Three days later 
in San Francisco he had another seizure. Two more physi-
cians were called in, and the diagnosis was now broncho-
pneumonia and circulatory collapse. At last, bed rest was 
made mandatory. 
On August 2, all perceptible symptoms of the sickness 
seemed to have disappeared. The President was in better 
spirits than he had been for a long time, and at 4:30 P.M. 
the doctors gave out an optimistic bulletin. At 7:30 P.M., 
while Mrs. Harding was reading to the President, a "con-
vulsive tremor" passed over his face, his body shuddered 
and sagged, and he was dead. 
The official bulletin, signed by the physicians in attend-
ance, stated that "we all believe he died from apoplexy or 
the rupture of a blood vessel in the axis of the brain near 
the respiratory center." However, the medical evidence in-
dicated coronary thrombosis as the probable cause of death, 
although this cannot be stated with certainty, since Mrs. 
Harding refused to permit an autopsy. 
Suicide and venereal disease figured in the word-of-
mouth "inside stories" that flooded the country immedi-
ately after the President's death. Mrs. Harding's refusal to 
permit an autopsy and the bewildering variety of diagnoses 
which figured in the official bulletins-hypertension, angina 
pectoris, acute gastrointestinal attack, crabmeat-copper poi-
soning, gall bladder disease, pneumonia, circulatory col-
lapse, apoplexy-undoubtedly encouraged speculation and 
abetted the spread of rumors. Other contributing factors 
were the suddenness of the President's death and the image-
makers' projection of him to the public as a man bursting 
with health. 
The most despicable of the stories about the President's 
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death-that he had been poisoned by his wife-appeared in 
The Strange Death of President Harding, by Gaston B. 
Means, a former Department of Justice employee who had 
been forced to resign his job because of his involvement in 
some of the many government scandals of the ill-fated Hard-
ing administration.11 Eighteen years later a similar title was 
employed for a no less scabrous and irresponsible attack on 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and again it was lack of reliable in-
formation about the President's health which provided the 
author with an opening. 
3. ROOSEVELT, THE PRESS, AND 
THE PALACE GUARD 
Because he had been crippled as a result of poliomyelitis, 
President Roosevelt's health was a national issue even be-
fore he took office in 1932. The general and deep admira-
tion for his triumph over a disability which would have 
ended the career of most men made it infeasible for his po-
litical opponents to attempt making political capital of his 
disability during Roosevelt's first two administrations. Nor 
did the question of his fitness enter appreciably into the 
1940 third-term campaign. However, in a book published 
after the President's death, Secretary of the Interior Frances 
Perkins quoted Roosevelt as saying to labor leader Daniel 
Tobin that he couldn't run for a third term because "I am 
tired. I really am .... This sinus trouble I've got, the Wash-
ington climate makes it dreadful. ... The doctors say I have 
to go into the hospital for a month of steady treatment. But 
I can't do that, you know. When a President does that, the 
bottom drops out of the stock market, the Japs take ad-
vantage of what they think is serious illness, the Germans 
start propaganda that I am dying and that the United States 
is in a panic. No, I can't be President again. I have to get 
over this sinus."6 
After Pearl Harbor, wartime secrecy tended to isolate 
the President from the press, and the result was the growth 
of some fantastic stories about his last years in office and his 
death. Following the Teheran Conference (November 28-
December 1, 1943), rumors of illness and of physical deteri-
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oration owing to the unprecedented length of Roosevelt's 
term in office began to make noticeable headway, and these 
stories appear to have had some factual basis. According to 
Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Roosevelt's friend and associate 
from 1928 until his death: 
The President developed some sort of bronchial affliction 
at Teheran which gave him a racking cough .... The [doc-
tors] found no unusual condition for a man of his age ex-
cept his cough and his sinuses. While Teheran was a high 
point in the President's career as Commander-in-Chief of 
our armed forces and as our leader in foreign affairs, it 
seemed to me also the turning point of his physical career. 
I think that his physical decline can be dated from Tehe-
ran, although at the time we did not see it.7 
From early in January, 1944, until his death on April 12, 
1945, the President's health seems to have been a source of 
continuing anxiety to the White House circle, and rumors 
proliferated all during this period. Immediately after the 
President's death, John Gunther has recorded, stories began 
to circulate 
some of which are still heard today-that FDR had shot 
himself, that he had been shot, that he had fallen off a cliff, 
and even that he didn't die, but had been packed off to a 
sanitarium as a mental cripple .... 
Mainly the attempt to make a mystery out of Roosevelt's 
death is of political derivation. Critics strive to prove (a) 
that he was much sicker than he ever was; (b) that he should 
not have been allowed to run for a fourth term, considering 
his condition; (c) that members of a White House camarilla 
concealed the true facts from the public, and foisted a dying 
Roosevelt on the country out of their own ambition and 
greed for power. 
Among the ailments the President was variously sup-
posed to have been suffering from were "coronary thrombo-
sis, a brain hemorrhage, a nervous breakdown, an aneurism 
of the aorta, and a cancerous prostate.'' Also "reports" were 
repeatedly heard that he had been spirited off to the Mayo 
Clinic for an operation for a malignant tumor of the liver 
or rectum .... 
Admiral [Ross T.) Mcintire, who had been Roosevelt's 
doctor for many years, vigorously refutes these charges. The 
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President, he insists, was in good enough health for the 
proper discharge of all his duties to the end. Mcintire takes 
full note of the frequent sinus attacks, the debilitating bout 
of bronchitis and intestinal influenza in 1944, and the pal-
lor, fatigue, and loss of weight, but he denies strenuously 
that any of this had any critical importance .... 
Questions about the President's health became so wide-
spread, particularly during the fourth-term campaign, that 
Mcintire issued several statements denying rumors and at-
testing to his good health. On October 12, 1944, for instance, 
he stated flatly, "The President's health is perfectly OK. 
There are absolutely no organic difficulties at all." ... s 
As Robert E. Sherwood, among others, has noted, the 
one serious issue in the 1944 campaign was the President's 
health. 
There was a good deal of extremely ugly whispering .... 
When he made his acceptance speech before his departure 
for the Pacific tour in July, a photograph had been taken in 
which he appeared haggard, glassy eyed and querulous-and 
this photograph had been given a very wide advertisement 
in the press and in the pamphlets with which the Repub-
licans were flooding the country. On his return from the 
Pacific trip, Roosevelt had made a nation-wide broadcast 
from the Bremerton Navy Yard at Seattle; when he deliv-
ered this speech he wore his leg braces for, I believe, the 
first time since he had returned from Cairo and Teheran 
and he was in such pain that he had to support himself by 
holding on to the lectern ... which made it extremely diffi-
cult for him to tum the pages of his reading copy and made 
the speech sound faltering and uncertain .... It was signifi-
cant that, after this speech, the public opinion polls indi-
cated a sudden and ominous slump for Roosevelt and a 
consequent rise in Dewey's stock. 
Sherwood also notes that, although he had heard Roose-
velt had lost a lot of weight, "I was unprepared for the 
almost ravaged appearance of his face. He had his coat off 
and his shirt collar seemed several sizes too large for his 
emaciated neck. But I soon began to suspect that the fears 
expressed by Hopkins, Watson and the others were ground-
less. He seemed to be more full of good humor and of fight 
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than ever." Again, referring to the "innumerable baseless 
and incredibly malicious rumors," Sherwood says, 
but there was some visible support for them-for [the Presi-
dent] was now truly crippled. The frail muscles in his legs 
and hips had become flabby through long disuse in the 
months between Teheran and the Bremerton speech, dur-
ing which time he had made no public appearances at which 
he would have to stand up-and he never wore the painful 
braces except on such necessary public occasions. It was now 
felt that he would probably never again be able to stand up 
and walk .... Actually, during the weeks of this campaign, 
he did manage to regain the use of his legs sufficiently to be 
able to stand up and speak from the back platform of his 
train for as long as half an hour .... 9 
Because of the secrecy sometimes surrounding the Presi-
dent's whereabouts-a necessary security measure in wartime 
-rumors that he had been hospitalized were lent a certain 
plausibility, and in the spring of 1944 on one occasion even 
members of the White House press corps were taken in. 
The story is related by Mike Reilly, then head of the White 
House Secret Service detail: 
The Boss's so-called illness and heart attacks were a 
source of great unhappiness to him. He thought the stories 
had been printed for political purposes and were outrageous 
lies, which worried his family and weakened his position in 
dealing with some of the rugged characters with whom he 
had to dicker at home and abroad. Right now-and FDR 
needs no help today from anyone, particularly the likes of 
me-I will swear on everything I love or believe that the 
Boss never had a heart attack and that he never was seri-
ously ill in the ten years that I worked at his side until the 
day of his death. 
Knowing how the Boss felt about these stories and realiz-
ing that there were three honest reporters who really be-
lieved he was in a hospital somewhere, I decided to forestall 
any newspaper junk that would upset FDR on this desper-
ately needed vacation [at Bernard Baruch's plantation in 
South Carolina]. So I said to the reporters, "Will you be-
lieve he's here if you see him yourselves?" 
"Sure." 
"Will your bosses believe it and keep quiet if you tell 
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them these wires they are shooting down here are sheer 
bunk?" 
"Okay," I said, "be ready at ten tomorrow and you'll 
see him.'' 
They were picked up at ten and taken to the estate. 1 
knew the President would pass a certain spot at eleven, so 
I parked the cars under some trees at the side of the road 
and waited. Sure enough, he went by on time and the re-
porters saw him. 
"He looks tired," one said. 
"He is. That's why I brought you guys out here. He's 
tired all right, but he's not in any Boston or Chicago hos-
pital. Tell that to your bosses:•10 
However, although Elliott Roosevelt has declared cate-
gorically that "there is no evidence of any kind, either in 
[President Roosevelt's] medical history or in the knowledge 
of any member of his family or those who were close to him 
throughout his years in the White House, to support any 
theory that he had suffered from heart attacks or cerebral 
hemorrhages at any time before his death,"11 this statement 
is apparently contradicted by two incidents recounted by 
James Roosevelt in his book Affectionately, F.D.R. The first 
incident occurred in the fall of 1944: 
I was temporarily stationed at Camp Pendleton, near 
San Diego, California, as intelligence officer .... Father paid 
us a visit to review a landing exercise being staged by the 
Fifth Marine Division as a dress rehearsal for its next Pacific 
operation. 
Just before we were to leave for the exercise, Father 
turned suddenly white, his face took on an agonized look, 
and he said to me: "Jimmy, I don't know if I can make it-
1 have horrible pains." It was a struggle for him to get the 
words out. 
I was so scared I did not know what to think or do. I 
gripped his hand and felt his forehead. We considered call-
ing the doctor, then decided against it. Both of us thought 
he was suffering from some digestive upset-Father himself 
was positive it had nothing to do with his heart. We talked 
some more, and I told him that, if he possibly could sum-
mon the strength, he should try not to cancel his appear-
ance at the exercise, as it would create much alarm. 
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"Yes," Pa said, almost sighing, "it would be very bad. 
But help me out of my berth and let me stretch out flat on 
the deck awhile-that may help." 
So for perhaps ten minutes, while I kept as quiet as 
possible, Father lay on the floor of the railroad car, his eyes 
closed, his face drawn, his powerful torso occasionally con-
vulsed as the waves of pain stabbed him. Never in my life 
had I felt so alone with him-and so helpless. 
Then he opened his eyes, exhaled deeply, and said: 
"Help me up now, Jimmy." I did so. I helped him to get 
ready and the Commander-in-Chief went out to review the 
exercises. 
The second attack took place after Roosevelt's fourth 
inaugural, January 20, 1945: 
The first moment I saw Father I realized something was 
terribly wrong. He looked awful and regardless of what the 
doctors said, I knew in my heart that his days were num-
bered. Just before he proceeded to the reception in the State 
Dining Room Father and I were alone for a few minutes in 
the Green Room. He was thoroughly chilled, and the same 
type of pain, though somewhat less acute, that had bothered 
him in San Diego, was stabbing him again. He gripped my 
arm hard and said: "Jim.my, I can't take this unless you get 
me a stiff drink." I said I would and as I started out he 
called to me: "You'd better make it straight." I brought him 
a tumbler full of whisky which he drank as if it were medi-
cine. In all my life I had never seen Father take a drink in 
that manner. Then he went on to the reception and no one 
there-no one but me-knew how he felt.12 
But even though "no one ... knew how he felt"-and 
the above account implies that the President never in-
formed Dr. Mcintire of his symptoms-nonetheless, a num-
ber of people seem to have noticed that the President was 
failing. His secretary, Grace Tully, writing of the fourth-
term inauguration, said: 
Several close acquaintances of the President have since said 
or written that they were distressed by his appearance on 
that inauguration day. I am sure that those who did not see 
him daily would he more aware of the change over a period 
of time .... I had been disturbed by the signs of fatigue 
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shown by the Boss but to me the greatest and most serious 
bits of evidence did not appear until his return from Yalta.18 
Vice President Truman, meeting Roosevelt on his return 
from Yalta, was disturbed by his appearance, but "after the 
first shock of seeing [him], I tried to dismiss from my mind 
the ominous thoughts of a possible breakdown, counting on 
his ability to bounce back from the stresses and strains of 
office."H Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in his 
book about the Yalta conference, says that it seemed to him 
"some kind of deterioration had taken place in the Presi-
dent's health between the middle of December and the in-
auguration on January 20," though he is careful to state 
that at Yalta (February 1-3), Roosevelt's mind "functioned 
with clarity and conciseness, furnishing excellent proof that 
he was alert and in full command of his faculties."111 As 
John Gunther points out, the President's condition "varied 
sharply from day to day; he always picked up and bounced 
back quickly" and this as much as anything accounts for the 
discrepancies and varying views expressed in the many ac-
counts of the President's last months . 
. . . his inner vitality, even though weakened, was so radiant 
that ... he could make almost any visitor completely forget 
that he seemed ill .... Many people who knew him well, in-
cluding those wlu> tried to build a kind of protective screen 
around him, had come to think in a peculiar way that he 
was indestructible. Life was inconceivable without Roose-
velt as President: ... it was just not possible that he could 
be sick enough to die.16 
When death did come it was with such swiftness that the 
problem of keeping the Vice President notified of the Presi-
dent's condition did not arise; Stephen Early, the Presiden-
tial Press Secretary, did not try to reach him until the 
President was dead. Truman, who consulted frequently with 
Roosevelt about the legislative program, was aware of his 
physical decline-"! saw what the long years in the presi-
dency had done to him."lT But still the news was so unex-
pected, he felt as if "the whole weight of the moon and 
stars" had fallen on him. The Vice President, no more than 
the White House inner circle, seems to have apprehended 
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that the President might actually die. They preferred to 
believe the reassuring medical reports rather than their 
own eyes.• 
James Roosevelt's account of his father's attacks of "in-
digestion" underlines the necessity for keeping the Presi-
dent's physicians informed of his condition. When the 
President of the United States has pains of the severity de-
scribed, while it may be an act of stoical courage to bear 
them in silence it is also a shocking failure of responsibility 
to the government not to speak out. If Dr. Mcintire had 
known the facts at the time, he would have insisted on an 
immediate examination; there would have been an oppor-
tunity for diagnosis and treatment. But a doctor cannot 
diagnose something the patient is silent about. In fairness 
to the Vice President also, the President should be frank 
about his condition. But Harry Truman wrote that 
the only indication I had ever had that [President Roose-
velt] knew he was none too well was when he talked to me 
just before I set out on my campaign trip for the vice-presi-
dency in 1944. He asked me how I was going to travel, and 
I told him I intended to cover the country by airplane. 
"Don't do that, please," he told me. "Go by train. It is neces-
sary that you take care of yourself." 
The sources cited thus far have been taken from the 
writings of men and women who deeply admired the Presi-
dent and in most cases, were closely associated with him. 
Representative of the "hearsay type" of account is one by 
Karl C. Wold, M.D., which appeared in Look. Titled "The 
Truth about F.D.R.'s Health," it included the statement: 
•A. Merriman Smith, dean of the White House press corps, who saw 
the President daily, wrote of the press conferences, "We saw Franklin 
D. Roosevelt die over a period of about a year." Quoted in Edgar 
Eugene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership, 1933-1945 (Philadelphia 
and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1955), p. ll27 n. 
As this book is being revised for the printer, a UPI stoiry datelined 
Washington reports that according to a new biography of Harry S. 
Truman, The Man from Missouri, by Alfred Steinberg, "Democratic 
party members were convinced as early as January 1944 that Roosevelt 
was showing unmistakable signs of failing health. • .. Steinberg quotes 
Truman as saying the thought of succeeding Roosevelt in office 'scares 
the hell out of me'" (Lincoln Evening Journal, April 17, 1962, ll:l-2). 
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In the later summer of 1938, while Roosevelt was visit-
ing a son, James, at the Mayo Clinic, in Rochester, Minn., 
the first of a series of strokes occurred. The attack was light 
and the hemorrhage evidently small because recovery was 
quick and complete. 
Under the subheads "Second Stroke" and "Third Stroke," 
the article further implied that the President had suffered 
a stroke following his trip to Teheran in December, 1943, 
and another on March 25, 1945.18 
A reply to this article, "They're Lying about F.D.R.'s 
Health," by Elliott Roosevelt, appeared in Liberty. After 
citing good and sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the 
Wold article was "completely false in every respect," Roose-
velt reported a telephone conversation with Dr. Wold short-
ly after the Look article appeared. Dr. Wold said that his 
article had been "highly sensationalized by the magazine 
and much of the material that appears in my book [Mr. 
President-How ls Your Health1, the medical histories of 
the Presidents] has been omitted, giving rise to a completely 
false impression as to the intent of my writings." As to the 
sources of his information, about the three alleged strokes, 
he said that he had a hazy recollection that he had received 
much of the information in a letter from Walter Trohan 
a Washington correspondent who had been with the Presi-
dent on those occasions .... [Elliott Roosevelt pointed out 
that] Mr. Trohan is the Washington correspondent of the 
Chicago Tribune, the most anti-Roosevelt paper in the 
United States. Mr. Trohan collaborated with James A. Far-
ley in Mr. Farley's book attacking Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and his policies .... Needless to say, he was at no time a 
White House confidant and wasn't regarded as an intimate 
of the President .... •19 
•Dr. Wold is now dead, but it has been alleged by a businessman 
friend of his that Mrs. Roosevelt and one of her sons were so incensed 
by Wold's book that they went out to St. Paul, Minnesota, to sue Wold 
and his publisher, but changed their minds after they had talked with 
Dr. Wold and seen his evidence. Queried about this story, Mrs. Roose-
velt replied that she had never seen Dr. Wold and had never gone to 
St. Paul for the purpose of suing him and his publisher (Mrs. Franklin 
D. Roosevelt to Richard H. Hansen, December 19, 1961). 
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The Strange Death of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A History 
of the Roosevelt-Delano Dynasty, America's Royal Family 
has as its theme that the President was the stooge of an aris-
tocratic, imperialistic dynasty.20 At Teheran, so the author 
tells us, the waiter assigned to the President and to Prime 
Minister Churchill was actually "a physician who special-
ized in the science of poisoning, toxicology ... . Shortly after 
their departure Winston Churchill became extremely ill. 
He was hurried to Egypt where ... his death was expected 
momentarily. But his life was saved by a protege of his, Sir 
Arthur Fleming, the discoverer of penicillin . . . Roosevelt 
also was extremely ill on his return. He was unable to walk 
or stand unassisted, and never recovered his strength. His 
disability bore a striking resemblance to poisoning with a 
form of curare, an Indian arrow poison that had engaged 
the interest of Russian scientists. He wasted steadily there-
after." The author lists eight other possible causes of the 
President's death, including cancer. 
It goes without saying that this vicious and absurd mish-
mash is wholly undocumented. Like the Wold article, it is 
mentioned here only as an example of the type of material 
bred by secrecy or incomplete information about the Presi-
dent's health. 
The most recent case of prolonged presidential inability 
occurred during the administration of Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, and for the first time in American history the public 
was kept well informed of the President's condition. Eisen-
hower had been a young Army captain during Wilson's long 
ordeal; he had heard the ugly rumors which flooded the 
country at that time and had seen the nation floundering 
leaderless through the crucial treaty-making period after 
World War I. He had been a General of the Army when 
President Roosevelt's health was the subject of anxious 
speculation in capitals and headquarters all over the Euro-
pean Theater of Operations; with millions of others, he had 
felt the shock, experienced the same moment of stunned 
disbelief, when news of the Commander in Chief's death 
was flashed around the world. A decade later, as President 
of the United States, Eisenhower was struck down by illness. 
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Mindful of the Wilson and Roosevelt episodes, he did every-
thing he could to make certain that the facts about his con-
dition were immediately communicated to the public and 
to insure that the power and duties of the Presidency were 
exercised without interruption. 
4. THE THREE EISENHOWER CRISES 
\Vhen President Eisenhower's seizure of September 24, 
1955, was diagnosed as a heart attack, the whole world 
shook with the vibrations of the needle on the electrocardio-
graph. The United States, by virtue of its regional alliances 
as well as its membership in the United Nations, had ties in 
every quarter of the globe. More than that, it was the leader 
and mainstay of free peoples everywhere; what happened 
here would have a direct bearing on their destiny. 
The domestic reaction to the President's illness was re-
flected by the stock market: on September 26, the first trad-
ing day after the news broke, prices lost over twelve hillion 
dollars in values. Despite the assurance of the "assistant 
president," Sherman Adams, that there was no government 
business requiring immediate presidential attention, the 
New York Times reported on September 27 that "top-level 
decisions were pending on disarmament policy, budgetary 
problems, military force levels, certain politico-strategic 
questions, withdrawal of troops from Korea, future military 
policy toward Formosa and reduction of forces in Japan."21 
The attack occurred when the President was in Denver, 
a guest at his mother-in-law's home. About 2:30 A.M. on Sep-
tember 24, he awakened in severe pain. Mrs. Eisenhower 
called Major General Howard Snyder, the President's phy-
sician, who arrived about 3:00 A.M. and administered emer-
gency treatment, including drugs to relieve the pain. At 
7:00 A.M. he called Murray Snyder, the Assistant Presiden-
tial Press Secretary, who was also in Denver, and left word 
that the President had indigestion and to cancel his ap-
pointments. When the President awoke at 12: 30 P.M., Dr. 
Snyder called Fitzsimmons Army Hospital and asked that 
an electrocardiograph be brought around. The cardiogram, 
which showed a lesion on the anterior wall of the heart, 
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confirmed Dr. Snyder's original diagnosis of coronary throm-
bosis. Murray Snyder was then informed, and after the 
President had been taken to Fitzsimmons Hospital the news 
was released to the press. 
In a subsequent report to the White House, Dr. Snyder 
had this to say about the eleven-hour delay in communicat-
ing the news: 
It was difficult for me to assume the responsibility of re-
fraining from making public immediately the diagnosis of 
coronary thrombosis. I postponed public announcement be-
cause I wished the President to benefit from the rest and 
quiet induced by the sedation incident to combating the 
initial manifestations. This decision also spared him, his 
wife and mother-in-law emotional upset upon too precipi-
tate announcement of such serious import. This action, I 
believe, limited the heart damage to a minimum and en-
abled us to confirm the diagnosis by cardiogram and make 
an unhurried transference from home to hospitai.22 
The decision to release the facts was made by James E. 
Hagerty, the President's Press Secretary, who was in Wash-
ington but flew at once to Denver and took charge at the 
Summer White House. As soon as the doctors would allow 
it, Hagerty saw the President, who approved his action in 
releasing the news and told him to "give 'em the facts."23 
In Washington, Vice President Richard Nixon conferred 
with the Acting Attorney General, William P. Rogers (At-
torney General Herbert Brownell was out of the country), 
and later with Secretary of State Foster Dulles and other 
members of the Cabinet. They were told that Colonel 
Thomas M. Mattingly, Chief of Cardiology at Walter Reed 
Army Hospital, was on his way to Denver with a plane-load 
of doctors. Although they "had nothing against military 
doctors ... [they] could not overlook that many people in 
the country might have more confidence, however unwar-
ranted, in a civilian heart specialist of national reputation." 
Dr. Paul Dudley White, a pioneer in cardiology, was sug-
gested by several people, among them Secretary of the 
Treasury George Humphrey, and General Wilton B. Per-
sons, the Deputy Assistant to the President, was given the 
"delicate and difficult task" of convincing Dr. Snyder that 
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no slight was intended by calling in Dr. White on consulta-
tion. Once this matter of professional etiquette had been 
satisfactorily resolved, the Vice President and the Cabinet 
could give some thought to the problem of "how to carry on 
in [the President's] absence without allowing the govern-
ment to drift dangerously in foreign or domestic affairs. 
There is an old political axiom that where a vacuum exists, 
it will be filled by the nearest or strongest power. That had 
to be avoided at all costs."24 
On Sunday, September 25, the Vice President was told 
Dr. White's prognosis that barring complications the Presi-
dent would be well enough to take on limited duties within 
two weeks and to resume normal activities within two 
months. 
Fortunately, this was vacation time in the government 
when there was a lull in the usual rush of activities. Several 
long-range projects were under way, like preparation of 
the budget and the State of the Union message, but there 
seemed to be no pressing item that required presidential 
action. Congress was in adjournment; there was no pending 
legislation. The cold war seemed frozen for the moment .... 
We were fairly certain by this time that there was noth-
ing requiring the President's signature or attention which 
could not be delayed for two weeks. The significance of this 
was that it became apparent this early that we would not 
have to solve the thorny problem of a delegation of the 
President's constitutional powers.211 
The President's right-hand man, Sherman Adams, was in 
Scotland at the time of the attack, but was back in Wash-
ington by Monday, September 26. No Cabinet meeting was 
called, as was done in the Wilson case. Vice President Nixon 
came to a luncheon meeting with the senior staff personnel 
of the White House and afterward conferred with Adams. 
That night there was a meeting at the home of Acting At-
torney General Rogers, attended by the Vice President, 
Adams, General Persons, Leonard Hall (the Republican Na-
tional Chairman), and Hall's press aide, Lou Guylay. The 
meeting was devoted chiefly to the political questions which 
would inevitably result fro.m the President's illness-for ex-
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ample, would he or would he not be able to run for a sec-
ond term? 
In view of Dr. White's encouraging report and since 
there was no government business requiring immediate 
presidential attention, Nixon, Adams, and the other mem-
bers of the administrative team aimed to carry on in a 
"business as usual" atmosphere. On Thursday, September 
29, the National Security Council held its regular meeting, 
presided over by the Vice President; he had previously pre-
sided at council meetings when the President was away from 
Washington. Twenty-three ranking members of the admin-
istration 
... spent considerable time putting somewhat of an official 
stamp of approval on the course of action for the interim 
government. It was officially decided, for instance, that 
Sherman Adams should go to Denver to serve as liaison and 
administrative assistant to the President, while Jerry Per-
sons would handle the paper work at the President's White 
House office, routing the documents which the President 
should see through Adams.26 
When he arrived in Denver, "Adams made it clear to the 
attending physicians that he would defer to their judgment 
on bringing matters to Eisenhower's attention during the 
crucial seven days ahead."27 Adams already had made up 
his mind that his course of action with the President-what 
he was consulted on, or told-would depend to a great ex-
tent on Dr. White's advice, and had so informed the mem-
bers of the Cabinet before his plane trip to Colorado. 
During the remainder of the period during which it was 
possible for complications to arise, Adams and Hagerty met 
daily with Dr. White and his associates to discuss what work 
was to be placed before the President.28 
For the next two months the government was managed 
by a six-man committee made up of Vice President Nixon, 
Secretary of State Dulles, Attorney General Brownell, Secre-
tary of the Treasury Humphrey, General Persons, and 
Adams. Nixon, according to Adams, "leaned over backward 
to avoid any appearance of assuming presidential author-
ity," but though things went fairly smoothly, Adams and all 
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the members of the committee knew that at any moment a 
global crisis or national emergency could make this "gov-
ernment by community understanding" woefully inade-
quate.29 As Vice President Nixon later wrote: 
Although it was hardly mentioned, I am certain that many 
of us realized our team-government would be inadequate to 
handle an international crisis, such as a brush-fire war or an 
internal uprising in a friendly country or a crisis of an ally. 
The ever-present possibility of an attack on the United 
States was always hanging over us. Would the President be 
well enough to make the decision? If not, who had the au-
thority to push the button?so 
It was only at the end of the two-week period, during which 
the scar tissue in the President's heart had formed, that the 
tension in Washington slackened. 
After his recovery from the heart attack, President Eisen-
hower continued in good health until early in June, 1956, 
when he had an attack of ileitis, a blockage of the lower part 
of the small intestine. Shortly after midnight on June 8, his 
condition became acute and the team of doctors at Walter 
Reed Hospital decided on immediate surgery. From 2:~0 to 
4:35 A.M., Adams, Hagerty, and Andrew Goodpaster, the 
President's staff secretary, kept vigil outside the operating 
room. The surgeons found no sign of malignancy; the Presi-
dent's recovery was quick and uneventful. However, 
the surgery focused the President's attention on the legal 
problems of the disability of a Chief Executive ... . On sev-
eral occasions afterwards, he pointed out to Vice President 
Nixon that for the two hours he was under anesthesia the 
country was without a Chief Executive, the armed forces 
without a Commander-in-Chief. In the event of a national 
emergency during those two hours, who would have had the 
authority to act for a completely disabled President? ... He 
told some of those around him that if illness ever struck 
again and he felt he could not physically carry on the bur-
dens of office, he would resign.st 
Seventeen months later, on the afternoon of November 
27, 1957, Ann Whitman, the President's personal secretary, 
went to Sherman Adams "on the verge of tears." She was 
upset over an incident which had just occurred in the Presi-
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dent's office-"He tried to tell me something but he couldn't 
express himself. Something seemed to have happened to him 
all of a sudden." When Mrs. Whitman called Dr. Snyder, 
the President refused to leave his desk. "Go away from me," 
he tried to say. Goodpaster finally persuaded him to leave 
his office and walk back to the living quarters.s2 
Dr. Snyder persuaded the President to go to bed; it was 
his opinion that the President had suffered a stroke and a 
neurologist was called to the White House. There was a 
state dinner scheduled for King Mohammed V of Morocco, 
and while Adams was discussing this complication with 
Mrs. Eisenhower the President got out of bed, and insisted 
that he intended to go to the dinner. But he still had a 
noticeable speech impediment, and Adams and Dr. Snyder 
managed to dissuade him. Despite his insistence to the con-
trary, according to Adams, the President knew something 
was wrong with himself: "He became upset and impatient 
with his difficulty in seizing the word that he wanted to say, 
sometimes coming out with a word or syllable that had no 
relation to the word he had in his mind."33 
Adams called Vice President Nixon to the White House 
and related what had happened. He told Nixon: "This is a 
terribly, terribly difficult thing to handle. You may be 
President in the next twenty-four hours." It was decided to 
withhold any announcement that the President had suffered 
a stroke until Dr. Snyder's original diagnosis had been con-
firmed. A bulletin was issued stating that the President had 
suffered a chill. Although Mrs. Eisenhower was greatly dis-
tressed, she realized that canceling the state dinner would 
alarm the nation and it was held as scheduled.84 
On the next morning-Tuesday-a meeting was held at 
the White House. At that time, says Sherman Adams, "the 
doctors could not tell us how seriously the shock of the pre-
vious day had affected the President's nervous system or 
whether it might be the first in a series of more damaging 
strokes."311 Nixon also agrees that the tension 
seemed even greater than at the time of the heart attack. In 
contrast to that period in 1955, this was the worst time pos-
sible for the President to be incapacitated. It was a time of 
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international tensions. Only a month before the Soviet 
Union had put its first Sputnik in orbit, and the whole 
structure of America's military might and scientific technol-
ogy was under suspicion here and abroad. The most im-
mediate problem was a scheduled meeting of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization only three weeks away .... On 
the domestic front, the first signs of the 1958 economic re-
cession were becoming obvious .... We were having serious 
budget problems .... the government had borrowed up to 
its legal debt limit, and we had to prepare the fiscal 1959 
budget with still higher defense spending. The Administra-
tion also had to complete its legislative program, the State 
of the Union message, the budget and economic messages 
for the opening days of Congress in January.as 
The medical report passed along to the press-that the 
President had suffered a "mild" stroke which affected only 
his ability to speak, and that his mind and reasoning powers 
were not involved-got a quite different reaction from the 
public than the news about the heart attack. "During the 
heart attack, the nation worried if the President would live 
or die but not about his ability to carry on if he recovered. 
This was not the case during the stroke. The public seemed 
to say okay, he may get well, but will he ever be the same 
again?"8T Fortunately for the nation, the President recov-
ered quickly and completely. 
The question of public information about the Presi-
dent's health continues to be a touchy one. A few months 
after his accession to office in 1961, President John F. Ken-
nedy suffered a recurrence of a wartime back injury during 
a tree-planting ceremony in Ottawa, Canada. He was treated 
by his personal physician, Dr. Janet Travell, but the injury 
gave him trouble during his state visit to Europe. News of 
the President's difficulty was withheld from the public until 
his return to the United States-an error in judgment which 
provoked mud~ criticism and gave rise to rumors that the 
injury might be more serious than the press had been led to 
believe. Subsequently the President came down with a virus 
infection, but this time there was no delay in announcing 
the news and lines of communication were ostentatiously 
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kept open. Reporters were able to interview Dr. Travell, 
whom previously they had not been allowed to question. 
The whole episode angered many of the White House 
press corps who had served under other Presidents. Merri-
man Smith, a UPI correspondent since Roosevelt's time, 
expressed himself on the subject during an interview by the 
author in Washington on July l, 1961. 
I think we were spoiled by the way in which Eisenhower 
handled the press during his illnesses. All of us around here 
got our degrees as doctors during that period. We read 
everything we could on heart trouble and when we ques-
tioned Dr. White we knew what he was talking about when 
he answered in medical terms. So we were irritated when 
we weren't informed about Kennedy's illness until a week 
after it had happened. Dr. Travell had her interview with 
us only after repeated requests and even then she wasn't 
altogether responsive. 
Smith said that he had checked to see if it could be med-
ically determined whether or not there was a connection 
between the back ailment and the virus infection, and had 
found that the only way was by means of a spinal tap and 
certain blood tests. He asked if such tests had been made 
and if so, what the results showed. According to Smith, Dr. 
Travell would state only that there was no connection be-
tween the two illnesses; she declined to be more specific. 
There is no ground for believing that President Ken-
nedy's ailment was anything other than it was represented 
to be, but the incident reminds us that what the public is 
told of a Chief Executive's health is still entirely up to the 
President himself or to the members of the palace guard. 
Chapter V 
The Stopgap 
I. THE EISENHOWER-NIXON AGREEMENT 
The efforts of the Eisenhower administration to secure 
action on the question of delegating authority during a 
President's temporary disability have been described by for-
mer Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., in an article 
which appeared in the Yale Law /ournal.1 
The battle began in January, 1956, when the President 
returned from Denver after recovering from his heart attack. 
At this time he directed Attorney General Brownell to "in-
stitute a full legal study of the problems raised by temporary 
presidential inability. His purpose was to draft a plan to 
protect the country fully if a President were to become 
disabled at a time when immediate executive action was 
needed" (p. 196). Brownell found that several authors had 
discussed the problem, but only one, Ruth Silva, had de-
voted an entire book to the subject. Her doctoral disserta· 
tion, Presidential Succession, presented at the University of 
Michigan in 1951, brought together many forgotten or ob-
scure facts on presidential illnesses and laid the groundwork 
for future studies. So it was natural that the Attorney Gen-
eral should enlist her aid. 
Practical political considerations, however, caused a post-
ponement of the project. Nineteen fifty-six was an election 
year, and "it was decided not to formulate such a plan dur· 
ing the presidential campaign, lest it become entangled in 
partisan politics" (p. 196). But after his re-election, the 
President again went ahead with his campaign for the adop-
tion of a practical law. 
Early in January 1957, [he] reviewed several alternative 
plans and authorized the Attorney General to consult sev· 
eral persons outside the Government to obtain their views 
and criticisms. The opinion of members of the Cabinet were 
sought at a Cabinet meeting. Finally, a definitive plan 
which proposed a constitutional amendment was approved 
by i:.he President. It was to be sent to the Congress with a 
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special message from the President urging its adoption (p. 
196). 
But again, practical politics intervened. When the plan 
was presented at a meeting of congressional leaders of both 
parties, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the 
late Sam Rayburn, 
raised the point that if the President should send a special 
message to Congress urging the adoption of the proposed 
constitutional amendment, the people of the country, in the 
mistaken belief that some unannounced development in the 
President's condition had occurred, might become alarmed. 
Accordingly, the forthcoming special message was cancelled, 
and public announcement of the plan took the form of 
testimony by the Attorney General before a subcommittee 
of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives 
(p. 196). 
Brownell was given the fullest opportunity to explain 
the program, which was embodied in a proposed constitu-
tional amendment. The operative clauses of the proposed 
amendment were as follows: 
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from of-
fice, or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall 
become President for the unexpired portion of the then 
current term. 
Section 2. If the President shall declare in writing that he 
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, 
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice 
President as Acting President. 
Section 3. If the President does not so declare, the Vice 
President, if satisfied of the President's inability, and upon 
approval in writing of a majority of the heads of executive 
departments who are members of the President's Cabinet, 
shall discharge the powers and duties of Acting President. 
Section 4. Whenever the President declares in writing that 
his inability is terminated, the President shall forthwith 
discharge the powers and duties of his office (p. 197). 
At the time Brownell testified before the committee, sev-
eral proposals already had been submitted, reflecting a va-
riety of opinions. Congressman Peter J. Frelinghuysen (New 
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Jersey) thought the Supreme Court should decide a Presi-
dent's inability; Joseph C. O'Mahoney (Wyoming) con-
tended that it should be determined by Congress; and 
Kenneth Keating (New York) was convinced that the whole 
matter should be adjudicated by a commission made up of 
congressional leaders, the Justices of the Supreme Court, 
and selected Cabinet members. 
In ruling out these ideas, the Attorney General used a 
fundamental doctrine of constitutional law-the concept of 
separation of powers, which has developed in our law since 
the adoption of the Constitution. It states as a basic prin-
ciple of our form of government that the executive, legisla-
tive, and judiciary branches must be kept separate from one 
another and free from the intrusions of the others into their 
respective domains. The President has invoked this doctrine 
to keep the files of the executive out of the hands of Con-
gress; and the courts have used it to keep the lawmaking 
power of the President at a minimum.2 In the present in-
stance, it was the basis for Brownell's contention that the 
determination of presidential inability should be made 
within the executive branch; the President should not be 
subject to control and possible domination by either the 
Supreme Court or Congress. In this connection, the Attor-
ney General read into the record a letter that Chief Justice 
Earl Warren had written to Representative Keating: 
During the time the subject of inability of a President 
to discharge the duties of his office has been under discus-
sion, the members of the Court have discussed generally ... 
the proposal that a member or members of the Court be 
included in the membership of a Commission to determine 
the fact of Presidential inability to act. 
It has been the belief of all of us that because of the 
separation of powers in our Government, the nature of the 
judicial process, the possibility of a controversy of this char-
acter coming to Court, and the danger of disqualification 
which might result in lack of a quorum, it would be inad-
visable for any member of the Court to serve on such a com-
mission . 
. . . I do believe that the reasons above mentioned for 
non participation of the Court are insurmountable.3 
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Brownell used a similar argument in repudiating the 
idea that Congress should decide the question. 
With the participation of congressional officials a presiden-
tial inability commission would be bound to assume a po-
litical appearance. Individual members of Congress, though 
elected by the people, are elected by the people of a particu-
lar small district or state, and are not necessarily representa-
tive of the nation as a whole; only the President and the 
Vice President are elected by the entire populace.' 
Before Brownell finished his testimony, the chairman of 
the committee, Representative Emanuel Geller of New York, 
and Representative William McCulloch of Ohio called at-
tention to a serious gap in the administration's proposal. 
What happened, they wanted to know, if a President re-
fused to give up his office, or if a President prematurely de-
clared his recovery? They had in mind the case of a mentally 
disturbed Chief Executive who might develop an irrational 
hostility or a mistaken belief in his own fitness, or who was 
just plain stubborn and would not relinquish the post.• 
The Attorney General's answer was that a mentally ill or 
stubborn President could be impeached. But he was not 
entirely satisfied with this solution. As he later wrote: 
... in the presentation of President Eisenhower's original 
proposal for a constitutional amendment in 1957, it was 
stated that any dispute between the President and the Vice 
•"Suppose some President shall become insane immediately after his 
inauguration and shall remain so for two or three years. Will it then 
become the duty of the Vice-President to perform the functions of the 
Presidential office? Clearly it will. Then, while the insanity continues, 
will the Vice-President be President or still only Vice-President? Surely 
the latter, for the President is still alive, and is, consequently, still the 
holder of the office. His title to it can only end by his removal, death 
or resignation. He cannot be removed pending his insanity except on 
conviction of treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 
He has not resigned, and an attempted resignation would be a nullity. 
If the Vice-President remains Vice-President under these conditions, 
how can he be else in case of the death of the President? The office or 
its powers and duties 'devolve' on him as fully in one case as in the 
other" (Lewis R. Works, "The Succession of the Vice-President under 
the Constitution-An Interrogation," American Law Review, XXXVIII 
[1904), 501). 
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President regarding termination of the President's disability 
could be resolved by Congress's taking impeachment pro-
ceedings against whichever official was wrongfully attempt-
ing to exercise the powers of the presidency. In subsequent 
public discussion of the proposal, however, it was pointed 
out that impeachment and trial are complicated and lengthy 
processes, that the Congress is not always in session, and that 
nothing in the Constitution now empowers the Vice Presi-
dent to call Congress into special session. Furthermore, con-
viction would remove the President permanently, and the 
odium attached to the impeachment might very well cause 
many Congressmen to hesitate to take such action-espe-
cially against an ill man.G 
Representatives Celler and McCulloch also questioned 
the wisdom of the Vice President's consulting with the Cabi-
.net before assuming office as acting President: the Cabinet, 
after all, is composed of political appointees who owe their 
political lives to the incumbent President. In countering 
this argument, Brownell cited the Tyler precedent as the 
reason the Garfield and Wilson Cabinets did not call in the 
Vice President. Thus, he reflected Silva's view that it was 
the fear the Vice President would oust the President that 
kept Arthur and Marshall from becoming acting Presi-
dents.• And this was only half true. 
At the conclusion of the hearings, the Attorney General's 
proposal went by the board. No legislator pretended to have 
the answers to the problems of presidential disability, but 
there was a feeling that something basic was lacking in all 
the legislation considered, and the subcommittee refused to 
•The Attorney General's testimony indicates that he was placing 
heavy reliance on Silva's research. See Hearings, Special Subcommittee 
on Presidential Disability of the Judiciary Committee, House, 85th 
Cong., lst Sess., p. 14. Other congressional hearings were held in 1956 
and 1958. (Hearings, Special Committee to Study Presidential Inability, 
Committee on the Judiciary, House, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., April ll, 12, 
1956; Hearings, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, Senate, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 24, 
February ll, 14, 18 and 28, 1958). The House Committee of the 84th 
Congress prepared and sent out a questionnaire which was published 
with the replies as a Committee Print, January lll, 1956; an analysis 
was published March 26, 1957. 
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recommend any one approach. Sherman Adams notes that 
at the very beginning of the venture Senator Knowland 
voiced the opposition to the Cabinet's being involved in 
questions of determining inability. Knowland also brought 
up the problem of a mentally ill President who would not 
give up the office, or who would try to resume it before he 
was fully recovered. At this early stage, no attempt had been 
made to compromise, and, as Adams writes: "There being 
no unanimity and little enthusiasm among the Republican 
leaders and strong opposition from Rayburn, it was appar· 
ent that the proposal would not get far .... "6 
The criticism of the impeachment process as a method 
of resolving a dispute between the President and the Vice 
President over the former's recovery continued after Con-
gress had adjourned. In response to these criticisms the new 
Attorney General, William P. Rogers, on February 18, 1958, 
presented a revised Section 4 for the proposed amendment: 
Whenever the President declares in writing that his inabil-
ity has terminated, the President shall forthwith discharge 
the powers and duties of his office: Provided, however, that 
if the Vice President and a majority of the heads of execu-
tive departments who are members of the President's Cabi-
net shall signify in writing that the President's inability has 
not been terminated thereupon: 
(a) The Congress shall forthwith consider the issue of 
the President's inability in accordance with procedures 
provided for impeachment, and if the Congress is not in 
session, shall forthwith convene for this purpose; 
(b) If the House of Representatives shall on record vote 
charge that the President's inability has not terminated, 
and the Senate so finds by the concurrence of two thirds 
of the members present, the powers and duties of the 
office of President shall be discharged by the Vice Presi-
dent as Acting President for the remainder of the term, 
or until Congress by a majority vote of the members of 
both Houses determines that the President's inability 
has terminated. 1 
This proposal also failed for lack of support, as did a simi-
lar bill backed by a bipartisan group led by Senators Ke-
fauver of Tennessee and Hruska of Nebraska. 
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lt was against this background of congressional inaction 
that President Eisenhower, on March 3, 1958, entered into 
a private agreement with Vice President Richard Nixon 
which would enable Nixon to act as President if circum-
stances required. Eisenhower had discussed the problem 
with Nixon a number of times since his heart attack. In 
these discussions, according to Nixon, the President 
had mentioned several alternatives, but kept coming back 
to the idea of a letter which would give the Vice President 
alone the authority to decide when the President was un-
able to carry on-that is, when the President himself was 
unable to make the decision. 
In early February, the President called Rogers and me 
into his office, commented that he thought he had licked 
the problem, and handed each of us a copy of a letter .... 
We made some minor suggestions and he incorporated them 
into the letter and then sent it on to his secretary, Ann 
Whitman, for final typing. Marked PERSONAL AND SECRET, 
one copy went to me, one to Bill Rogers as Attorney Gen-
eral, and one to John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State 
and ranking member of the Cabinet. 
With the exception of our very minor suggestions, the 
letter was wholly Eisenhower's in concept and drafting, and 
it was a masterpiece. Leaving the White House, Bill Rogers 
remarked that Eisenhower would have made an outstanding 
lawyer, for the letter handled the contingencies of a very 
complex problem from every angle and was as good a draft-
ing job as any constitutional expert could have done.8 
The terms of this letter, which reduced to a memoran-
dum the President's and Vice President's understanding of 
the constitutional role of the Vice President as Acting Presi-
dent, were made public on March 3, 1958. They are as 
follows: 
The President and the Vice President have agreed that 
the following procedures are in accord with the purposes 
and provisions of Article 2, Section l, of the Constitution, 
dealing with Presidential inability. They believe that these 
procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves only, 
are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution but 
are consistent with its present provisions and implement its 
clear intent. 
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1. In the event of inability the President would-if pos-
sible-so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President 
would serve as Acting President, exercising the powers and 
duties of the office until the inability had ended. 
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the 
President from so communicating with the Vice President, 
the Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him 
appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon 
the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and 
would serve as Acting President until the inability had 
ended. 
3. The President, in either event, would determine when 
the inability had ended and at that time would resume the 
full exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.9 
Commenting on this memorandum in his Yale Law 
Journal article (which appeared some eight months after 
the historic agreement was made public), Herbert Brownell 
wrote that it 
represents the Eisenhower Administration's interpretation 
of the Constitution as it now stands. The only addition to 
present Constitutional requirements is that the Vice Presi-
dent take action "after such consultation as seems to him 
appropriate under the circumstances." Although the Con-
stitution does not require the Vice President to consult any-
one, it was felt that, as a matter of good judgment, the Vice 
President would want to consult members of the Cabinet, 
congressional leaders of both parties, and perhaps other 
prominent citizens before presuming to exercise the powers 
and duties of the presidency. The Eisenhower-Nixon under-
standing, in effect, gives the Vice President the comfort of 
being directed to seek opinion from other persons and thus 
strengthen his position if he should be obliged to take these 
steps. Appropriately, in view of constitutional silence on the 
matter, the persons with whom the Vice President is to con-
sult are not mentioned. Presumably, the Vice President's 
choice would depend on the circumstances of the moment; 
in time of international crisis the opportunity for consulta-
tion might be very brief.lo 
Thus, Eisenhower became the first President in our his-
tory to take cognizance of and act upon a serious defect in 
our Constitution. But the agreement was a purely personal 
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one between Eisenhower and Nixon, and could not, there-
fore, apply to their successors. President John F. Kennedy, 
when he succeeded to office, did enter into a similar agree-
ment with Vice President Lyndon Johnson, but, as former 
Vice President Nixon points out, 
... the agreement President Eisenhower set forth in his 
letter to me, and the one President Kennedy has entered 
into with Vice President Johnson, are only as good as the 
will of the parties to keep them. Presidents and Vice Presi-
dents have not always had the mutual trust and cordial 
relations President Eisenhower had with me or that Presi-
dent Kennedy has had with Vice President Johnson up to 
this time. Jealousies and rivalries can develop within an 
Administration which could completely destroy such an 
agreement. 
Only a constitutional amendment can solve the problem 
on a permanent basis. President Eisenhower's agreement 
with me was personal and had the force of authority only 
during his term of office. President Kennedy's agreement is 
similarly limited. These agreements, which are mere expres-
sions of a President's desires, do not have the force of law. 
Even a law passed by Congress might be subject to constitu-
tional challenge. However, such a law would express the 
will of Congress and should be passed while the incumbent 
President is in good health and before a presidential elec-
tion year drags politics into an already complex problem. 
The experiences of Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower should 
have taught us a lesson. Surely the time has come for a truly 
bipartisan program to draw up a constitutional amendment 
which would define the rights and duties of a Vice President 
during any period when the President of the United States 
is incapacitated. 
The urgent need for such an amendment becomes crys-
tal clear when a President is disabled, but that is precisely 
the time when politics bar any reasonable agreement on the 
wording of such an amendment ... . It is hardly necessary 
to point out that these perilous times in which we live will 
continue, and more than ever before our nation will need 
an able and healthy Chief Executive or acting Chief Execu-
tive at all times . ... 
The heart attack, the ileitis operation, and the stroke 
were .. . potential constitutional crises of the greatest mag-
nitude for the nation. If such a crisis should arise in the 
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future its outcome should not be dependent upon the per-
sonal whims of whoever happens to hold the offices of Presi-
dent and Vice President, but on the law of the land, as 
approved by the Congress or set forth in the Constitution.11 
2. THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON AGREEMENT 
In December, 1960, President-elect Kennedy and Vice 
President-elect Johnson made a tentative informal agree-
ment, similar to that which had existed between Eisenhower 
and Nixon, on the procedures to be followed should Ken-
nedy become disabled. Soon after the new administration 
took office, the President asked Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy for an opinion on the construction to be given the 
presidential inability clause of the Constitution. Specifically, 
President Kennedy wanted to know: 
first, whether when presidential inability occurs, the Vice 
President ... succeeds to the "Office," i.e., becomes Presi-
dent and remains in the office even if the inability should 
cease; second, who determines whether the inability exists 
and who determines whether the inability has ended; and 
third, whether the memorandum of March 3, 1958, between 
former President Eisenhower and former Vice President 
Nixon ... is a desirable precedent for this administration 
to follow.12 
Assistant Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, 
Robert Kennedy's legal adviser, was assigned to review the 
problem and subsequently drafted the opinion which was 
delivered to the President on August 2, 1961. In summariz-
ing his conclusions, the Attorney General stated: 
In my judgment, there is no question that the Vice 
President acts as President in the event of the President's 
inability and acts in that capacity "until the disability be 
removed." ... 
I believe also that there is no substantial question that 
it is the Vice President, if the President is unable to do so, 
who determines the President's inability and that it is the 
President who asserts when the inability has ceased. These 
conclusions are supported by the great majority of reputable 
scholars who have examined the problem, as well as by my 
predecessors .... 
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I am of the opinion that the understanding between the 
President and the Vice President ... is clearly constitutional 
and as close to spelling out a practical solution to the prob-
lem as is possible.is 
In the discussion preceding this summary, the Attorney 
General had noted that since the Eisenhower-Nixon under-
standing 
may prove to be a persuasive precedent of what the Consti-
tution means until it is amended or other action is taken, I 
would favor that the Administration follow it. Cumulative 
precedents of this kind may be valuable in the future.14 
On August 10, 1961, President Kennedy announced 
adoption of the Eisenhower precedent, and a summary of 
the provisions of the agreement, identical with that of the 
Eisenhower-Nixon understanding, was made public in a 
press release the same day. 
There already are two schools of legal thought concern-
ing this memorandum: one group (which does not include 
Eisenhower or Kennedy) regards it as a perfect solution to 
the problem and sees no need for further action; at the 
other extreme are those who hold that it is unconstitutional. 
Not only because of this divergence of opinion but because 
an examination of the specific provisions may help to bring 
into focus the real problems of disability, a closer scrutiny 
of the agreement is indicated. 
Without congressional action, a memorandum is the 
only way a President can set up a formal procedure to cover 
inability. But a memorandum is discretionary with each 
new administration, and this, of course, is one of the chief 
drawbacks of the inability agreement. A President who 
wishes to ignore the memorandum may do so. He may also 
adopt a completely different formula for making the deter-
mination. In either case the net result would be even greater 
uncertainty than now exists. 
Section I states that a disabled President would, if pos-
sible, inform the Vice President of his condition, in which 
case the Vice President would take over as Acting President 
until the inability is ended. Because it allows a President to 
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step down temporarily, this provision-in the view of Attor-
neys General Brownell and Kennedy-serves to negate the 
Tyler precedent; and-so they reason-if the Tyler prece-
dent is nullified, a disabled President will not hesitate to 
give up his job. He is assured of resuming it upon his re-
covery. The provision is based on Silva's assumption that 
Garfield's and Wilson's refusal to step aside derived from 
the Tyler precedent. But such an assumption is a gross over-
simplification of a complex problem. John Tyler's decision 
offered a comfortable and plausible excuse for the failure 
to call in Arthur and Marshall; in neither case did it moti-
vate the refusal. 
General Eisenhower, in discussing the memorandum 
with the author, particularly stressed that its strength de-
pends entirely upon the good will existing between the 
President and the Vice President.Hi He must have had in 
mind the historical evidence that there was no good will 
between Garfield and Arthur and only a semblance of it be-
tween Wilson and Marshall. The point is that we have not 
changed our system of choosing the President and Vice 
President; political expediency can still determine a ticket; 
and politics makes strange bedfellows. The possibility of a 
rift between the incumbents should neither be overlooked 
nor minimized, and there is no protection against such an 
eventuality in the present memorandum. 
While it is certainly wise to allow a President who wishes 
to do so to step aside, the question history poses is not 
should he? or can he? but will he? Whether we like it or 
not, no President, if we are to judge by past performances, 
is likely to give up his office-to relinquish it voluntarily to 
a subordinate. 
When President Eisenhower announced that he would 
run for a second term, he promised the American people 
that he would resign from the Presidency if his health 
should fail.• The resignation of the President would have 
•"I have said unless I felt absolutely up to the performance of the 
duties of the President, the second that I didn't, I would no longer be 
there in the job or I wouldn't be available for the job."-President 
Eisenhower in a press conference, March 7, 1956. Quoted in Nixon, Six 
Crises, p. 176. 
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been unprecedented in the nation's history. The only re-
motely analogous situation occurred in 1832 when John C. 
Calhoun resigned the Vice Presidency, and his action was 
in no way connected with his health. He split with Presi-
dent Andrew Jackson over the issue of state rights. The 
agricultural states of the South were burdened with what 
they called the "Tariff of Abominations," a protective levy 
which, so the Southerners said, favored the manufacturers of 
the North at the expense of the plantation owners. Calhoun, 
a South Carolinian, wrote a stirring essay setting forth the 
doctrine that no state could be bound by a federal law 
which it regarded as unconstitutional. Since President Jack-
son stood for a strong central government, a deep rift devel-
oped between him and the Vice President, and Calhoun 
ultimately resigned to enter the Senate, where he became 
the leading proponent of state rights. Although Presidents 
and Vice Presidents have had differences approaching feuds, 
none except Calhoun has ever resigned for any cause. 
Reluctance to surrender power is a very human charac-
teristic, and the man who is President of the United States 
is the most powerful man in the modern world. Moreover, 
there is no position more calculated to build a man's ego. 
Edward R. Murrow describes the White House as being "a 
kind of alchemist. There little men have grown great, and 
great men have become giants."16 To complete the picture 
he should have added-"and all but a very few have become 
indispensable to the nation-in their own minds." 
Until 1940, the two-term tradition initiated by George 
Washington was unwritten law. Except for those Presidents 
who died during their first term or were not renominated, 
how many between Washington and Franklin D. Roosevelt 
gave up the office after only one term? James K. Polk took 
office in 1845 with "the settled purpose of not being a can-
didate for re-election"; Rutherford B. Hayes made it known 
early in 1876 that he would not run again "under any cir-
cumstances." That makes two, and Calvin Coolidge might 
be counted as a third, depending on whether one puts the 
emphasis on I or choose in his statement "I do not choose 
to run." Four Presidents-William Henry Harrison, Zachary 
Taylor, Garfield, and Harding-died during their first term. 
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Five-Tyler, Pierce, Buchanan, Johnson, and Arthur-were 
not renominated. Excluding Washington, who founded the 
tradition, and the nine Presidents who died or were not re-
nominated, only three out of the remaining twenty vacated 
the White House before tradition compelled them to do so. 
The force of the White House as an ego-builder can also 
be seen in more recent history. The circumstances surround-
ing Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to run for a third term 
have been described fully by James A. Farley, Judge Samuel 
Rosenman, and others. The President had given Farley and 
Secretary of State Hull reason to believe that he would sup-
port them to head the Democratic ticket in 1940. But with 
the war crisis coming on-and even though the Republican 
nominee, Wendell Willkie, was no isolationist and, in fact, 
helped to create the bipartisan foreign policy of World War 
II-Roosevelt decided that his experience was indispensable 
to the proper handling of the situation. This indispensable 
man was the same F.D.R. who said in 1932, "The genius of 
America is greater than any candidate or any party." And it 
was the same F.D.R. for whom Rosenman helped prepare 
the speech given at Shibe Park in Philadelphia on October 
27, 1944. Rosenman says about that address: 
Roosevelt wanted to talk about the strenuous and exacting 
role a President has to carry as Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army and Navy in the conduct of a war. The political point 
was obvious even though unspoken: That the man who 
since 1937 had been preparing the country physically and 
mentally for what was coming, who had been conducting a 
successful global war for almost four years, should be con-
tinued in office to finish the job; that it would be inadvis-
able to tum it over to inexperienced hands.17 
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy under Woodrow 
Wilson, has set down some pungent comments on the pre-
vailing desire of our Chief Executives to prolong their 
White House tenancy, though not all of them were as insist-
ent as Roosevelt upon their indispensability. 
Why do I think Wilson, even though partially paralyzed, 
would have felt constrained to have accepted if nominated? 
Because he would have regarded it as a command with a 
vital principle as the issue, and his views were so well known 
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that personal campaigning would not be necessary. There 
is another reason based upon some acquaintance with Presi-
dents and some knowledge of politics and history. It is my 
deliberate judgment that, since Andrew Jackson returned to 
the Hermitage after having hand-picked Martin Van Buren 
as his successor and paved the way for Polk, his political 
protege, to carry on his policies-since Old Hickory's day, 
no President has willingly left the White House. There is 
something about the office and place that makes all after-
life lack that something which only the White House gives. 
If Wilson had been a well man, he would, in my opinion, 
have been willing to break the old three-term jinx in devo-
tion to the League. It is well known that Theodore Roose-
velt expected to resume residence after one term for Taft, 
and that he never lost the animus revertandi, even bolting 
the Republican Party in 1912 and organizing a new party 
which he thought would lead to the White House. Most 
people believe if he had lived he would have been given the 
Republican nomination in 1920. When Cleveland's term 
expired in 1889, he declared that he was happy to be re-
lieved of the duties and retire to private life. But he was 
fooling himself and the public, he did not fool his wife. As 
she was leaving the White House she told a faithful Negro 
who had long been there, "Keep everything as it is now so 
that we will find no change when we return in 1893." 
Taft felt that Teddy had "done him wrong" when he 
sought to oust him in 1912 but was somewhat consoled when 
he was made Chief Justice. He wanted a second term and 
felt he was entitled to such an encore when Wilson won. 
When Coolidge said "I do not choose to run," he thought 
that delphic utterance would cause the people to break the 
third-term tradition for him without his initiating it. No 
man was ever more disappointed when his statement was 
construed to mean that he did not desire the nomination. 
Hoover has never really found himself since his ejection 
from the White House. No President ever worked harder 
than Hoover, or, in his own peculiar way, enjoyed being 
President more than Hoover. It was not his fault that the 
depression came to make his reelection impossible. 
Franklin Roosevelt loved the great office to which he 
added distinction. He did not need great persuasion to ac-
cept nominations that gave him the unprecedented honor of 
being elected four times.is 
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After four years at the head of the mightiest nation in 
the world a man is bound to feel indispensable. It is a nat-
ural reaction to the adulation the President receives from 
the public, and to the customs which have attached to the 
presidency. From the minute he occupies the national shrine 
called the White House a President is constantly reminded 
of his importance. "Ladies first" does not apply at the 
White House-protocol demands that the President get into 
the car first; when the President enters a room, everyone 
stands; no one leaves a room before he does; the President 
is served first at all meals; wherever he appears he is the 
center of interest, attention, solicitude-"Hail to the Chief!" 
blare all the bands. No law can change the deeply rooted 
tendency toward presidential deification. Since prehistoric 
times human beings have stood in awe of power, and a 
President is a symbol of power. Homage to the President is 
often justified on the grounds that it is paid to the office, 
not the officeholder, but it cannot fail to affect him: a man 
who has experienced the pomp and circumstance of the 
presidency can never again be as other men. 
George Washington, who observed the weaknesses of 
men in times of triumph as well as of trial, wisely set the 
two-term tradition. When that precedent was finally broken 
by Franklin Roosevelt, the American people, much as they 
revered F.D.R., amended the Constitution to make it cer-
tain that no President ever again would hold office longer 
than eight years. But the people, by their adulation of the 
President, share the responsibility for the "indispensable 
President" concept, whether it is in connection with the 
two-term tradition or with presidential inability. It was fit-
ting that we should limit the term of office; it is equally 
appropriate for us to stifle the misguided ambition of a sick 
executive and insist that he surrender his powers until he 
is well. Therefore, while the Kennedy-Johnson memoran-
dum wisely allows a President to step aside temporarily, the 
history of the Presidency and human nature, not the Tyler 
precedent, make it highly unlikely that he will do so. 
Section 2 of the presidential memorandum provides for 
a situation in which the President is unable to communicate 
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with the Vice President. If such a situation should arise the 
Vice President may take action "after such consultation as 
seems to him appropriate under the circumstances." 
All those who have undertaken studies of any depth 
agree that, under the present Constitution, the Vice Presi-
dent determines disability. It is inconceivable that the dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention, with their practical 
approach to these matters, intended the Vice President to 
make the decision without ascertaining the facts of the 
President's illness. To do this adequately, he would first 
have to consult with the President's doctors, then the Cabi-
net. If time allowed, he might also wish to discuss the mat-
ter with the President's family. So, when the memorandum 
allows the Vice President such "consultation as seems to 
him appropriate under the circumstances," it is merely re-
flecting the present state of the Constitution. Of course, if 
consultation were required with specific people, this would 
amount to amending the Constitution by memorandum. 
Such a result would follow any understanding that a certain 
person, say the Attorney General, were to be consulted. 
This section, as it presently stands, may be good consti-
tutional law, but here again the law is far removed from 
practicality. Was Thomas R. Marshall kept informed of 
Wilson's condition? Well enough informed to make a deci-
sion on disability? Was Arthur carefully advised of Gar-
field's progress during the eighty days the President was 
disabled? The basic problem is one of keeping the Vice 
President and the public informed. The public announce-
ments during the Eisenhower illnesses were as novel as they 
were appropriate, and it must not be forgotten that they 
were entirely discretionary on the part of the President and 
his official family. There is no assurance that future Presi-
dents will follow the Eisenhower precedent rather than the 
practices of Garfield and Wilson. There is no law in 1962 
which even requires the President to have a physical exam-
ination, let alone make the results public; any President 
may refuse to tell anyone anything about the state of his 
health. "Why not?" say some people. "It's a private matter." 
Such reasoning gives inordinate emphasis to the right of 
privacy, a right which any man who enters public life relin-
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quishes in part. The health of the President of the United 
States in the twentieth century is not only every American's 
business, it is also of vital importance to millions of foreign 
peoples. 
Section 3 of the agreement states that whether the Presi-
dent or the Vice President has declared the inability, the 
President may determine when it is over, and forthwith 
resume the full exercise of the powers and duties of the 
office. Since it was this proviso in the original Eisenhower 
program which drew fire from Congress, and which was 
amended in the subsequent proposal to provide for the re-
moval of an unwilling President without impeachment, it 
is surprising to find Attorney General Robert Kennedy's 
opinion ignoring this aspect of the situation. While he cites 
Rogers and Brownell in support of the idea that the Presi-
dent should determine his own recovery, he omits any refer-
ence to the fact that Eisenhower, Brownell, and Rogers all 
subsequently agreed on the necessity for changing their pro-
posed constitutional amendment. The Attorney General 
cites no other authorities in this regard, and ends the argu-
ment by quoting the remarks made by Senator Cole in 1881 
that the remedy should be by impeachment. 
The opinion and the memorandum are subject to valid 
criticism on another point. Attorney General Kennedy 
stresses throughout his opinion that it is the Vice President 
who determines disability. But this power carries with it the 
implication that the Vice President also determines when 
there is no disability, in other words, when he should not 
act as President. Thus, the Attorney General's reasoning is 
illogical, for if the Vice President does not determine when 
the President is well, how is he supposed to determine when 
he is ailing? Before the Attorney General's reasoning in this 
respect is accepted, he will have to produce considerably 
more authority to make absolutely certain that a shift in 
vested constitutional powers is not being accomplished by 
a private memorandum. 
There are several drawbacks to the alternate procedure 
of having the Congress determine the President's recovery 
if there is a dispute. First of all, such a procedure is illogical. 
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Although its proponents, Rogers and Brownell, did not 
favor letting Congress determine disability when the Presi-
dent first takes ill, when a dispute arises between a President 
and the Vice President later on, they suggest that the mat-
ter be resolved by a two-thirds vote of both Houses. Why is 
it a violation of the separation of powers doctrine in one 
instance and not in the other? The same reasons which mili-
tate against Congress deciding the problem in the first place 
are even more applicable when the two executives differ. A 
prompt decision would be required and congressional de-
termination would take months-and how many congress-
men could resist the opportunity to make political capital 
out of the situation? 
The imperfections and potential trouble spots in the 
memorandum should be apparent. Both Eisenhower and 
Kennedy recognize the need for Congressional action. It will 
take much more than a private understanding to insure 
perpetuation of the wise precedent established by President 
Eisenhower. 
This was amply proven by the fact that Congress has 
made no provision for the publication or even the preserva-
tion of the originals of the Eisenhower-Nixon and Kennedy-
} ohnson agreements. There is no provision for depositing 
the original Eisenhower memorandum with the Secretary of 
State or publishing it in the Federal Register. According to 
Ann Whitman, it was necessary for the Eisenhower-Nixon 
agreement to be "very tightly held and to my certain knowl-
edge less than a handful of people in Washington have ever 
seen the documents."19 The same situation prevails with 
regard to the Kennedy-Johnson agreement. It is only by the 
grace of the two Presidents that these private understand-
ings were made public. Almost any type of arrangement 
could be made on this crucial subject, and there exists no 
legal requirement that it be made public. It is a strange 
situation when the law requires publication of presidential 
proclamations on matters involving the administration of 
Palmyra Island, National Forest Products Week, and dele-
gation of authority with respect to foreign assistance,20 but 
an agreement determining succession to the presidency must 
be "tightly held"! 
Chapter VI 
Colonial Precedents and State Laws 
Every attempt to find a solution to the problems of presi-
dential inability must begin with the Constitution itself-
with a study not only of the succession clause and of other 
provisions, but of the records and history of the Constitu-
tional Convention, the debates in the Convention and the 
ratifying conventions, and also such contemporary writings 
as Madison's Notes and Hamilton's Federalist papers. 
All previous scholars, however, have confined themselves 
to the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and the de-
gree to which the presidential inability clause is based on 
similar clauses in colonial charters and state constitutions 
has never been thoroughly considered.• Yet since precedent 
and personal experience are great opinion-molders, these 
documents surely merit examination. As Attorney General 
Robert F. Kennedy has written: 
In attempting to ascertain the intention of the framers 
of the Constitution, it is helpful to know what the practice 
was in the thirteen States when the Constitution was 
adopted. We would expect that the provisions of those State 
Constitutions dealing with succession in event of a gov-
ernor's inability definitely influenced and shaped the think-
ing of the framers of the Constitution in determining what 
provisions should be made in event of presidential inability. 
Accordingly we may consider those State constitutional pro-
visions as a guide in interpreting the corresponding succes-
sion clause in the Constitution of the United States.1 
l. COLONIAL PRECEDENTS 
The pre-Federal period (1604-1789) affords many exam-
ples of a "deputie governour" tempararily performing the 
governor's duties. The conditions of frontier life made such 
•The notable exception is Irving Williams, The Rise of the J'ice 
Presidency (New York: Public Affairs Press, 1956), where colonial expe-
rience is considered with reference to secondary sources (p. 16). 
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forehanded arrangements essential if there were not to be 
lapses in executive power. Traveling involved months, not 
hours. Common disasters were not atomic in nature, but 
common disasters there were. Danger to the community as 
a whole was always imminent-from the Indians, from epi-
demic disease. A measure of the colonists' chances for sur-
vival is tellingly expressed in a single statistic: during this 
period the average life span for males was twenty-seven 
years. 
The uncertainties of existence in the New World were 
certainly borne in mind by the delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention. Many of the delegates were lawyers and 
thoroughly conversant with the provisions in colonial char-
ters framed for the specific purpose of preventing voids in 
the exercise of power. Colonial practice in this respect re-
mained virtually the same from founding of the first colony, 
Jamestown, until the adoption of the Constitution. 
A deputy governor for Jamestown was named as early as 
1617, three years after the colony was founded. Moreover, 
due to the chief executive's inability to depart for his post, 
the deputy governor was obliged to assume office.2 
William Penn received the grant of Pennsylvania from 
King Charles II in 1681; he was resident in the colony from 
1682 to 1684, and then returned to England. The King's 
grant refers to the "governor, or his Deputy," but says noth-
ing about the procedure required for the deputy to assume 
office. In 1689 it was necessary for Penn, then Governor of 
Pennsylvania, to report to the King on the status of the 
colony. He wrote to the Pennsylvania Assembly: 
And if you Desire a Deputy Governor rather, name 
three, or five, and I shall name one of them, so as you Con-
sider of a Comfortable substance, that ye Government may 
not go a begging.a 
Penn thereafter appointed a man as deputy and lieutenant 
to act in his name. 
Seventeen of the colonial charters and constitutions in 
effect at various times before the adoption of the Federal 
Constitution provide for a lieutenant governor or his equiv-
alent. Fifteen of the seventeen gave him status as "acting 
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governor"; and of the fifteen, four provide for the governor's 
powers to be exercised during his absence, ten for the in-
ability or "sickness" of the governor. Colonial precedent is 
clear. Only the constitutions of South Carolina of 1776 and 
1777 state that the lieutenant governor succeeds to the office 
of governor, and these provisions were later amended. In 
April, 1961, the constitutions of eleven of the original thir-
teen states adhered to colonial practice. Only Rhode Island 
and Virginia follow the "Tyler trend."4 
The very early charters of the colonies gave the govern-
ing power to the owners or their descendants. If an owner 
was absent, his son could assume his powers and there 
would be no delay in the execution of the laws. The same 
rule applied when a governor died. In cases of inability, the 
governor "deputized" the lieutenant governor, otherwise 
the latter automatically made the determination. This cus-
tom of automatic transfer of power developed at the same 
time as the rule of descent. In line with the latter concept, 
some of the charters provided for a regency if the owner's 
descendant was a minor.• But as democracy evolved in the 
colonies, deputization replaced succession by descent as the 
general practice, and this custom continued after the Decla-
ration of Independence. 
Alexander Hamilton refers to state disability provisions 
in The Federalist. After discussing the Federal Convention's 
reasons for electing a Vice President and making him pre-
siding officer of the Senate, Hamilton says: 
... The other consideration is, that as the Vice President 
may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in 
the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which rec-
ommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply 
with great if not with equal force to the manner of appoint-
ing the other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other 
instances, the objection which is made would lie against 
the constitution of this state [New York]. We have a Lieu-
tenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who pre-
sides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for 
•The disability provisions of all the colonial charters and early state 
constitutions may be found in Appendix II. 
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the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would 
authorize the Vice-President to exercise and discharge the 
duties of the President.11 
Thus, the spirit and the letter of the law of the pre-
Federal period substantiates the interpretation placed on 
the inability clause of the Federal Constitution by Henry E. 
Davis at the time of President Garfield's illness, and by a 
majority of scholars since that date, including Eisenhower's 
and Kennedy's Attorneys General. 
2. EXPERIENCE IN THE STATES SINCE 1789 
Obviously the interpretation given a state constitution 
cannot be applied to the federal document, except by com-
parison. But we have had four or five times as many gov-
ernors as Presidents, and there is a correspondingly greater 
amount of experience from which to draw in appraising 
laws of succession. 
Disability clauses in state constitutions, as in the Federal 
Constitution, are part of a general section dealing with suc-
cession. Disability is grouped with other contingencies, like 
impeachment or death. In order to understand the inter-
pretation given to the disability clause of the succession sec-
tion, it is necessary to examine the cases dealing with the 
other contingencies. 
Death 
The question of succession in the states most frequently 
follows the death of the chief executive. It becomes a court 
matter, as a rule, when the man who has to fill the gov-
ernor's shoes wants to know if he will receive the governor's 
salary. 
The first interpretation of a succession clause dates back 
to the death of Governor DeWitt Clinton of New York, who 
died on February 11, 1828. Nathaniel Pritcher, Lieutenant 
Governor, raised the question of whether he was entitled to 
the salary of governor or lieutenant governor. William M. 
Marcy, comptroller of New York, said Pritcher was acting 
governor, and entitled by law to the salary given the gov-
ernor. 
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The state courts have followed Marcy's ruling in "succes-
sion by death" cases, right up to the most recent one in 
Florida in 1953.6 The only exceptions have been in Oregon 
and Wyoming.7 In Wyoming, for example, the second man 
in line is the secretary of state, a common line of succession 
in smaller states which find eliminating a paycheck for lieu-
tenant governor a convenient method of economizing. But 
the Wyoming court seemed not to be thinking of economy 
when it ruled that the secretary of state, when he acts as 
governor, is entitled to both salaries. This is an odd decision 
for any state to make and certainly places Wyoming in a 
class by itself. 
There is no question that a majority of state courts, in 
these "succession by death" cases, have refused to follow the 
Tyler precedent. 
Impeachment 
Succession by impeachment is a completely different type 
of situation from succession by death. The word "impeach-
ment" itself is often misunderstood: it refers to the proceed-
ing by which an executive is accused of wrongdoing and 
brought to trial. At the federal and state levels, the actual 
complaint is made by the House of Representatives, and the 
trial is held in the Senate, with the Chief Justice presiding. 
The senators act as the jury. The legal questions surround-
ing impeachment in the states involve the problem of 
whether the governor is suspended from his duties at the 
time of filing of the charges against him, or after his convic-
tion. If he is suspended, what is the status of the person who 
acts as governor during the interval? The leading case origi-
nates in Nebraska. 
In the early 1870's Nebraska had a young Republican 
governor, David Butler, who had overstepped the law in 
encouraging land sales and pushing the building of the 
state Capitol in the new town of Lincoln. The legislature 
had been inclined to excuse technical irregularities in ap-
preciation of his great services to the public, but Butler 
continued to cut corners and play fast and loose, and a day 
of reckoning finally came. When the Governor was unable 
to account satisfactorily for funds collected from the sale of 
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school lands, the house of representatives approved articles 
of impeachment against him and he was subsequently con-
victed on the charge that he had appropriated the funds 
collected from the federal government to his own use. At 
the time the articles of impeachment were filed, the legisla-
ture addressed a letter to the state supreme court asking its 
opinion regarding Butler's status pending his trial by the 
senate. Justices Lake and Crounse held that in the case of 
impeachment the functions of the governor are entirely 
suspended until his acquittal, when they again become 
operative, or until his conviction, when the suspension be-
comes permanent.a Butler was, of course, permanently re-
moved from office, but the important aspect of the decision 
is that the secretary of state became acting governor during 
the proceedings against the chief executive. Similar hold-
ings have been made in New York, North Dakota, and 
Oklahoma.9 Thus, here again the Tyler trend has been dis-
regarded and the precedent established from colonial times 
recognized and applied by the states. 
Resignation 
If governors are not as reluctant as Presidents to relin-
quish office, the answer no doubt resides in the relative im-
portance of their posts: a governor, unlike a President, may 
be able to climb to a higher rung on the political ladder. 
At any rate, political advancement seems to be most fre-
quently the motivating factor in gubernatorial resignations. 
One case in which it did not figure occurred in 1829 
when Sam Houston resigned as Governor of Tennessee be-
cause of a quarrel with his wife. He had unjustly accused 
her of infidelity, and Mrs. Houston-after verbally scalping 
the old Indian fighter-packed up and left. When no 
amount of pleading could induce her to return, Houston 
felt that his domestic difficulties might undermine public 
confidence in him. He wrote to his lieutenant governor: 
. . . Although shielded by a perfect consciousness of undi-
minished claim to the confidence and support of my fellow 
citizens, yet delicately circumstanced as I am and by my 
own misfortunes, more than by the fault or contrivance of 
anyone, overwhelmed by sudden calamities, it is certainly 
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due to myself and respectful to the world, that I should re-
tire from a position which, in the public judgment, I might 
seem to occupy by questionable authority.10 
In recent years a divorced man has twice been nominated 
for the Presidency, and to us today Houston's statement 
might seem overemotional and unnecessary, but his attitude 
was wholly consistent with nineteenth-century morals. 
Houston's case was unique. Most governors resign to 
accept a federal appointment or to campaign for a higher 
office. Martin Van Buren, for example, resigned as Governor 
of New York to run for President. When the traditional 
question arose as to the status of his successor, Lieutenant 
Governor Enos T. Throop, the question was decided by 
Silas Wright, then comptroller, in the same manner as his 
predecessor had decided the Clinton-Pritcher case. Wright 
said that Throop became acting governor, exercising the 
powers and duties of the office.11 
Five other court cases are reported concerning governors 
who resigned.12 In four cases the men involved quit the 
governorship to advance their political careers: Governors 
Joseph T. Robinson of Kansas and Francis E. Warren of 
Wyoming resigned to take office as United States Senators, 
while Governor John W. Griggs of New Jersey became At-
torney General of the United States. Governor James H. 
Peabody of Colorado resigned in favor of his lieutenant 
governor, but remained in the political spotlight and later 
became United States Senator. There have been other cases 
of gubernatorial resignations, but they did not come before 
the courts. While figures are not available, the trend evi-
denced in the court cases would probably be followed. 
In sharp contrast to those situations in which incum-
bents voluntarily abandon the governor's chair are the 
dramas enacted when men are either so hellbent to attain 
the office or to hang onto it that they will resort to force. 
Governor-elect Eugene Talmadge of Georgia died on De-
cember 1, 1946, before publication by the legislature of the 
returns verifying his election; M. E. Thompson was the 
lieutenant governor-elect. The Talmadge machine had con-
trolled Georgia politics for years, so it came as no surprise 
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when the legislature proceeded to name Herman Talmadge, 
son of the late Governor-elect, for the office. However, 
Georgia's laws provide that the legislature can select a gov-
ernor only if the people fail to cast a majority of votes for 
one candidate. The Georgia Supreme Court, where the con-
test was taken, decided that Eugene Talmadge, though dead 
when the votes were counted, had received a majority, hence 
the legislators' choice of Herman Talmadge was void.1B 
Then who was governor? Thompson? But he had been 
elected lieutenant governor. What about Ellis Arnall, the 
incumbent governor? The supreme court said Arnall held 
over as governor, not acting governor. On January 18, 1947, 
Arnall resigned in favor of Thompson. Herman Talmadge 
instantly declared war, establishing a beachhead on Arnall's 
doorstep when the latter refused to surrender to the ma-
chine, and only quick action by the supreme court made a 
peace treaty possible. The Georgia judges endorsed Thomp-
son's right to the governor's chair, but-in a decision oddly 
at variance with their earlier ruling-said that Thompson 
was acting governor. The case illustrates what can happen 
when the law is fuzzy and men are greedy. 
An even more fantastic game of Musical Chairs occurred 
in Louisiana in 1930 when Louisiana's "Kingfish"-Gov-
ernor Huey P. Long-was elected to the United States Sen-
ate. Lieutenant Governor Paul Narcisse Cyr, a foe of Long's, 
took the governor's oath before a notary public on the 
theory that Long's election to the Senate vacated the gov-
ernor's office. The Kingfish, having prevented Cyr's takeover 
by calling out the National Guard, maintained that since 
Cyr had taken the governor's oath he had deprived himself 
of his rights to the office of lieutenant governor, and that 
A. 0. King, president pro tern of the State Senate and third 
in line to the governorship, automatically had become lieu-
tenant governor. By a coincidence, King happened to be a 
member of the Long organization. The whole situation 
lapsed into low comedy when W. L. Aldrich, a private citi-
zen with a sense of humor, also took the governor's oath. 
"Since there are two governors," Aldrich said, "I see no rea-
son why we shouldn't have threel" Less amusing-since it 
demonstrated that Long's hold on the state extended even 
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to the judiciary-was the decision of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. It ruled in favor of A. 0. King, adopting Long's 
incredible theory which deprived Cyr of the lieutenant gov-
ernorship on the ground that he had pressed an unconsti-
tutional claim to the office of governor. Justice St. Paul said: 
This court has no more authority to inquire into the title 
of Huey P. Long ... than would a court of the United 
States be authorized to inquire into the title of Herbert 
Hoover, to the office of President of the United States.14 
President Hoover was not asked to comment on the case, 
but it is doubtful that he would have appreciated either the 
reasoning or the analogy .... Long postponed his move to 
Washington until 1932 when 0. K. Allen, a Long protege, 
was elected governor. 
Disability 
The reported cases on the problem of gubernatorial dis-
ability-there are only two-differ from the Garfield and 
Wilson situations because the determination of inability 
was made by the courts, not by a cabinet. The case of Gov-
ernor David H. Goodall of New Hampshire, which deals 
with the subject at some length, affords the better example. 
Governor Goodall became ill early in 1890. By March 31 
his condition was such that he wrote to his attorney general: 
Please take such steps as you think necessary to cause 
the president of the senate to exercise the powers of the 
office of governor during the vacancy caused by my illness. 
I am not able to perform the duties of the office, and public 
service should not suffer from my inability.111 
Upon receipt of this letter the attorney general peti-
tioned the Supreme Court of New Hampshire for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the president of the senate to exercise 
the executive powers and duties. Chief Justice Charles Doe's 
opinion is the classic one in this field: 
From 1784 to 1792 the governor (then styled President 
of the State of New Hampshire) was president of the senate. 
Instead of his present power of vetoing or approving bills 
passed by the senate and house, he had "a vote equal with 
any other member" of the senate and also "a casting vote in 
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case of a tie," and when his office was vacant all his powers 
were exercised by "the senior senator." When the constitu-
tion took effect and the legislature met for the inauguration 
of the new government, June 2, 1784, Meshech Weare, the 
governor-elect, was unable to be present. In brief periods of 
his illness and absence, in June, 1784, and February, 1785, 
his duties were performed by Woodbury Langdon, senior 
senator, acting as governor pro tem. On both occasions 
Langdon presided in the senate, by virtue of his provisional 
tenure of the governor's office; and on the 8th of June, 1784, 
as governor, he sat with the council, and exercised the gov-
ernor's power (with the required advice and consent of the 
council) of signing warrants for the payment of money .... 
The authority of this precedent has not been shaken, and it 
does not appear that the soundness of the contemporaneous 
construction has ever been doubted.16 
The period of New Hampshire history to which Chief 
Justice Doe referred coincided with the holding of the Fed-
eral Convention in 1787 and the ratification and operation 
of the Constitution in 1789. The experience of Governor 
Weare in New Hampshire in 1784 and what Doe calls "the 
contemporaneous construction" of the state's disability 
clause casts considerable light on the thinking of the states-
men of the period. The men who drafted the New Hamp-
shire Constitution of 1784 sought to avert the dangers of 
an interregnum just as did the delegates to the Federal Con-
vention. The Chief Justice wrote in this connection: 
The mischief designed to be prevented was the suspen-
sion of executive government by the governor's death, 
absence from the state, or disability .... The prescribed 
remedy is the duty of a substitute to act in cases of necessity. 
The services of a substitute may be necessary when the gov-
ernor's absence or inability is temporary as well as when it 
is permanent. . .. In article 49, "vacant by reason of his 
death, absence from the state, or otherwise," has a broader 
significance if due weight is given to the evidential force llf 
the primary and leading purpose that the executive work 
shall go on without interruption. An intermittent vacancy, 
such as occurred in the time of Governor Weare, may occur 
again; and the evils of an interregnum, which article 49 was 
intended to prevent, are not to be introduced by technical 
reasoning or arbitrary rules ... .17 
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Since Doe wrote this opinion a scant nine years after the 
Garfield case, the use of the words "technical reasoning" 
has special significance. By recognizing the difference be-
tween temporary and permanent inability, Doe relegated 
the Tyler decision to the scrap heap so far as its application 
to state succession laws was concerned. 
It is apparent that the Chief Justice felt that politics 
should not be the primary factor in determining inability, 
for his opinion continues: 
It is proved by medical testimony that the governor is still 
in the physical condition stated in his letter to the attorney 
general, and that his disability may be reasonably expected 
to last a few weeks and perhaps a few months. It is proved 
by the testimony of the secretary of state and the state treas-
urer that there is executive business demanding immediate 
attention, and that the governor's duties should no longer 
remain unperformed. The case being one of necessity, article 
49 directs the president of the senate to exercise executive 
powers until the governor resumes them.1s 
Since Governor Goodall himself had declared his inabil-
ity, the court was not faced with a decision regarding deter-
mination of that condition. But Chief Justice Doe also 
considered the problem of the "reluctant chief executive": 
There might be a case in which the attorney general 
would intervene without such request. While a determina-
tion of the question of vacancy on a petition of this kind 
is not legally requisite to call the president of the senate to 
the executive chair, it may be a convenient mode of avoid-
ing embarrassment that might sometimes arise from doubt 
and controversy in regard to his authority, and the validity 
of his acts. The existence of an executive vacancy is a ques-
tion of law and fact within the judicial jurisdiction. If the 
defendant exercised executive power without a previous 
judgment on that question, the legality of his acts could be 
contested and determined in subsequent litigation, and the 
judicial character of the question does not depend upon the 
time when it is brought into court. With adequate legal 
process, the consideration and decision of such a question 
may be prospective as well as retrospective.19 
In stressing that adequate legal process would insure the 
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consideration and decision on disability in advance of the 
acting governor's assuming power as well as afterward, the 
Chief Justice probably had in mind two writs which are 
known in legal language as "quo warranto" and "manda-
mus." A quo warranto action is brought against an officer of 
the government to determine by what right (quo warranto) 
he holds office. Mandamus, as the Latin implies, is in the 
nature of an order to compel him to perform the functions 
of his office. Either of these modes could be used to bring 
about a determination of disability by the courts. 
The second recorded case concerning gubernatorial dis-
ability occurred in Ohio in 1907. The situation here was 
significantly different, for the governor had not relinquished 
office voluntarily. In a superficial opinion, the Ohio court 
showed its ignorance of constitutional law. Scholars are gen-
erally agreed that under most constitutional provisions the 
alternate or substitute officer should determine disability. 
Henry E. Davis wrote that 
In the absence of any designation to the contrary, "it may 
be taken to be axiomatic that when the Constitution im-
poses a duty on an officer, to be done by him, he must be 
the sole judge when and how to do that duty, subject only 
to his responsibility to the people and to the risk of im-
peachment if he act corruptly or improperly." ... 20 
Similarly, former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, in a 
summary cited by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, 
stated that 
By a well-known principle of law, whenever any official by 
law or person by private contract is designated to perform 
certain duties on the happening of certain contingencies, 
unless otherwise specified, that person who bears the respon-
sibility for performing the duties must also determine when 
the contingency for the exercise of his powers arises .... 21 
Nevertheless, the Ohio court held that the extreme illness of 
the governor did not cause his powers and duties to devolve 
upon the lieutenant governor because the governor 
had not voluntarily relinquished the office. A self-contained 
Lieutenant Governor could not be expected to assume the 
function of the Governor upon his own initiative.22 
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Actual practice has given additional weight to Attorney 
General v. Taggart, the New Hampshire decision. Governor 
John S. Little of Arkansas suffered a nervous breakdown in 
1907. Although Little did not resign and was considered 
governor for the balance of the term, the president and 
president pro tern of the senate exercised the powers and 
duties of the office. Governor Chamberlain of Oregon died 
in 1910 and was succeeded by Frank M. Benson, the secre-
tary of state. When Benson became incapacitated, Jay Bow-
erman, president of the senate, acted as governor for the 
remainder of the term.2s As late as 1935, the New Hamp-
shire court indicated its support of the Taggart case: a 
unanimous decision by the court made the distinction be-
tween temporary and permanent inability and permitted 
the president pro tem of the senate to act as governor when 
that officer was absent from the state.24 
Perhaps the most extended case of gubernatorial disabil-
ity occurred in Illinois in the late l 930's. Following a heart 
attack in November, 1938, Governor Henry Homer spent 
several months in Florida to regain his health. Despite his 
illness he would not surrender his office. He returned to 
Illinois in April, 1939. On April 8, just before the state pri-
mary, Lieutenant Governor Stelle proclaimed himself acting 
governor and called for a special session of the legislature 
to meet on the same day that Governor Horner had con-
vened the lawmakers. However, the official seal was affixed 
on Governor Horner's call but not on Lieutenant Governor 
Stelle's proclamation, and when the legislature met, Stelle 
took his seat as presiding officer of the senate. Subsequently 
a private citizen brought a mandamus action to compel 
Stelle to serve as acting governor. The court held that Gov-
ernor Homer was a necessary party to the suit; he did not 
reside in the county in which the action was brought, and 
therefore the court had no jurisdiction. On October 5, 1939, 
Homer's secretary signed a "disability certificate" an<i filed 
it with the secretary of state. The next day Homer died, and 
Stelle at last was able to step in. Illinois had been without a 
governor for just a few weeks short of a year.25 
Two dramatic cases of gubernatorial disability which 
occurred in 1959 were alike only in that in each instance 
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the incumbent clung grimly to his office. The case of Gov-
ernor Earl K. Long made headlines the length and breadth 
of the land for nearly a month. According to an impartial 
summary of events: 
After a week in which [Governor Long] had burst into 
profanity on two occasions in the state legislature, he was 
flown from Baton Rouge to Galveston, Texas, May 30 for 
mental observation in John Sealy Hospital. After medical 
testimony that Long was mentally ill and likely to injure 
himself or others, Probate Judge Hugh Gibson of Galves-
ton, at the request of the Governor's wife, Blanche, ordered 
him held in protective custody at the hospital June 2 pend-
ing a court hearing. Long charged in a court petition in 
Galveston June 12 that he had been drugged in Louisiana, 
bound and taken to Galveston by force. He was released 
from John Sealy Hospital June 17 and flown to New Or-
leans on his promise to enter Ochsner Foundation Hospital 
there, which he did. Long stormed out of the hospital June 
18 and headed for Baton Rouge in a car, but was intercepted 
... by State Police armed with a court order requested by 
his wife; he was committed to Southeast Louisiana State 
Hospital at Mandeville. In a move that prevented his wife 
from opposing his discharge from the hospital Long filed 
suit June 19 for a legal separation. Prior to a court hearing 
at Covington, La., June 26 Long discharged the director of 
state hospitals and the superintendent of the Mandeville 
institution and named two new officials, who declared him 
sane and a free man. The court then dismissed the pro-
ceedings. 26 
During the period of Long's confinement, Lieutenant Gov-
ernor Lether Frazer hesitantly took over the gubernatorial 
duties-"until I learn something else." Attorney General 
Jack Gremillion declared Frazer was acting governor until 
Long could resume his job. After being "released" from 
Mandeville, Long exercised the duties of governor, but his 
physical and mental condition deteriorated. In September 
he withdrew from the primary race for governor, ran for 
lieutenant governor, and was defeated. The following year 
he ran for Congress, won the nomination, and died nine 
days later. While the affairs of the state of Louisiana, as well 
as its prestige, suffered as a result of this unfortunate se-
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quence of events, the episode did at least dramatize luridly 
the woeful state of our succession laws. 
The second case occurred in Nebraska. On April 17, 
1959, Governor Ralph G. Brooks suffered a stroke while en 
route in a plane from Kansas City to Lincoln. The attack 
was first characterized as "influenza," then as "diabetes and 
complete exhaustion," then as a "slight stroke," and finally 
on May l as "cerebral thrombosis."27 Brooks's prolonged 
absences because of ill health were toted up in an editorial 
on April 28, 1960: during his seventeen months in office, 
the Governor had "been hospitalized for 47 days and off the 
job for health reasons for a total of about three months."28 
On August 24, 1960, Brooks was again hospitalized for treat-
ment of a virus infection; it affected his heart and his condi-
tion was termed critical on August 30.29 At this time he was 
a candidate for the United States Senate, but Brooks refused 
to withdraw from the campaign. The deadline for with-
drawal was 5:00 P.M., September 9. At 3:20 P.M. on that day, 
in spite of the fact that his lungs were filling with fluid, the 
Governor announced that he was "sticking in the Senate 
race." He died twenty minutes after making the announce-
ment.80 
During Brooks's last illness there was no agreement on 
the procedure for determining disability. The attorney gen-
eral's office issued no official opinion, although that officer 
commented to the press that "it was up to the Governor." 
Lieutenant Governor Dwight Burney said that any citizen 
could call a hearing before the attorney general; the attor-
ney general denied this; the Governor's administrative as-
sistant said that the whole problem was a medical question. 
Lieutenant Governor Burney was advised informally that 
he could determine the Governor's disability himself, but 
he was afraid of the public reaction and the political conse-
quences that would follow such a step, since he was a Re-
publican and Brooks a Democrat.st 
In 1961 the Nebraska Legislature passed a bill which 
created a board of three men to determine disability. Two 
members are to be doctors and the third is the state's chief 
justice.82 Oregon recently passed a similar law creating a 
disability board composed of the chief justice, the superin-
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tendent of the state hospital at Salem, and the dean of the 
University of Oregon Medical College.33 
The constitutions of only three states-Alabama, Missis· 
sippi, and New Jersey-mention the method of determining 
disability. In Alabama the supreme court makes the deter-
mination, but can act only in cases of "unsoundness of 
mind." In Mississippi the secretary of state submits the 
question to the supreme court, and in New Jersey the 
supreme court decides, but the legislature instigates the 
action.84 Although the constitutions of Texas and Alaska 
provide for the procedure to be prescribed by the legisla-
ture, to date these bodies have taken no action. 
Commenting on the present practice of the states in his 
1961 opinion, Attorney General Kennedy noted that 
today with very few exceptions, State Constitutions expressly 
or impliedly provide that where the governor is unable to 
exercise the powers and duties of his office, the officer next 
in line of succession shall discharge them, but only tem-
porarily.• 
The inferences to be drawn from this review of State 
practice and experience relating to gubernatorial disability 
and its bearing upon this problem of presidential inability 
have been summarized forcefully by Professor Kallenbach: 
" ... State experience reinforces the point observable in 
national experience that situations of various kinds can 
and do arise involving inability of the Chief Executive to 
exercise his powers and which require devolution of these 
powers for an indefinite period of time upon the officer next 
in line of succession. It shows that constitutional provisions 
on this point are, in effect, self-executing. It shows that 
devolution of power in these circumstances can be brought 
about by simple acquiescence of the incumbent when he is 
able to recognize his incapacity. He does not, by so doing, 
remove himself from office, but merely acquiesces in the 
operation of the constitutional rule that permits and re-
quires the succeeding officer to exercise the powers of chief 
executiveship. The officer named by the constitution or laws 
as the one upon whom the authority to act as governor shall 
•According to Joseph E. Kallenbach, Presidential Inability, House 
Committee Print, 84th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1956), p. 40, forty-six states have 
such provisions. 
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devolve has no option but t-0 exercise the powers and duties 
of that office, even though his doing so does not oust the in-
cumbent from the office of governor permanently. His duty 
to so act is an ancillary and conditional function of the 
incumbent in the office next in line in the succession. When 
and if the cause occasioning the temporary devolution of 
power has ceased to be operative, there must be a resump-
tion of his constitutional powers and duties by the tempo-
rarily displaced Chief Executive. His assertion of his right 
and capacity to reassume the powers and duties of his office 
is ordinarily regarded as sufficient to restore them to him."35 
The fact remains, however, that more than half the states 
have no procedure for determining when disability exists, 
and there is considerable confusion over the whole question. 
Many of the state officials queried in a recent survey be-
lieved that the state supreme court could determine disabil-
ity by mandamus or quo warranto proceeding; others felt 
that such a procedure was inadequate.as 
State court decisions on succession make it apparent 
that the "melting pot" label is appropriate to describe our 
legal growth as well as our social and genealogical develop-
ment. The rulings reflect a variety of components, and the 
words of the judges often provide clues to the disparate 
personalities of the governors. In the Huey Long episode in 
Louisiana, political pressure is manifest in the legal lan-
guage, but such cases are indeed the exception. 
An examination of state cases yields four general con-
clusions: 
(1) Few men will voluntarily give up the office of 
governor unless by so doing they improve their political 
position. A sick executive will stay in office regardless of the 
public interest, while the lieutenant governor stands help-
lessly by, waiting for death to determine disability. 
(2) The state judiciary, on the other hand, repudiates 
by implication such action by the governor. When a case 
reaches court, the judges uniformly hold that there should 
be no lapse of executive power-that vigor in the executive 
is an essential of good government. If sometimes the judges 
have done violence to the letter of state laws, or even the 
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state constitution, it has been in order to uphold one of 
the most ancient principles of Anglo-American law-the 
public interest demands that there shall be no interregnum 
in the executive. 
(3) To implement this general purpose the courts have 
interpreted the succession paragraph to affirm and reaffirm 
precedents established as early as Jamestown. They have 
adapted the old practice of deputizing the lieutenant gov-
ernor, the successor now being designated "acting governor." 
The Tyler precedent has a few adherents among the states' 
judiciaries, but its existence is seldom recognized. 
(4) By disregarding the Tyler precedent, the state courts 
have been able to act freely in distinguishing between tem-
porary and permanent inability. They have acted as our 
forefathers looked to us to do, using experience and wisdom 
to adapt the state constitutions to modern needs. 
Chapter VII 
A Basis for Action 
Since the final solution to the problems of presidential 
inability inevitably depends on congressional action, it may 
not be amiss to review the record of congressional considera-
tions of this matter. As summarized by Ruth Silva, it is not 
very heartening: 
The constitutional provision for the exercise of presiden-
tial power during periods of inability received practically 
no attention until the serious and prolonged illness of Presi-
dent Garfield. The [Presidential Succession J Act of 1792 did 
not deal with inability; and the poorly reported debates do 
not show that the Congress even discussed the matter at 
the time the law was passed. In 1856, when the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary was commissioned to study the 
whole succession problem, the Committee did not consider 
this particular aspect of the subject. At least, presidential 
inability was not mentioned in the Committee's report. After 
President Garfield's illness of eighty days, the Forty-seventh, 
the Forty-eighth, and the Forty-ninth Congresses discussed 
the meaning of "inability," its extent and duration, and 
how it should be established. Instead of dealing with the 
problem which had so recently alarmed the country, how-
ever, the Congress named a statutory successor to act as 
President during periods of vacancy or inability in the 
offices of both President and Vice President. 
After the enactment of this law the subject of presiden-
tial inability was again neglected until the illness of Presi-
dent Wilson. During the eighteen months of his disability, 
proposals for dealing with the situation were introduced in 
the Congress, but all were killed in committee. When presi-
dential succession was discussed in the Seventy-ninth and 
the Eightieth Congresses, inability was presented as the real 
problem. It was then urged that a joint committee be estab-
lished to examine all aspects of presidential succession. But 
the Congress created no such committee, ignored all ques-
tions connected with inability, and legislated without bene-
fit of an extensive study. 
In terms of actual occurrence inability is the most 
pressing problem involved in presidential succession. Presi-
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dential power has never passed to a statutory successor; but 
two cases of inability have jeopardized the public interest. 
Yet Congress has enacted three laws establishing a statutory 
line of succession and has done nothing to provide for cases 
of disability .... 1 
The unavailing efforts in more recent years to secure con-
gressional action have been described in preceding chapters, 
and as this book goes to press it appears unlikely that a bill 
on presidential inability will be passed during the second 
session of the Eighty-seventh Congress. 
Apathy and indifference undoubtedly have been respon-
sible in great part for a century of legislative inaction, but 
it would be unfair to say that this is still the case. While it 
is true that too many members of Congress are unaware of 
the numerous ramifications of the problem, those who are 
sincerely concerned and who have made a serious attempt 
to explore it have felt, as Senator Kefauver points out, hon-
est doubt as to the form which either a constitutional 
amendment or a statute should take. Silva has stated that 
"the principal reason for neglect of this subject seems to be 
the difficulty of finding a solution which would be adequate, 
constitutional, and desirable."2 It might be added that his-
tory, common sense, and the pressures of our time demand 
that a sound legislative program provide a plan for deter-
mining presidential inability which is "swift, small, and un-
complicated" as well as trustworthy.3 
The procedural and substantive difficulties inherent in 
the problem can perhaps be stated most clearly in question 
form: (1) Is a constitutional amendment necessary or can 
the gap be filled by statute? and (2) What should be the con-
tent of either the amendment or the statute? 
These were the questions to which the Nebraska Law 
Review addressed itself in a research project which had its 
inception in September, 1960, at a time when President 
Eisenhower's illnesses, the carnival case of Governor Earl 
Long, and the fatal illness of Governor Ralph Brooks were 
very much in the foreground. During the course of this 
nineteen-month study of presidential and gubernatorial dis-
ability, which was directed by the present writer, a detailed 
investigation was undertaken of every disability case to 
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reach the courts-and many which did not. The constitu-
tions of all the states in the Union were scrutinized, and 
colonial precedents were unearthed and carefully perused 
for the first time. This study, the most comprehensive yet 
made, led to several conclusions which may prove useful in 
finding that much-needed "swift, small, and uncomplicated" 
plan for determining presidential disability.4 
I. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
ls an Amendment Necessary1 
The failure of attempts to enact inability legislation, as 
Senator Kefauver has indicated, has resulted as much from 
confusion over procedure as from disagreements on sub-
stantive provisions: the Congress has never been certain 
whether the gap can be closed by a passage of a law, or 
whether a constitutional amendment is required. 
There is a natural reluctance to make changes in our 
basic governmental blueprint. This was the feeling ex-
pressed by former President Hoover in a letter of March 15, 
1962: "It seems to me that an amendment to the Constitu-
tion should be avoided." And he then asked: "Could not an 
act of Congress duly signed by the President serve the pur-
pose?"•5 Herbert Brownell's reasoning is relevant to this 
query: 
Ordinary legislation would only throw one more doubt-
ful element into the picture, for the statute's validity could 
not be tested until the occurrence of the presidential inabil-
ity, the very time at which uncertainty must be precluded. 
Most of the proposals involve a transfer or diminution of 
the Vice President's constitutional power and no statute can 
do this. Thus, a statute which contained the additional 
measures needed-a designation of persons to share with the 
Vice President the power to make the initial decision, or a 
provision for a solution of disputes between the President 
and Vice President-would alter the existing powers of the 
President and Vice President. Even a statute which sought 
•After studying the proposal by Cornelius W. Wickersham (see page 
117), Mr. Hoover wrote to Mr. Wickersham that he felt the amendment 
proposed is "the most interesting to date." 
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to do nothing more than declare the original intent of the 
framers would have to be construed in the light of previous 
constitutional interpretations and the precedents based on 
those interpretations, and would therefore be valueless in 
resolving doubt and uncertainty.6 
A majority of scholars favor an amendment to the Con-
stitution.• Their conclusion is reinforced by the review of 
congressional considerations of inability which opens this 
chapter: as Silva has pointed out, several federal succession 
statutes have been enacted, not one of which has faced up to 
the problem of disability. Moreover, the experience of the 
states since 1789 indicates a reluctance to adopt a statu-
tory solution in the absence of a clear-cut constitutional 
authority.•• 
Those who assert that provision for presidential disabil-
ity may be accomplished by statute would seem to find 
support in some state constitutions. In the Nebraska Consti-
tution, for example, the wording of the disability clause is 
such that disability legislation could be enacted by the 
legislature under the authority given it by the State Consti-
tution to adopt "all laws necessary to carry into effect the 
provisions of this Constitution" (Nebraska Constitution, Art. 
XVII, Sec. VI). The Constitution of the United States has 
a similar "necessary and proper" clause, but the disability 
clause itself bars statutory action. According to Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 5, 
•"Among those who recently expressed themselves in favor of an 
amendment to the Constitution upon the ground that it is either neces-
sary or desirable are: Stephen K. Bailey, Hon. Peter Frelinghuysen, 
Richard C. Huber, Joseph E. Kallenbach, Arthur Krock, Jack W. Pelta-
son, C. Herman Pritchett, Arthur E. Sutherland, Hon. John S. Spark-
man (Presidential Inability, House Committee Print, 84th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., pp. 59-6'). Edgar Waugh, Charles S. Rhyne" (Hearing, Special 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Problem of Presidential In-
ability, 85th Cong., lst Sess., pp. 127, 191). 
••The danger of premature enactment of a statute without exhaust-
ive study of the Constitution involved was pointed out by the author 
in "One Strike and You're Out," New Hampshire Bar journal, July, 
1962. The Nebraska Legislature adopted a gubernatorial disability 
statute without adequate consideration; subsequent study shows it is 
subject to attack on at least two sound constitutional grounds. 
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... Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and 
the Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as 
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. (Em-
phasis added). 
Thus because of the peculiar wording of this section, Con-
gress is excluded from the right to act in the case of 
presidential disability only. 
Nonetheless, the minority group supporting a statutory 
solution continue to base their contention that no constitu-
tional amendment is required on the "necessary and proper" 
clause.• Cornelius W. Wickersham, past chairman of the 
Committee on the Federal Constitution of the New York 
State Bar Association, has commented on their stand in his 
1962 article, "Presidential Inability: Procrastination, Apathy 
and the Constitution": 
Although some who have studied the problem feel that 
Congress has power to deal with the problem under the 
"necessary and proper" provisions of the Constitution, oth-
ers are clearly of the opinion that only a constitutional 
amendment would be satisfactory. The latter rely on the 
fact that the "necessary and proper" clause applies only to 
those matters to which basic policies are laid down in the 
Constitution and does not authorize Congress to fill gaps in 
the policies so laid down. The latter view seems to be sup-
ported by case law•• and furthermore, where a constitu-
tional problem of such vital importance, involving not only 
legal questions but widespread and national implications, is 
concerned it would seem to be most unwise and probably 
of small effect to leave the matter to legislation of doubtful 
cons ti tu tionali ty. 7 
•Among those who currently assert that proposed plans of presiden-
tial inability may be carried out by statute are Everett S. Brown, 
Edward S. Corwin, William F. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, David Fell-
man, James Hart, Arthur N. Holcombe, Mark DeW. Howe. Opinions of 
the Attorneys General, XLII, No. 5 (August 2, 1961), 31 n . 
.. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907); United States v. 
Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (188!1). These cases state the general proposition 
that Congress can legislate only on subjects where the power to legislate 
has been granted by the Constitution. 
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If a solution to the inability problem should be sought 
through legislation, it is certain that a lawsuit would be 
brought to test the validity of any statute passed. And the 
chances are, as Wickersham and Brownell have pointed out, 
that the action would be brought at a time when the Presi-
dent was disabled-a time when litigation, whether speedy 
or prolonged, would be least desirable. 
An impressive array of lawyers and political scientists is 
on the record as favoring a constitutional amendment to 
settle the inability question. But what are the feelings of 
the men on Capitol Hill? How does Congress look upon 
such a solution? What inferences might be drawn from 
Eisenhower's attempts to secure congressional action? 
For a time in 1958 members of the Eisenhower official 
family were highly skeptical that any inability amendment 
could be passed. Undoubtedly their thinking was influenced 
by the shellacking which the administration had just taken 
when President Eisenhower's proposed amendment was be-
fore the Congress. In retrospect, however, it appears that 
there was nothing wrong with the procedural route; the 
trouble was that in prescribing the method for determining 
inability, the proposed amendment tried to accomplish too 
much. 
Congress, it is axiomatic, will not pass an amendment 
which is too complicated or too controversial, and to em-
phasize method is to emphasize a major area of disagree-
ment.• Moreover, method can be handled by statute at a 
later date. Since Congress had not yet been sold on the pro-
cedure to be followed, the inclusion of the provision on 
•In answers to questions posed by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary in March, 1957, five of those polled thought Congress should 
determine inability, six that the Vice President should be the sole 
judge, and three that the Cabinet should decide (but then so qualified 
their answers as to nullify them). A number of others thought that the 
determination should be made by commissions and boards. See House 
Committee Print, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 26, 1957, pp. 11-12. The 
men polled were political scientists whose knowledge of the problem 
supposedly transcends that of the legislators who would be required 
to make the final choice and pass a law on the method to be used. 
112 THE YEAR WE HAD No PRESIDENT 
method not only made the measure unnecessarily contro-
versial, but also put the cart before the horse. 
Cornelius Wickersham's remarks on this "package deal" 
kind of proposal bring out a further important point: 
... some proposals for an amendment ... endeavor to pre-
scribe the methods to be used for determination of the facts 
relating to inability and to set up machinery for determina-
tion of that question both as to the commencement as well 
as to its termination. But, the difficulty with this course is 
that the freezing of any one method into the Constitution 
would make any necessary future correction extremely diffi-
cult because it might require an additional constitutional 
amendment. It is better constitutional practice to prescribe 
the principles to govern action and to leave to the legisla-
ture the selection of methods by which those principles can 
be best implemented under the "necessary and proper" 
clause. This gives elasticity without imperiling the basic de-
sign. The danger of freezing a particular method is avoided 
by giving to Congress the power to select the method. Cor-
rection or improvement can thus be made at any time by 
the enactment of new legislation within the framework of 
the amendment.8 
Wickersham has captured the spirit of the founding 
fathers, who recognized that they were neither infallible nor 
all-knowing and who strove to make the Constitution adapt-
able to future times. Former President Truman has ex-
pressed something of this same idea: "I have always felt that 
there is great danger in writing too much into the Constitu-
tion. We must have a certain flexibility to meet changing 
conditions."9 A rigid amendment, incorporating a fixed 
method, would make future changes unduly complicated 
and would be out of harmony with the concept of flexibility 
which pervades the entire Constitution. 
What Should an Amendment Include? 
Assuming that a constitutional amendment is the only 
way to settle the inability question beyond any doubt, what 
should be the scope of such a measure? 
The foregoing discussion has provided some positive and 
negative indications as to what might prudently be included. 
The experience of the Eisenhower administration and the 
A BASIS FOR ACTION 113 
remarks of Wickersham and Truman demonstrate the desir-
ability of removing from consideration the primary question 
about the power of Congress to enact any method, of em-
phasizing areas of agreement, and of adhering to principles 
inherent in our system of government. In the search for a 
constitutional solution, the differences of opinion are more 
procedural than substantive; the areas of agreement are 
numerous and basic. The following listing of them will 
serve as a guide in staking out the terrain the amendment 
might cover as well as affording a convenient framework 
for discussion. 
l. In case of permanent inability-the death of the Presi-
dent, his resignation, his conviction by impeachment, or his 
removal for other cause-the Vice President succeeds to the 
Presidency. 
Seven Presidents have established the custom that when 
a President dies, the Vice President becomes President, not 
Acting President. Few people seriously argue that when a 
President dies the Vice President should be considered the 
"servant or agent of the deceased President." Although it 
was the essence of colonial practice that the alternate was a 
deputy, no one suggested that he should become an agent 
or deputy for a dead man. And although John Tyler's as-
sumption of office in 1841 "might readily have been ques-
tioned had historical materials on the framers' intent been 
on hand, the fact remains that it has been relied on for the 
proposition that the Vice President becomes President when 
the elected President dies-a proposition scarcely to be ques-
tioned today."10 
2. In case of temporary presidential inability, the Vice 
President succeeds only to the powers and duties of the 
office as the Acting President, and not to the office itself. 
See pages 16-20. According to Attorney General Ken-
nedy, "almost every student of the Constitution who was 
recently canvassed to express an opinion" was in agreement 
on this point.•11 Wickersham, referring to the differences of 
•Included in this group of distinguished scholars of the Constitution 
were: Stephen K. Bailey, Princeton University; Everett S. Brown, Uni-
versity of Michigan; Edward S. Corwin, Princeton, N. J.; William W. 
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opinion and confusion in the discussions during the series 
of congressional hearings after President Eisenhower's ill-
ness, remarks that "it seems fair to say that the majority felt 
that in any event the Vice President should not succeed to 
the office of President but should only be an Acting Presi-
dent until the disability ended or until a new President was 
elected ... "12 
3. Upon termination of the President's inability prior to 
the election, he shall resume office. 
See pages 79, 86, 103-104. In the opinion written for 
President Kennedy, Attorney General Kennedy comments 
on the minority position: 
Unquestionably, those scholars who claim the Vice Presi-
dent becomes President upon the latter's inability would 
assert that the Vice President may not be divested of his 
authority by recovery of, or action thereafter by, the Presi-
dent. In my opinion, this view does violence to the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution, and would defeat the will of 
the people. 
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers were in 
agreement that the President could reclaim the discharge of 
the powers and duties of his office merely by announcing 
that his inability had terminated, and that he is ready now 
to execute his office. [See Brownell, "Presidential Disabil-
ity," p. 204.] In my opinion this interpretation of the Con-
stitution is clearly correct. The force of popular opinion, 
the people's sense of constitutional propriety, and the co-
operation of Congress could be counted on to support the 
President's decision if he acted properly.1s 
It should be noted, however, that former President Tru-
Crosskey, University of Chicago Law School; Charles Fairman, Law 
School of Harvard University; David Fellman, University of Wisconsin; 
Thomas K. Finletter, Esq., New York, N. Y.; James Hart, University of 
Virginia; Arthur N. Holcombe, Harvard University; Mark DeW. Howe, 
Law School of Harvard University; Richard G . Huber, Tulane Univer-
sity; Joseph E. Kallenbach, University of Michigan; Jack W. Peltason, 
University of Illinois; J. Roland Pennock, Swarthmore College; C. Her-
man Pritchett, University of Chicago; John H. Romani, the Brookings 
Institute; and Arthur E. Sutherland, Law School of Harvard University. 
Presidential Inability, House Committee Print, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1957), pp. 49-52." Note appearing in Opinions of the Attorneys Gen-
eral, XLll, No. 5 (August 2, 1961), 19-20. 
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man, in his disability proposal, specified that in the event 
a President is unable to perform his duties and the Con-
gress by a two-thirds vote designates the Vice President as 
President, the stricken President would not be able to re-
possess the office during the remainder of the term, even 
though he experiences a complete recovery.14 (See Appendix 
V for the full text of the Truman proposal.) 
4. The difference between permanent and temporary in-
ability should be clearly stated, recognizing the Tyler prece-
dent in the case of permanent inability and eliminating it 
as a consideration in the case of temporary inability, which 
would be governed by (2) above. 
Making a clear-cut distinction between permanent and 
temporary disability is mandatory before consideration can 
be given to other aspects of the problem. This step, so long 
urged, would remedy after nearly 175 years the mistake 
made by the Committee on Style and restore the original 
intent of the framers of the Constitution. The experience 
of the states, as evidenced by the opinions of their courts, 
has long since indicated the desirability of distinguishing 
between the various situations. The states have been able 
to accomplish this through judicial action, but presidential 
disability, existing solely within the confines of the execu-
tive branch, is removed from determination by the courts 
or Congress. 
In view of the questions raised by the Garfield and Wil-
son Cabinets, it might be well to define the leg-al status of 
a disabled President during the period a Vice President acts 
as President. Such a rationale may not be necessary, but the 
question of "how ... the duties can be separated from the 
office"111 has arisen many times in state and national history, 
and it would be reassuring to have this dilemma concisely 
resolved. The explanation given by Justice Alexander An-
derson of California has been overlooked for many years 
because the case dealt with the temporary disability (ab-
sence) of a justice, not a governor. However the same prin-
ciple applies. Justice Anderson said: 
... the vested rights of the term attaches to the person of 
the elected incumbent, but ... the functions of the office, 
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in certain contingencies, separate from him temporarily, 
and adhere to a distinct class of powers within the depart-
ment, for the use, benefit and protection of that great public 
for which the government was created.16 
5. Commencement and termination of a disability shall 
be determined by such method as Congress shall by law pro-
vide, so long as that method is compatible with the system 
of checks and balances provided for in the Constitution for 
the maintenance of the separate and coequal branches of 
the government. 
Students of the presidential disability problem will find 
in the many and various proposals for its solution repeated 
affirmations of the necessity for maintaining a balance be-
tween the three branches of the government, assuring con-
tinuation of the traditional checks which one has against 
the other, and preventing the dominance of one over the 
other. For examples, one needs only to look to the writings 
of our living former Presidents. Truman's suggested method 
for determining presidential disability involves "representa-
tives of the three branches of government"; Hoover believes 
that "the method of determining 'inability' or 'recovery' re-
quires consideration of the spirit of the separation of powers 
in the Government ... "; and Eisenhower's position in this 
regard, which was made abundantly clear to the author in 
a personal interview, has been well expressed by members 
of his administration. His concern lest "a major shift in the 
checks and balances among the three divisions of the gov-
ernment ... result" is stressed by former Attorney General 
Brownell.17 
Senator Kefauver, in the introduction to this book, 
makes it clear that the legislative branch is no less interested 
in preserving the separation of powers; and Chief Justice 
Warren, speaking for the Supreme Court, gave this doctrine 
as the primary reason why members of the Court should not 
serve on any disability commission (see page 71). 
The disability clause should be and must be harmonized 
with the Twentieth Amendment. The so-called Lame Duck 
amendment recognizes the distinction between temporary 
and permanent disability by providing that if, at the time 
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fixed for beginning the term of the President, the President-
elect has died, then the Vice President-elect "shall become 
President." The amendment further provides that if a Presi-
dent has not been chosen by the time fixed for the begin-
ning of his term, or if a President-elect fails to qualify, then 
the Vice President-elect shall "act as President until the 
President qualifies" (see page 19). As the Constitution now 
stands, the disability clause, the interpretation put upon it 
by seven Presidents, and the Twentieth Amendment are at 
odds with each other. 
These five areas of agreement are embodied in the fol-
lowing proposal for an amendment made by the Committee 
on the Federal Constitution of the New York State Bar 
Association: 
In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of 
his Death or Resignation, the said Office shall devolve on 
the Vice President. In Case of the Inability of the President 
to Discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the 
said Powers and Duties shall devolve on the Vice President, 
until the Inability be Removed. The Congress may by law 
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or In-
ability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring 
what Officer shall then be President, or in case of Inability, 
act as President, and such Officer shall be or act as President 
accordingly, until a President shall be elected, or, in the case 
of Inability, until the Inability shall earlier be removed. 
The commencement and termination of any Inability shall 
be determined by such method as Congress shall by law 
provide.us 
This proposal could be readily expanded to include the 
proposed rationale for the distinction between temporary 
and permanent disability. So that there would be no possi-
bility for further confusion about the scope of the powers 
given to Congress, it would seem wise to remove the word 
"both"; and it would, of course, be essential to add a quali-
fying clause to the last sentence: "so long as that method is 
compatible with the system of checks and balances and the 
maintenance of the three separate and coequal branches of 
government." 
•See also Appendix III, Proposal of Nebraska Law Review. 
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In such a form, the amendment would be logical and on 
sound ground historically and legally. It would, in the 
author's opinion find support from scholars, past and pres-
ent Attorneys General, and the former Presidents. With 
such support, the prospect of passage of the amendment 
would be far more favorable than before. Once it had been 
adopted by Congress, ratification by two-thirds of the states 
could be anticipated within ten to twelve months. 
Contrary to popular opinion, "amending the Constitu-
tion" need not be a process prolonged over a period of 
years. The Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the elec-
tion of senators by popular vote, took thirteen and a half 
months; the Nineteenth (woman suffrage) fifteen months; 
and the Twenty-first (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment) 
less than ten months. The public's increasing awareness of 
the urgency of inability legislation no doubt would expe-
dite the process in the present case. 
2. THE DETERMINATION OF INABILITY 
After the amendment has been ratified, it would be up 
to the Congress to choose a sound method for determining 
inability. While passage of an amendment of the type dis-
cussed above would not automatically insure a quick agree-
ment on the modus operandi, there would be a climate of 
cooperation and accomplishment far more conducive to 
productive action than the present rather competitive at-
mosphere. 
Should Determination of Inability Remain 
within the Executive Branch1 
Most of the procedures proposed to date have suggested 
that the determination of inability be made by the legisla-
tive branch, the Supreme Court, or a combination of the 
two with officials from the executive branch.• In this con-
•The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Juris-
prudence and Law Reform has proposed a commission with representa-
tives from all three branches. The proposal is questionable on several 
counts, including possible violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
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nection the suggested constitutional provision requiring 
compatibility with the doctrine of separation of powers be-
comes a paramount consideration. Which of these proced-
ures is compatible with the maintenance of three separate, 
coordinate, and coequal departments of government? Let us 
consider the methods proposed in the light of this basic 
requirement. 
It has frequently been suggested that the Supreme Court 
would offer an impartial forum of respected men who could 
determine presidential inability. Study of proposals incor-
porating this view shows that they not only would violate 
the doctrine of separation of powers, but would be emi-
nently impractical. It will be remembered that two Chief 
Jnstices, Roger B. Taney and Earl Warren, rejected sug-
gestions that they take part in the succession procedure at 
any stage (see pages 11 and 71 ). Taney, in refusing to con-
fer on the question of whether or not Tyler was to take the 
oath prescribed for the President, said in part that he 
wanted to be careful lest it appear he was intruding in the 
business of a coordinate branch of the government. Warren, 
in his letter to Representative Keating, requested that the 
members of the Supreme Court be excluded from partici-
pating in the determination of inability. The sound legal 
basis for this request has been illustrated by Wickersham: 
The policy of the federal courts to avoid political questions 
was well expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove 
v. Green [328 U.S. 549, 553-54] as follows: 
From the determination of such issues this Court has 
traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic sys-
tem to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people. 
And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention 
in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the 
abstract phrases of the law. 
Thus, it is safe to assume that neither quo warranto nor 
mandamus is available in a federal court. Aside from the 
basic question of the correct interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, solution by court action presumably cannot be relied 
upon. 
Even if the courts were willing to take jurisdiction it 
might require months of litigation before a final decision 
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was reached. During that time no officer of the Government 
would be sure of his right to carry out the order given to 
him by either of the claimants. The result could easily be a 
complete paralysis of our Government and of its armed 
forces in case of war, rebellion or invasion.19 
Wickersham further points out that the disability ques-
tion came before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in 
the Taggart case (see pages 96 ff.) because the attorney 
general instigated the action at the request of the governor 
himself. Wickersham's clear implication is that if the gov-
ernor had been unconscious, or had not initiated the action 
by his letter to the attorney general, or had in fact opposed 
such action, the court would have hesitated to assume juris-
diction. That Wickersham's implication is justified by prac-
tical experience is shown by the Ohio case (see page 99) 
in which the State Supreme Court refused jurisdiction be-
cause the action was not initiated by the governor. The 
experience of the United States with its Presidents and gov-
ernors is replete with examples which substantiate Wicker-
sham's argument that a chief executive may not step aside 
voluntarily, and that failing such action by the incumbent 
the courts may refuse to take jurisdiction. 
Noel Dowling, Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law 
at Columbia University has put forward a second and even 
more cogent reason £.or excluding the Supreme Court from 
any statutory scheme of determining disability: the original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not include such 
matters. Under the present Constitution, the United States 
Supreme Court would not issue a mandamus or quo war-
ranto proceedings as was done in the Taggart case; a con-
stitutional amendment would be required to give them that 
power.2° Would such action be practical? 
The wisdom of removing the justices from consideration 
for any inability commission is supported historically by 
the Hayes-Tilden election dispute of 1876. In the presiden-
tial election of that year, the balloting in several states and 
the counting and tabulating of the vote, was so clearly char-
acterized by fraud on both sides that it was impossible to 
determine which of the nominees was entitled to the elec-
toral votes of those states. Congress consequently created a 
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special commission to pass judgment on the disputed votes. 
The commission was composed of five senators (three Re-
publicans and two Democrats), five members from the 
House of Representatives (three Democrats and two Repub-
licans), and five justices of the Supreme Court. It was in-
tended that there be two Republicans and two Democrats 
from the last-named body, and the deciding vote was to go 
to Justice David Davis of Illinois, an Independent. But 
Davis was unexpectedly elected to the Senate, and resigned 
from the Court to accept the office. Since the remaining 
justices were all Republicans, the commission decided the 
election disputes in Hayes's favor by a straight eight-to-seven 
party-line vote. Millions of Americans were infuriated at 
this demonstration of partisan politics by supposedly non-
partisan Supreme Court justices, and for more than twenty 
years the Court was criticized for taking part in the resolu-
tion of the question. No doubt the Warren Court had this 
affair in mind when it pointed out the impropriety of its 
members serving on a disability commission-and of course 
the legal arguments presented by Warren have a basis which 
no one has been able to refute. 
Former President Truman has advocated deciding in-
ability by a vote of the Congress. In 1957 he proposed that 
when a President is stricken with an illness ... there should 
come into being a Committee of Seven composed of repre-
sentatives of the three branches of the Government. ... 
This Committee would select a board of leading medical 
authorities drawn from top medical schools of the Nation. 
This medical board, thus chosen, would then make the nec-
essary examinations, presenting their findings to the Com-
mittee of Seven. Should the findings of the medical board 
indicate that the President is unable to perform his duties, 
and that he is, in fact, truly incapacitated and not merely 
stricken with a transitory illness, then the Committee of 
Seven would so inform the Congress. Congress would then 
have the right to act, and by a two-thirds vote of the full 
membership declare the Vice President as President.21 
This proposal would hardly assure swift and decisive action. 
Nor would the public place confidence in a nonpolitical 
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decision by a body which, by its very nature, is political. 
After the experience with Congress during the Johnson im-
peachment trial, few scholars support the proposal. 
The Federal Convention itself refused to enlarge the 
powers of Congress over the executive. When the delegates 
discussed impeachment procedure, it was suggested that the 
practice of the states be followed: that, is, when impeach-
ment charges are filed, the President (like the governors) be 
suspended pending the outcome of the trial. James Madison, 
the father of the Constitution, objected in these words: 
The President is made too dependent already on the 
Legislature, by the power of one branch to try him in conse-
quence of an impeachment by the other. This intermediate 
suspension will put him in the power of one branch only. 
They can, at any moment, in order to make way for the 
functions of another who will be more favorable to their 
views, vote a temporary removal of the existing magistrate.22 
Madison won his point and the Convention refused to ex-
tend the power of Congress over the President. The vote 
was three states to eight. The analogy to disability is clear: 
temporary removal of an executive could be accomplished 
as easily by letting Congress decide his disability. Congress 
would not need to impeach a President; they could declare 
him permanently disabled! The same principle is involved 
and the same reasoning should apply in rejecting any such 
proposal. 
History, experience, and common sense dictate that, if 
we are to preserve the doctrine of separation of powers and 
maintain three separate and coequal departments of gov-
ernment, the determination of presidential inability must 
remain within the executive branch. In Herbert Brownell's 
words: 
If the power of initial determination is diverted from 
the executive branch, or even is shared in some fashion with 
those outside the executive, a way is opened for harassment 
of a President for political motives. A major shift in the 
checks and balances among the three divisions of the federal 
government could well result.23 
A BASIS FOR ACTION 123 
Should the Vice President Determine Inability? 
The evolution which has taken place in the office of 
Vice President is suggested by a comparison of the role of 
Chester A. Arthur, who was excluded from the deliberations 
of the Cabinet during Garfield's illness, and the part played 
by Richard Nixon during Eisenhower's sicknesses. One 
might even say there was a trend for the Vice President to 
revert to the status of the "Deputie Governour" of the co-
lonial period, and the Eisenhower and Kennedy agreements 
could be characterized as an attempt by the President to 
"deputize" the Vice President, even as the colonial gov-
ernors deputized their alternates. Unless the legal procedure 
for choosing our Vice Presidents is modified, or unless there 
is a change which would eliminate his ties to Congress and 
place him solely in the executive branch (Hoover's sugges-
tion that he become an Assistant President), it is reasonable 
to expect that modern Presidents will continue to delegate 
as many duties as legally possible to the Vice President. He 
will no doubt continue to sit in on Cabinet meetings, and 
the trend toward deputization probably will increase rather 
than diminish. Thus, the Vice President will be much better 
trained to succeed to the Presidency than were his prede-
cessors. 
But if the office of Vice President has changed, the sys-
tem of choosing the Vice President has not. Tyler, as we 
have seen, became Vice President because of a political deal 
with Clay; Arthur's nomination was an attempt to placate 
the Stalwart faction; Marshall admittedly was Wilson's sec-
ond choice. In recent times the President's potential succes-
sor too often has been chosen on the basis of geography, 
and the presidential ticket is still too often a marriage of 
convenience. It is by no means inconceivable that a per-
sonal or political antagonism could develop between some 
future President and his running mate. 
In planning for disability, how can the growth of the 
Vice Presidency be recognized on the one hand, and its 
static potential for disagreements on the other? Perhaps the 
answer is indicated by the common denominator in the con-
duct of Vice Presidents during presidential disability. In 
the three major instances of temporary inability, Vice Presi-
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dents Arthur, Marshall, and Nixon made no attempt to 
determine disability, although at least Nixon had reason to 
believe the legal right wa& his. 
Since history has shown that the Vice President will not 
initiate action for determining inability, why not remove 
him completely from this determination? He would then 
come into office, temporarily or permanently, not only well 
versed in the business of the executive department but free 
from the personal embarrassment and public criticism 
which would attend his passing upon his own advancement. 
What Should Be the Cabinet's Role? 
In his letter to Senator Kefauver (the full text appears 
in Appendix V), former President Hoover pointed out that 
"the President and Vice President are elected as the chosen 
leaders of a political party with declared mandates, princi-
ples, solutions of issues, and promises to the people." But an 
opposition political party may-and frequently does-con-
trol one or both of the Houses of Congress, in which case 
those in control "are, in practice, mostly opposed to the 
mandates or promises upon which the President and Vice 
President are elected by the people. All of which leads me 
to the generalization that a President's inability to serve 
. . . should be determined by the leading officials in the 
executive branch, as they are of the party having the 
responsibilities determined by the election."24 
Certainly the political consequences of presidential ill-
nesses cannot be overlooked, but any method for deter-
mining disability must take into account that the issue is 
primarily medical, not political. Election to the Presidency 
of the United States does not change a man's anatomy or 
physiology; he is still mortal, with lungs, heart, digestive 
and nervous systems like the rest of us. The former Presi-
dents themselves are the first to bear testimony to this fact. 
Eisenhower has shown by his rigid adherence to the regimen 
prescribed by his doctors that he recognizes the critical role 
played by medical men in keeping a President fit. Truman 
recommended that his "Committee of Seven" select "a board 
of leading medical authorities drawn from the top medical 
schools of the nation"; 2~ and Hoover in his letter suggested 
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that a commission made up of chief officials of departments 
or agencies within the executive branch "should seek the 
advice of a panel of experienced physicians or surgeons" in 
determining inability.26 
During the illnesses of Garfield and Eisenhower it was 
the Cabinet which ran the government of the United States, 
and it was the Cabinet, along with Dr. Grayson and Mrs. 
Wilson, which presided over the operations of the executive 
during Wilson's long incapacity. During Wilson's illness two 
bills were introduced to give the Cabinet the power to de-
termine inability.• According to Silva, 
Hearings on these bills disclosed the belief that the 
Cabinet is the safest body in which to vest the power. De-
termination by the Cabinet would cause the least friction 
because the decision would be made by the President's own 
appointees. Cabinet members presumably are his friends 
and are not eager to displace him. Moreover, the Cabinet is 
in the best position to know whether a President is really 
disabled or not.27 
But the Wilson case reminds us that there is always the pos-
sibility that the palace guard can play a "house game" and 
fail to brief the Cabinet fully on the President's condition. 
Nor can we forget that Wilson's Secretary of State was com-
pelled to resign because he had convened the Cabinet. 
The historical difficulties in leaving the determination 
of inability to the Cabinet could be obviated if an impartial 
medical board were to be established (see below). The board 
•H.R. 12629, introduced by Martin B. Madden of Illinois, and H.R. 
12647, introduced by Clifton N. McArthur of Oregon, 66th Congress. 
"The Madden bill provided that, whenever the President became un-
able to perform his duties for six consecutive weeks, the question of 
his inability was to be made the subject of official inquiry by the 
Cabinet. The bill empowered the Secretary of State to convene the 
Cabinet for this purpose, and provided that the determination was to 
be made by a majority vote. The removal of a disability was to be 
established in the same manner. The McArthur bill contained similar 
provisions. Madden thought his bill superior to McArthur's because it 
made the Secretary of State legally responsible for calling the Cabinet 
together in case of a President's inability. He objected to Wilson's 
ruling that a President's inability prevented the Cabinet from func-
tioning" (Silva, Presidential Succession, p. 108 n.). 
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would inform the Cabinet and the public of the President's 
condition, and the Cabinet, e"<:lusive of the Vice President, 
would make the final determination of disability or recov-
ery, using the report of the board as a guide to both in-
stances. 
Is a Medical Board Necessary? How Would It Operate? 
Evidence of the increasingly large part doctors play in 
relation to the Presidency can be found in the extralegal 
physical examinations of present-day Chief Executives. That 
such examinations take place is a tacit, if not express, ad-
mission that perhaps preventive medicine should apply to 
a President as well as corporation executive. The trend for 
presidential candidates to take physical examinations is also 
indicative of the growing awareness on the part of both poli-
ticians and voters that the people of the United States have 
an interest in the President's general health as well as his 
condition if he should be ill. 
But the fact remains that presidential physical examina-
tions are still discretionary, and what the public is told of 
the results of such examinations is still up to the President 
and his official family. Moreover presidential physicians are 
usually personal friends of the President, biased in his favor 
to a greater or lesser extent. We have seen that Dr. Grayson 
told a series of half-truths to Wilson's Cabinet; that the 
initial diagnosis of a coronary thrombosis was overridden by 
Harding's personal physician, General Sawyer; that Cleve-
land's cancer operation was concealed from all but one of 
his Cabinet members, to say nothing of the public (Dr. John 
F. Erdman later observed that at the time of the Cleveland 
operation and convalescence "he did more lying than in all 
the rest of his life put together"28); that at least two twen-
tieth-century Presidents-Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt-
ignored the advice of their physicians with disastrous conse-
quences; and that Roosevelt, according to his own son, did 
not inform Dr. Ross T. Mcintire of two seizures. 
Surely these lessons of history and human nature point 
to the necessity of enacting legislation requiring periodic 
physical examinations of the President by a board of physi-
cians. But how can such a procedure be kept within the 
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executive branch and at the same time removed from presi-
dential domination? 
An answer is suggested in the example of the organiza-
tion of the Secret Service, which protects the President from 
outside threats to his life and well-being. The White House 
Detail is responsible to the Secretary of the Treasury, who 
in this regard is in turn responsible to the Congress, not to 
the President. The Secret Service may veto presidential ac-
tivities which might endanger the Chief Executive's life, 
and though there are times when they resent the interfer-
ence and inconvenient precautionary measures "Presidents 
usually accept the laws of the land and follow Secret Service 
advice with little or no question."29 The organization of the 
Secret Service could, by analogy, provide the rationale for 
setting up an impartial board of physicians charged with the 
responsibility of protecting the President from ills, including 
that of overworking himself. The Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare could select the doctors on a rotating 
basis from a list provided by the Civil Service Commission. 
The board of physicians would be responsible to the Secre-
tary, who in turn would be responsible to the Congress, not 
the President, for the health of the Chief Executive-just as 
the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible to the Congress 
for his safety. 
Doctors uniformly recommend at least one comprehen-
sive physical a year for the average adult male. It would be 
reasonable to require quarterly physicals for the President, 
with the board automatically stepping in when there is a 
major illness. "Major illness" could be determined by the 
President's personal physician, his family, or the Cabinet. 
Or, if the board felt there was sufficient question about the 
President's health, it could determine by a majority vote to 
conduct an examination. It is highly unlikely that the board 
would act capriciously in conducting such an examination; 
most people would consider it more disinterested than the 
Cabinet or the President's family. Referring to the proposed 
commission made up of high officials from the executive 
branch which would determine inability, Hoover said that 
he could not "conceive of any circumstance when such a de-
fined body of leaders ... would act in these circumstances 
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other than in the national interest." The traditions and 
code of the medical profession are such that surely we 
should be able to make the same statement about a respon-
sible board of physicians. 
It would not be necessary to make public the results of 
every routine examination. Merriman Smith offers a sugges-
tion, based on observation of four Presidents: 
My essential feeling is that aside from recognizedly 
minor involvements-a cold, a sprain, or something equally 
trivial-when the illness of a President is sufficiently serious 
to warrant public announcement, the White House then 
should make available quite detailed medical information. 
When a President has more than a minor ailment, I 
think the public is entitled to know just how sick he is, en-
titled to know the basic medical facts in order to arrive at 
independent judgment. The illness of a President has no 
right whatever to be a private matter.3o 
Under the impartial medical board proposed, announce-
ment could be made first to the Cabinet, then to the public. 
The statement to the Cabinet could include a recommenda-
tion concerning temporary or permanent disability. 
What Are the Objections to a Medical Board1 
When the disability problem first came up for discussion 
in the Eisenhower Cabinet, says Sherman Adams, 
Eisenhower suggested that a special committee consisting 
of the Chief Justice and representatives of the medical pro-
fession, among others, should decide .... I think that any 
plan that attempts to prescribe physical examination and 
reports from a standing group of physicians would be im-
practical and unwise. The sense of personal responsibility 
which the President has in keeping fit is as implicit as his 
feeling of responsibility for conducting the affairs of his 
office.31 
By this time-1958-there had been a number of sugges-
tions for disability commissions. Only one of these proposals 
placed emphasis on the role of the medical profession;• the 
•see Presidential Inability: An Analysis of Replies to a Question· 
naire and Testimony at a Hearing on Presidential Inability, Committee 
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, March 26, 1957, p. 21. 
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others grouped together such diverse categories as Supreme 
Court justices, inferior court judges, the President's wife, 
the Cabinet, and party leaders. 
Brownell says of these multi-member bodies: 
Arguments for a group determination of presidential 
inability overlook the fact that throughout American his-
tory, not merely in the Garfield and Wilson instances, the 
problem has never been ascertaining presidential inability; 
the stalemate in executive activity has proceeded from a 
Vice President's reluctance to assume his superior's office 
and a President's (or his personal advisers') reluctance to 
turn over presidential duties with no assurance of their 
return. 
Not only would such a fact-finding commission have 
been unnecessary and ineffective in every presidential in-
ability problem so far encountered, but in the future it 
could have very serious and unfortunate consequences. Any 
law requiring complicated procedures, investigations, hear-
ings, findings, and votes, would prevent immediate action 
in case of emergency. Today's need is for unquestioned con-
tinuity of executive power and leadership. A law establish-
ing a fact-finding body on this issue might completely thwart 
that objective, to the nation's deadly peril. 
Furthermore, it seems unwise to establish elaborate legal 
machinery to provide for examinations of the President. 
The question of the physical and mental capacity one needs 
to serve as President is, of course, far more than a matter 
of medical findings by a group of learned physicians. Pro-
viding for physical and mental examinations would, at the 
least, be an affront to the President's personal dignity and 
degrade the presidential office itself; more dangerously, it 
would give a hostile group power to harass the President for 
political purposes. s2 
It is clear that Brownell's objections are addressed gen-
erally to the multi-member commissions proposed by various 
groups; only in the last paragraph quoted does he discuss 
doctors as the sole determinants of inability. Brownell's be-
lief that "the stalemate in executive activity has proceeded 
from a Vice President's reluctance to assume his superior's 
office" and that "the problem has never been ascertaining 
presidential disability" blandly overlooks that neither Vice 
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Presidents Marshall nor Arthur were kept informed about 
the condition of the Chief Executive. Moreover, the idea 
that the Vice President is the sole person to determine dis-
ability was not seriously considered until Davis' article 
(cited by Brownell, p. 190) was published in 1919, and it 
was not generally recognized until after Silva's book was 
published in 1951. Since Brownell was appointed by a Presi-
dent who made no secret of his physical condition it is un-
derstandable that the former Attorney General should feel 
that "the problem has never been ascertaining presidential 
disability"; but history belies his statement. A review of the 
lives of our Presidents proves that "the sense of personal 
responsibility which the President has in keeping fit" has 
weighed more heavily with some than others. "Duty" has 
too often been confused with compulsion and it would be 
interesting to hear a psychiatrist's explanation of the rea-
sons for the almost total disregard, in some cases, for the 
sound advice of a physician. 
Brownell assumes from the various prop9sals for com-
missions that they would necessarily require "complicated 
procedures, investigations, hearings, findings, and votes," 
making an immediate decision impossible. This conclusion 
is warranted when some of the proposals advanced are ex-
amined carefully. But it would be invalid in the case of an 
impartial board of physicians, appointed by the Secretary 
of Health, Education, and Welfare and working within the 
framework of an organization patterned after that of the 
Secret Service. Since Brownell's statements in the Yale Law 
journal had been directed primarily at the hybrid commis-
sions, he was queried regarding the use of doctors in deter-
mining disability. His answer was: 
These proposals were deemed inadequate for several rea-
sons. One was that if the decision-making power were given 
exclusively to the medical panel we thought it would be 
entrusting them with making a kind of decision which does 
not lie fully within the competence of medical men. The 
doctors could discover the facts relative to the actual physi-
cal or mental condition of the President but the judgment 
as to whether the President is able to discharge his functions 
and duties goes beyond medical knowledge and also in-
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volves practical governmental experience. Secondly, if the 
panel were given merely advisory authority it was believed 
that the particular physical or mental ailment of the Presi-
dent might not come within the competence of the pre-
selected physicians; also that irresponsible demands would 
be made from time to time by prejudiced persons to have 
physical examinations made of the President, and doubts 
could be raised either by refusing to have the examination 
made or by disagreement among the members of the panel 
or doubt as to the meaning of the panel's report.as 
Brownell points out that the particular ailment might 
not come within the competence of the medical board, but 
this is a rather superficial objection. The board should not 
be composed of specialists but of general practitioners with 
authority to call in specialists as needed. Trying to antici-
pate every specific ill by putting specialists on the board 
could result in a body so large it would be grossly imprac-
tical. A board of general practitioners should also have the 
authority to call in the President's personal physician for 
consultation and for his records. 
The former Attorney General has expressed fear of irre-
sponsible demands by prejudiced persons, leading to harass-
ment of the President for political motives. If the board 
were composed of doctors from private practice, political 
pressures might prove irresistible. Politics is not foreign to 
the medical associations, as the doctors are the first to ad-
mit. And an unpopular decision could finish a physician's 
private practice. Political influence could be held to a mini-
mum by providing that the board be chosen from the ranks 
of the thousands of physicians presently in the Civil Service 
of the United States-from the staffs of our veterans hos-
pitals, for example. The doctors should be far enough re-
moved from the top echelon to be free from direct pressure; 
a double precaution would be to change the personnel of 
the board after each examination, just as the members of 
the Secret Service White House Detail are changed from 
time to time, and always with each new administration. If 
the organization were patterned after that of the Secret 
Service, harassment would be unlikely. Brownell has never 
asserted that the Secret Service men harass the President; 
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what they do is for his personal safety, and does not consti-
tute "an affront to his personal dignity." In principle, such 
an argument could be considered to put personal dignity be-
fore the public welfare: it smacks too much of Mrs. Wilson's 
statement that she thought of her husband first and the 
public good second. When one assumes the Presidency, it is 
taken for granted that a large degree of privacy will be lost. 
The political implications of a presidential illness, as 
already mentioned, could be recognized by leaving the final 
decision to the Cabinet; the political ties of that body to the 
President could be acknowledged by requiring that the 
medical report be made public at the time it was given to 
the Cabinet. With the eyes of the nation on them, and the 
medical facts known to all the parties and the public, a non-
political decision would be more likely, if not assured. 
Summary: A Method for Determining Disability 
The method summarized below is derived from the 
Nebraska Law Review's investigation of executive disability. 
While this study is the most comprehensive yet to be made, 
the following proposal is offered with the full awareness 
that no one person or organization can have the ideal an-
swer to such a complex problem, and that compromise will 
be essential to the passage of any legislation. 
1. The determination of disability should remain within 
the executive branch, recognizing that the separation of 
powers doctrine, as originally expressed by Madison, upheld 
by the Constitutional Convention and ratified by the states, 
and perpetuated by subsequent case law proscribes per se 
any plan that would place the determination of disability in 
the hands of Congress, the Supreme Court, any combination 
thereof, or any temporary commission composed of citizens 
and government employees. 
2. The Vice President should be removed from any par-
ticipation in the process of determining presidential inabil-
ity; the trend to inform him and prepare him for succession 
should be recognized and implemented by insuring that if 
he should be called upon to exercise the duties of President, 
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he enters upon their execution free from any suspicion of 
usurpation or precipitate action. 
3. While the determination of disability should be kept 
within the executive department, the necessary machinery 
should not be under the direct supervision of the President. 
The precedent existing in the structural composition and 
organization of the White House Secret Service Detail sug-
gests a very practical solution. 
Under a similar plan, physicians from the government 
service would be appointed to a medical board by the Sec-
retary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The President's 
personal physician could be an ex officio member of the 
board, but with no authority to compose or supervise the 
examination or report, though his records probably would 
be voluntarily requested by the board and his opinion 
would rightfully be solicited. 
Examinations could be given at stated intervals (at least 
quarterly) or in case of "major illness," and "major illness" 
could be quickly determined by a simple majority vote of 
the doctors, trusting in their professional experience to in-
sure against premature or immature judgment. Following 
the examination, the doctors could report to the public and 
the Cabinet concerning the President's state of health. 
The Cabinet-and excluding the Vice President or any-
one else (the Tumultys of the future)-would have the legal 
responsibility, with the eyes of an informed American pub-
lic focused upon them, for making the final decision con-
cerning the President's disability by a simple majority vote. 
Current members of the health board could be assigned 
to the staff of one of the government hospitals in Washing-
ton in order to be immediately available in case of a major 
illness; possibly one of them, as a "Chairman," could be 
detailed to accompany the President on any trips made; so 
a report could be made immediately to the board regarding 
any illness that occurred during the President's absence 
from Washington. 
4. To avoid charges that the legislation proposed is in-
tended to harass or embarrass a President then in office, a 
clause should be included making the law effective with the 
President whose term begins following enactment. 
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The Presidency as it was in the days of Tippecanoe and 
Tyler is no more. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and 
Kennedy have said again and again that no one can compre-
hend the scope of the trust placed in the man in the White 
House unless he himself takes up residence there. Speaking 
of the need for modernizing the disability clause, Mr. Tru-
man has written: 
... who could fully foresee the role of the American Presi-
dency in the kind of world in which we now live-a role 
which also requires the President to be available in person 
at any hour to make decisions which he alone can make and 
which cannot be put off?H 
The President's personal powers are startling, and his 
exercise of them can affect directly every citizen of the 
United States. For instance, the President by signing his 
name can change the value of the dollar in your wallet or 
purse; if you are a farmer or engaged in work subsidized in 
some way by the government or if you should be in need of 
federal disaster relief, the President's inability to sign his 
name not only could keep money from your pocket but 
might mean misery for you and your family; if you are a 
laboring man, the President's action or inaction in a labor 
dispute can decide whether or not you go to work in the 
morning; if you are a businessman, the failure of a disabled 
President to adjust imports at a critical time could ruin 
your business overnight. But these matters seem trivial when 
compared with international problems. 
The President's powers and responsibilities in the field 
of foreign affairs are such that the necessity for keeping the 
President fit, physically and mentally, is synonymous with 
national survival. The nature of these responsibilities is 
symbolized by a large leather pouch, with a double lock. 
Guarded by five United States Army warrant officers, 
this pouch contains all the super-secret messages and codes 
to put the nation's key emergency plans into effect. These 
are the plans which only the President can initiate. 
They are not plans for declaring war. They are plans to 
meet any military challenge to the security of the United 
States and its allies. The pouch contains the coded key to 
unleash our retaliatory forces, if we are attacked.35 
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On the President's desk sits a "crash" telephone. A Presi-
dent has only to reach for that telephone, speak a few words 
in the mouthpiece, and our nuclear deterrent is unleashed. 
The law as it now stands increases the risk that a sick Presi-
dent either might use that telephone prematurely or be 
unable to use it at all. It would be a tragic irony if we con· 
tinued to spend billions for defense but lost the final battle 
because we chose to gamble with destiny on the wording of 
one section of the Constitution. 
Appendix I 
Inability of the President 
What Constitutes? and Who Decides? 
MONOGRAPH BY HENRY E. DAVIS 
Non.-The greater portion of the following article was prepared in 
the summer and autumn of the year 1881, when its subject was of 
lively interest owing to the attack upon President Garfield. The addi-
tions due to the discussion in Congress over the bill which subsequently 
became law in the form of the act of January 19, 1886, respecting the 
performance of the duties of the office of President in case of the re-
moval, etc., of both the President and Vice President, will readily be 
recognized. The reader of the act of January 19, 1886, and of the de-
bates preceding the enactment of the same will observe that notwith-
standing the fact that the question treated in the article was very fully 
discussed, no attempt to settle it was made by Congress and that it is 
accordingly as open as ever. The article is printed in the form in which 
it was originally put in final shape, 30 years ago. 
The severe and protracted illness of President Garfield 
brought into prominence a provision of the Federal Con-
stitution which, until that emergency, may be said to have 
been practically out of sight since the organization of the 
Government-the provision, namely, respecting the discharge 
of the duties of the Executive during an inability of the 
President. (Art. II, sec. 1, cl. 5: "In case of the removal of 
the President from office, or his death, resignation, or in-
ability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, 
the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Con-
gress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, 
resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice 
President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, 
and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be 
removed or a President shall be elected.") The cognate pro-
vision as to the discharge of those duties on the death of the 
President had three times been called into requisition-in the 
cases of Vice Presidents Tyler, Fillmore, and Johnson; that 
which refers to removal was, for a while, forcibly present 
to the mind of President Johnson at least; and that respect-
ing resignation was, in all probability, one of the few jests 
which tempered the almost depressing earnestness of the 
136 
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Federal convention. But the inability provision slept a long 
sleep, to be awakened at last by a second "shot heard round 
the world." 
What does that provision mean? was at once the anxious 
general inquiry; and as the subject presented itself quite as 
a nova questio, many and various were the replies. Of such 
as found their way into print scarcely any two agreed; if 
they seemed to agree in one particular they differed in at 
least one other, and earnest as was the general discussion 
represented by these replies no digest of them could ap-
proach a harmony. 
The question is still as interesting and important as 
when thus startlingly projected, for while the Congress is 
even now seeking some solution of the problem of the order 
of succession in case of inability of both President and Vice 
President, no effort is making (and it is difficult to perceive 
how any generally satisfactory effort could be made) by that 
department of Government to solve the many other prob-
lems touching the character, extent, and ascertainment of 
an inability, and the proper course of action by the officer 
or officers most nearly concerned. 
What the provision means is then of vital interest, and 
in dealing with the question it is necessary to look closely 
not only at the provision itself, but also into the object 
which the framers of the Constitution thought they were 
attaining by it. And manifestly there are two points of 
view from which such examination may be made, the first 
in natural order being that of the proceedings of the con-
vention, the other that of the language of the provision as 
it left the convention's hands-or, rather, as it now meets 
the eye; for, as indicated below, there would seem to be 
reason for this particularity in the form of the statement. 
The general disposition has been to confine examination 
to the language, such resort as has been had to the proceed-
ings being almost exclusively spasmodic and for purposes of 
illustration on some single point. Conforming for the pre-
sent to that disposition, it is of interest to consider what may 
fairly be deemed representative specimens of the varying 
results of such examination. 
The questions which, in this connection, suggest them-
selves upon the threshold are such as these: What is in-
ability in the sense of the provision; and what its effect as 
to the Executive and executive duties? Each of these ques-
tions includes others: Who shall decide when the inability 
138 THE YEAR WE HAD No PREsmENT 
occurs, whether it is continuing at a given date, when it has 
ceased? And, in case of inability of the President, does the 
Vice President become President or merely acting President 
for the time being? And at the termination of the inability 
shall the President and the Vice President resume their 
normal functions? 
The difficulties in the way of satisfactory answer to these 
questions are sufficiently attested by the varying conclusions 
already adverted to. As a general answer, some say that the 
inability contemplated by the Constitution is one that shall 
completely disable the President to discharge his duties dur-
ing the remainder of his term, in fact, a quasi death; on 
which the Vice President, on his own decision of the neces-
sity, shall become President; and that any other case of 
in ability is casus omissus (ex-Judge Dittenhoefer in New 
York Herald, Sept. 13, 1881). Others find more difficulty in 
the subject. One maintains that the character of the con-
templated inability must be decided according to the law 
sense of the term and must, therefore, be an intellectual 
incapacity of the President, on the happening of which and 
proof thereof in a manner to be prescribed by the Congress, 
the office of President devolves on the Vice President (Prof. 
Dwight, North American Review, Nov., 1881). Another 
thinks that the Constitution intends to provide for the case 
of an inability either physical or mental, which is to be 
known to the Vice President when "so open, notorious, and 
indisputable as to be recognized by all as existing" (ex-
Senator Trumbull, Ibid.). Still another contends that a 
temporary inability is not contemplated by the provision, 
but that the inability intended to be provided for depends 
upon its probable continuance and the condition of public 
affairs, and that the Congress is to declare when such exists; 
in other words, that "an inability, in the constitutional 
sense, is one that not only exists presently, but, in the 
opinion of Congress, is of such a nature and probable con-
tinuance that it causes or threatens inconvenience in pub-
lic affairs"; on the happening of which, though the Presi-
dent may not again resume his powers, the Vice President is 
only to act as President, for he can not become President, 
the elected President still actually living Oudge Cooley, 
Ibid.). And, again, it is said that any inability, of whatever 
character and however transient, is what the Constitution 
aims to provide for; that the Vice President, himself de-
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termining when such inability has arisen, shall thereupon 
enter upon the discharge of the presidential duties; and that 
when the inability ceases the President is to resume his func-
tions and the Vice President to go back to his place in the 
Senate (ex-Gov. Butler, Ibid.). 
Perhaps the most natural explanation of these varying 
opinions is to be found in the character of the subject and 
its mode of treatment, above suggested; it is practically res 
integra, than which nothing is more inviting, and at the 
same time stimulating, to the human mind; and it has been 
dealt with from the point of view of the language of the 
provision. Did the solution of the problem depend upon 
"authority" and the citation of precedents, diverse enough 
would be the conclusions reached; and independence of 
authority and precedent, setting the matter at large, does 
not conduce to lessen the number of such conclusions or to 
promise for them any nearer approach to similarity. 
But another explanation suggests itself, to be found in 
the constitutional nature of the provision; accounting as 
well for the simplicity of its statement and the different con-
ceptions of its scope and meaning, as for the comparative 
absence of resort to authority or precedent in its considera-
tion; not that much light may not be thrown on the in-
quiry by study of the origin and development of the pro-
vision, but the case almost wholly wants those direct declara-
tions of intent and expressions of opinion which may be 
brought forward in almost every other constitutional dis-
cussion. The provision in question is matter of detail pure-
ly; no principle is involved in it, and the debates of the 
Federal convention, as also the States in considering the 
Constitution, show an absence of any discussion of it what-
ever. Referred to it is, as a matter of course, but only by 
the way, not to be dwelt upon or even stated in an argu-
mentative or explanatory way, and of the many amendments 
proposed by one State or another, no one makes any refer-
ence to the subject. The nearest approach to notice of the 
question of inability to be found in the debates is the 
amendment proposed by New York: "That all commissions 
• • • shall • • • be tested in the name of the President of 
the United States, or the person holding his place for the 
time being" (2 Deb., 408). But this is far from touching the 
questions in respect of which the provision is here under 
consideration; those, nameh, above stated: What con-
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stitutes an inability, who shall decide its existence, and 
what is the proper course of action on its happening and 
cessation. 
But this apparent want of attention to the provision 
should not be misconceived; nor should it be overstated or 
misstated, as, from imperfect consideration of the subject, 
it not infrequently has been. Thus it has been repeatedly 
said that the provision for a Vice President was conceived 
in the closing days of the Federal Convention, when it was 
not possible to give the subject deserved attention; which 
statement, while apparently founded in fact, rests on a com-
plete misconception. It is true that, in respect of succession 
to the powers and duties of the Presidency, the Vice Presi-
dent was provided for at that late day; but he was con-
ceived merely as a substitute in that behalf for the President 
of the Senate for whom, as contemplated successor to those 
powers and duties, provision had been made from the first. 
Again, so experienced a statesman as ex-Senator Trum-
bull has used these words: "The original Constitution did 
not prescribe the qualifications of age and citizenship of 
Vice President as it did of President. Hence a Vice President 
not eligible to the Presidency might, under the Constitution 
as it existed prior to 1804, have had devolved upon him the 
powers and duties of the presidential office" (N. Amer. 
Rev., Nov., 1881, p. 419). And in debate in the Senate on 
January 8, 1883, Senator Dawes held language to the same 
effect: "So little considered was the provision in reference to 
the Vice President that they did not even provide that the 
Vice President should have the qualifications for office that 
the President should have" (Cong. Rec., vol. 14, No. 29, p. 
IO). But a glance at Article II, section 1, of the Constitution 
as it originally stood will show that the third paragraph of 
that section provides for a balloting by every elector for 
two persons, and a list of all the persons voted for; of whom 
the person receiving the highest number of votes should be 
President, and in every case after the choice of the Presi-
dent the person having the next greatest number should 
be Vice President; and the fifth paragraph prescribes the 
qualifications for eligibility to the office of President. As 
the electors in voting could not designate their choice for 
President and Vice President, respectively, and as either of 
the two persons voted for by each of them might be chosen 
President, it followed as of course that the qualifications 
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for eligibility must be had by all the persons voted for, of 
whom one must be Vice President. Wherefore the qualifica-
tions of the Vice President were necessarily prescribed by 
the method of his election; and those qualifications were 
the same as in the case of the President. 
While, then, the framers of the Constitution were not 
remiss, yet the provision under consideration apparently 
did not receive the same attention at their hands as did the 
other provisions. But neither was this because of careless-
ness, nor is it strange. It is just what might be expected, 
considering the object in view. 
The main features to be provided for as to the Executive 
were: First, the character of the office; second, the qualifica-
tions of the incumbent; third, the mode of his election; 
fourth, his powers and duties; fifth, his tenure. Each of these 
was the fruitful source of earnest, often confused, and at 
times seemingly hopeless discussion. This was transferred, 
after the preparation of the Constitution, to the State con-
ventions and there gone over again and again. In all these 
features the gravest principles were involved; but those 
principles once settled, there was left to consider only a pos-
sible vacancy during the term for which a President might 
be chosen. This was a matter wholly secondary to the main 
consideration, that, namely, of providing an executive; and 
it was disposed of by a provision wholly simple in its lan-
guage and, doubtless to the minds of the Convention, also 
in its meaning and operation. 
How a vacancy might occur was evident. It might hap-
pen by act of God, as death; by act of another branch of 
Government, as removal; or by act or condition of the in-
cumbent himself. And this last might be either voluntary, 
as resignation or absence, or involuntary, as inability. 
The death of a President is a matter about which no 
great doubt can exist; and the same is equally true of his 
removal from office and his resignation, when either is 
once a fact. But, it may be said, inability may exist as a fact 
and yet grave doubt of its being a fact exist at the same 
time. In turn, it may also be said and confidently that the 
Convention was not blind to this; yet it saw fit to leave the 
provision in its present shape. The questions, What is an 
inability? Who shall decide its existence? were put, but not 
answered or even discussed in the Convention, "What," 
asked Mr. Dickinson, "is the extent of the term 'disability' 
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(that being the form originally), and who is to be the judge 
of it?" (5 Deb., 481). Here the whole question was broached, 
but nothing followed the inquiry; and in the State conven-
tions the inquiry was not even put. 
The care with which the Federal Convention worked out 
every provision incorporated into the Constitution is yet 
the theme of our wondering praise. Is the provision under 
consideration an exception in this particular? We must 
think not, but that the provision was left as it is, not 
through carelessness, nor because it was not thought prob-
able that in the brief term fixed for the office an inability 
might occur; for the Constitution would, for either of those 
reasons, have been wholly silent on the subject. In fact, the 
Convention thought the provision as adopted self-explana-
tory, self-operative, and sufficient. Not only do the charac-
ter of its members and the earnestness of its deliberations 
compel us to this view, but also especially must the silence 
on Dickinson's inquiry and its failure to reappear be 
deemed conclusive of the point. And additional weight is 
given this view by the amendment proposed by New York, 
above mentioned; it is inconceivable that that amendment 
could be suggested and not one providing for determina-
tion of the existence of an inability, etc., if the Constitution 
was thought to leave any doubt on the point. 
That this is the real explanation in the premises, and 
that the provision was in fact not slighted in point of at-
tention, will be made clearer by considering the question 
from the other point of view, that, namely, of the proceed-
ings of the Convention, and by reviewing its successive steps 
on the way to the provision; and this consideration will 
also aid much in arriving at the construction now to be put 
upon its language. 
The first provision touching the Executive was the 
seventh of Randolph's resolutions, which, when originally 
offered, on May 29, 1787, was wholly silent on the subject 
of succession or substitution (1 Deb., 144; 5 do., 128). 
The next in order was Charles Pinckney's draft, sub-
mitted the same day, Article VIII of which provided in 
respect of the President that-
He shall be removed from his office on impeachment 
by the House of Delegates, and conviction, in the Supreme 
Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his re-
moval, death, resignation, or disability, the President of the 
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Senate shall exercise the duties of his office until another 
President be chosen. And in case of the death of the Presi-
dent of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Delegates 
shall do so (l Deb. 148; 5 do. 131). 
On being read, Pinckney's draft was referred to the com-
mittee of the whole (1 Deb. 150). 
On June 15 Mr. Patterson submitted his propositions, of 
which the fourth provided for a plural executive, ineligible 
for reelection, "and removable on impeachment and con-
viction for malpractices or neglect of duty by Congress on 
application by a majority of the executives of the several 
States" (1 Deb. 176; 5 do. 192); but these propositions also 
were wholly silent as to succession or substitution of any 
officer in the President's stead. The propositions, like Pinck-
ney's draft, were at once referred to a Committee of the 
Whole House (1 Deb. 177). 
On June 18 Hamilton, in a speech, presented his plan of 
government, Article V of which was as follows: 
On the death, resignation, or removal of the governor 
(Hamilton's title for the executive), his authority to be 
exercised by the President of the Senate until a successor be 
appointed (1 Deb. 179). 
Hamilton's plan contemplated the continuance in office 
of the executive during good beha-vior and made no pro. 
vision for the case of inability (Cf. 5 Deb. 587). 
No other general plans were proposed for the considera-
tion of the convention. On May 30 the House resolved it-
self into a Committee of the Whole to consider the state of 
the Union, and took up Randolph's resolutions (1 Deb. 
150), which furnished the basis of consideration throughout 
the convention. The resolution respecting the executive 
was taken up on June 1 (1 Deb. 154), and, on June 2, post-
poned to the consideration of the resolution respecting the 
second branch of the legislature (1 Deb. 156). 
No definite action on Randolph's seventh resolution had 
been taken when, on June 19, the committee disagreed to 
Patterson's propositions, and a second time reported the 
resolutions of Randolph (1 Deb. 180; Cf. pp. 174-175). 
While in Committee of the Whole the convention had left 
Pinckney's draft untouched; and though in Randolph's 
resolutions as now reported it was provided by that touch-
ing the executive (now numbered 9), that the President 
should "be removable on impeachment and conviction of 
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malpractice or neglect of duty," the resolutions were still 
silent on the subject of succession or substitution (1 Deb. 
182). So the matter of a disability or an inability was still 
unprovided for. 
The executive continued for a long time a stumbling 
block, and when, on July 23, the proceedings were referred 
to a committee for the purpose of reporting a Constitution, 
"what respects the supreme executive" was expressly ex-
cepted (1 Deb. 216). On the next day, July 24, the subject of 
the executive was taken up by the House, but almost im-
mediately again postponed (1 Deb. 217). At the same time, 
the committee of the whole was discharged from acting on 
the propositions of Pinckney and Patterson, and the propo-
sitions were referred to the committee to whom the pro-
ceedings of the convention had already been referred, viz, 
Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and Wilson (l 
Deb. 217-218; 5 do. 357-358, 363). 
Finally, on July 26, the resolution respecting the execu-
tive, as reported on June 19, was adopted and referred to 
the committee already provided (I Deb. 219-220). So this 
committee now had before it the resolutions of Randolph 
as altered by the Convention, the draft of Pinckney, and the 
propositions of Patterson (l Deb. 221; 5 do. 363, 374-376). 
The Convention adjourned from July 26 to August 6, 
during the interval between which dates the committee did 
its work. We have no record of its proceedings, but when on 
the latter date it reported to the House the draft prepared 
by it, the article respecting the President (Art. X) contained, 
in section 2, the following: 
He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by 
the House of Representatives, and conviction in the Su-
preme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case 
of his removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability 
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Presi-
dent of the Senate shall discharge those powers and duties 
until another President of the United States be chosen, or 
until the disability of the President be removed (l Deb., 
228; 5 do., 380). 
The draft reported by the committee was then taken up 
and considered from day to day in Committee of the Whole. 
Article X was not reached until August 24 (I Deb., 262), 
and on August 27, the last clause of that article being 
reached, its consideration was postponed (I Deb., 267). On 
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August 31 such portions of the draft as had been postponed, 
including this clause, were referred to a committee of a 
Member from each State, 11 in number (1 Deb., 280). This 
committee reported September 4, and in their report occur 
for the first time provisions respecting a Vice President, as 
distinguished from the President of the Senate. Among these 
was the following: 
The Vice President shall be, ex officio, President of the 
Senate except when they sit to try the impeachment of the 
President, in which case the Chief Justice shall preside, and 
excepting, also, when he shall exercise the powers and 
duties of President, in which case, and in case of his ab-
sence, the Senate shall choose a President pro tempore (1 
Deb., 284; 5 do., 507). 
And the committee recommended the following as the 
latter part of the second section of Article X: 
(The President) shall be removed from his office, on 
impeachment by the House of Representatives and convic-
tion by the Senate, for treason or bribery; and, in case of 
his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation, or in-
ability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the 
Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until 
another President be chosen or until the inability of the 
President be removed. (Ibid.) 
On September 7 that portion of the committee's report 
touching the election of President and Vice President was 
amended by adopting the following: 
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the 
United States shall act as President in case of the death, 
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice Presi-
dent, and such officer shall act accordingly until such dis-
ability be removed or a President shall be elected (1 Deb., 
291; 5 do, 220-221 ). 
On the following day the last clause of section 2, Article 
X, as repotted by the committee (supra) was agreed to (l 
Deb., 294), and a committee of five, viz, Johnston, Hamil-
ton, G. Morris, Madison, and King, appointed "to revise the 
style of and arrange the articles agreed to by the House" 
(l Deb., 295; 5 do, 530). To this committee went the pro-
visions touching inability in the shape in which they are 
last above given; that is to say, in terms prescribing that in 
case of inability the Vice President or other officer of the 
United States exercising the powers and duties of President 
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(or acting as President) should do so until such inability 
were removed. 
The committee reported September 12; the clause pro-
viding for the case of removal, etc., as reported being, ac-
cording to the Journal, as follows: 
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of 
his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers 
and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the 
Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the 
case of removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the 
President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall 
then act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly 
until the disability be removed or the period for choosing 
another President arrive (I Deb., 302). 
On September 15 this clause was amended by striking 
out the words "the period for choosing another President 
arrive" and inserting in place thereof the words "a Presi-
dent shall be elected" (l Deb., 313). As thus amended the 
clause was written into the final draft of the Constitution, 
with this difference, according to Madison's Minutes: In-
stead of the two semicolons were two commas (5 Deb., 562), 
although in the Constitution as now frequently printed the 
semicolons appear (e. g., see Porter's Outlines U. S. Const. 
Hist., 81). 
In view of the stress which has been laid on these semi-
colons by some in discussing the provision (who could not, 
however, have examined the clause as it stands in the Re-
vised Statutes, for there the commas are found and not the 
semicolons), this difference in the punctuation is of no 
slight significance; and Mr. Madison's form is entitled to be 
deemed correct, in preference to the other, not only because 
he found frequent occasion to note errors in the printed 
journal (in 17 instances at least, of which samples may be 
found at 5 Deb. 506, 543), but also, and especially, because 
he was himself a member of the committee on style which 
prepared the last draft submitted to the Convention. He says 
specifically that the copy given by him is the copy "as 
signed," himself italicizing the words (5 Deb. 536), and 
though the Convention compared "the report from the 
committee of revision with the articles which were agreed 
to by the House, and to them referred for arrangement" 
(the comparison being made paragraph by paragraph), "no 
entry of the corrections and amendments adopted or pro-
posed appears upon the journals," resort being had to the 
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written interlineations, Mr. Madison's minutes, and the 
tally sheets to complete the journal (1 Deb. 307). 
The exact effect of the committee's action in the 
premises may be perfectly seen from the following arrange-
ment, side by side, of the clauses as they were adopted by 
the Convention and their consolidation as effected by the 
committee: 
In case of (the President's) re· 
moval as aforesaid, death, absence, 
resignation, or inability to dis-
charge the powers or duties of his 
office, the Vice President shall ex-
ercise thOBe powers and duties un-
til another President be chosen, 
or until the inability of the Presi-
dent be removed. 
The Legislature may declare by 
law what officer of the United 
States shall act as President, in 
case of the death, resignation or 
disability of the President and 
Vice President; and such officer 
shall act accordingly, until such 
disability be removed, or a Presi· 
dent shall be elected. 
In case of the removal of the 
President from office, or of his 
death, resignation, or inability to 
discharge the powers and duties 
of the said office, the same shall 
devolve on the Vice President; 
and the Congress may by law pro· 
vide for the case of removal, 
death, resignation, or inability, 
both of the President and Vice 
President, declaring what officer 
shall then act as President; and 
such officer shall act accordingly, 
until the disability be removed, 
or (the period for choosing an· 
other President arrive) a President 
shall be elected. 
However much the outcome of the committee's efforts 
may cause us to doubt its qualifications in respect of style, 
this chronological examination of the Convention's pro-
ceedings in the premises would seem to make clear several 
things: 
1. The Vice President was not, as some have thought, in-
tended to sit in the Senate and act as president at the same 
time. Even the language of Article I, section 3, as it now 
stands, manifests this. ("The Senate shall choose their other 
officers, and also a president pro tempore in the absence of 
the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of 
President of the United States.'') 
2. When the provision under consideration left the hands 
of the Convention, to be put into shape by the committee on 
style and arrangement, it was distinctly provided that, in 
case of an inability of the President, the Vice President was 
not to become President, but to exercise the powers and 
duties of the President, which exercise was to cease with the 
inability of the President. 
3. The officer intended to be designated by the Congress 
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in case of the double inability was an officer of the United 
States. 
4. The committee on style and arrangement regarded it· 
self as merely bringing together and combining into one, 
without alteration of sense or intent, two cognate provisions 
found lying apart, by each of which provisions exercise of 
the presidential duties by a substitute was restricted to the 
period of actual inability. The committee had no authority 
to alter or amend; no objection was taken to their union 
of these provisions, which fact indicates that the revised 
form was not regarded as in any particular altering or 
amending "the articles agreed to by the House"; and Mr. 
Madison's punctuation (which is that actually adopted) 
makes the clause "until the disability be removed" part of 
a continuous sentence and therefore constructively, if not 
strictly, referable alike to the case of the Vice President and 
the "officer" to be designated by the Congress. And this is 
a complete answer to Prof. Dwight's assertion that "the 
specific reference to powers and duties was deliberately re-
jected, as well as the words 'until the disability be re-
moved,' " so far as that assertion intends to imply that the 
new form imports alteration or amendment of the Conven-
tion's determinations. 
These conclusions are not in any sense antagonized by 
the language of the provision as we now find it. The lan-
guage is, "in case of • • • inability to discharge the powers 
and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the 
Vice President." "The same" has reference to the object of 
the verb "discharge,'' which is not "said office,'' for that is 
the object of the preposition "of," but "the powers and 
duties of the said office": and the expression "in case of in· 
ability" may fairly be construed as equivalent to "during an 
inability," which would involve return of the executive 
duties to the President on cessation of the inability. 
Nor are Prof. Dwight's citations from Munroe and Mar-
tin inconsistent with this view. Munroe was objecting to 
the Vice President as an unnecessary officer and noting his 
dangerous influence from the standpoint of "advantage to 
the State he comes from" (3 Deb., 489-490) . "He is," said 
Munroe, "to succeed the President in case of removal, dis-
ability, etc., and to have the casting vote in the Senate." In 
the connection in which Prof. Dwight cites the former part 
of this remark the word "succeed," as used by Munroe, is 
absolutely colorless. The same remark is applicable to the 
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extract from Martin's letter. Martin was writing in almost 
the identical vein in which Munroe spoke, and in stating his 
objections to the Vice President he spoke of him as the 
officer "to supply (the President's) place" (1 Deb., 378). In 
neither instance was the question of inability under con-
sideration; each used the quoted expression in the run of 
argument and by way of recital of features deemed ob-
jectionable. It would be as fair to cite against Prof. Dwight's 
contention that the "office" devolves Madison's assertion 
(in the same debate in which Munroe was arguing) that "the 
power will devolve on the Vice President" (3 Deb., 498); 
notwithstanding the remark, being made by Madison while 
arguing in favor of the provision touching the Executive, 
has no sort of reference to the point of view from which the 
provision is now being considered. Indeed, Madison might 
more justly be cited, for his exact language was, "(the House 
of Representatives) can impeach (the President); they can 
remove him if found guilty; they can suspend him when 
suspected, and the power will devolve on the Vice Presi-
dent." But such remarks, made in such connections, are no 
more to the point than are the dicta of judges' law. 
Reverting now, with the aid of this review of the Con-
vention's proceedings, to the several views of the meaning 
and intent of the provision above noticed, that taken by 
ex-Gov. Butler would seem to be the correct one. He 
thinks that the inability may be of any kind, and that when 
it ceases both officers, President and Vice President, should 
return to their proper places. The "articles as agreed to by 
the House" incontestably manifest this, and "this view is in 
consonance with the whole theory of an alternative officer 
in all parliamentary bodies and in executive offices" (North 
Amer. Rev., Nov., 1881, p. 434). 
And the Vice President is the person to decide when the 
inability has arisen. In the absence of any designation to 
the contrary, "it may be taken to be axiomatic that when 
the Constitution imposes a duty on an officer, to be done 
by him, he must be the sole judge when and how to do that 
duty, subject only to his responsibility to the people and to 
the risk of impeachment if he act improperly or corruptly" 
(ibid, 433); a remark which gains weight from consideration 
of the complete isolation respectively of the executive, 
judicial, and legislative branches of our Governmeent; than 
which no feature of our system was more in contemplation 
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by its framers or has been more rigidly respected. The best 
judgments now agree even that the Supreme Court can not 
(except by mandamus in those cases of nonfeasance wholly 
independent of discretion), lay down law for the Executive; 
the function of that court being only to decide "cases aris-
ing" under the prescribed conditions. And the legislature 
can interfere with the Executive only by impeachment for 
malfeasance of a specific sort, so that neither the judiciary 
nor the legislature being either capable of affecting or 
responsible for the performance of the executive duties, the 
discharge of those duties is properly left where the respon-
sibility belongs. 
Of course, save in the exceptional case of an insane Presi-
dent, no Vice President would assume to insist to a Presi-
dent against his judgment that he was under an inability; 
and so long as a sane President would resist such intimation 
there would be no inability. The President may safely be 
trusted to help out the Vice President in the necessity of 
deciding to assume the functions of the office, save only in 
the case of insanity, as suggested; but the Constitution could 
not go into every exceptional case. Section 675 of the Re-
vised Statutes provides that "in case of a vacancy in the 
office of Chief Justice, or of his inability to perform the 
duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the 
associate justice who is first in precedence." What is an 
inability in this case, and who decides it? Section 10 of the 
act of March l, 1792 (l Stat., 239; R. S., sec. 147) provides 
"that whenever the office of President and Vice President 
shall both become vacant the Secretary of State shall forth-
with cause a notification thereof to be made to the execu-
tive of every State." Who decides when the two offices are 
vacant? In the one case the senior associate takes the seat 
of the Chief Justice because the latter is not in it, and in the 
other the Secretary of State, being charged with the duty, 
would discharge it when he himself deemed the occasion to 
have arisen. And, as Senator Ingalls said in the debate of 
January 8, 1883, already noticed, "By the Constitution it-
self, if the Constitution is self-operative or could be self-
operative, the powers and duties of (the presidential) office 
did devolve upon Vice President Arthur on the 2d day of 
July, 1881." 
The determination of the question of inability is an 
Executive affair altogether. The only other power said to be 
concerned in it is the Congress, but that body is under a 
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limitation in the premises confining its participation to 
quite another matter. The Constiution has provided that 
when an inability exists in one case the Vice President shall 
act, and that the Congress may-do what? Determine when 
an inability has arisen in any case? No; but provide what 
officer shall act when such inability exists in another case. 
This merely gives the Congress the right to designate an 
officer to succeed to the discharge of the Executive duties 
when the double disability exists; it does not even give that 
body the right to say under what circumstances such dis-
ability shall be deemed to have arisen, much less to de-
termine when a wholly different di5ability occurs. Inclusio 
unius exclusio alterius; and the Congress recognized this by 
the act of 1792, which act is a distinct interpretation by that 
body of its constiutional rights and duties in the premises. 
That interpretation is perfectly expressed by the language 
of Senator Morgan (Dec. 29, 1882): "Whenever we proceed 
further than to declare what officer shall act as President, 
we transgress the bounds of our constitutional authority." 
And immediately in this connection there at once pre-
sents itself a question, which, even without its answer, not 
only indicates that the Constitution did not intend to vest 
the Congress with the power to determine when or under 
what circumstances an inabilty exists, but also suggests the 
reason for the shape in which we find that subject left by 
the Constitution: How could the Congress decide an in-
ability to exist? Only in one of two ways: First, by special 
decision in each case as it arises; or, second, by a general 
provision prescribing a method in advance or conferring the 
power of decision upon some person or body, to be exercised 
in a prescribed manner and under prescribed conditions. 
It may safely be said that the first of these methods needs 
no serious consideration. All that is urged against the 
power of the Congress to interfere at all in the determining 
the existence of an inability applies with more than double 
force to its interference without previous provision therefor, 
and the difficulties in the way of its acting at all in such case 
are apparent. The alleged or possible existence of an in-
ability is a matter calling for instant consideration and 
decision, not a matter to be left to the consideration, dis-
cussion, perhaps wrangling, of a great number of variously 
disposed and diverse-minded men. Besides, suppose an in-
ability to appear during a recess of the Congress, what is to 
be the proceeding? 
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And here is presented still another important considera-
tion. The very fact that the Constitution contains no pro-
vision for summoning the Congress by any other than the 
President is almost proof conclusive that that branch was 
intended to have no part in determining the existence of 
an inability; for to say that the Vice President might so sum-
mon that body is to yield the whole question; the very act 
by the Vice President would determine the inability to 
exist. If provision were made or to be made for summon-
ing the Congress by any other than the President to con-
sider a supposed disability how would the body be sum-
moned? Clearly some one person would be compelled to 
take the initiative; and how delicate would be his task, prac-
tically deciding the question in advance. Would such task 
be much less delicate than that of the Vice President as-
suming to declare an inability to exist and acting accord-
ingly? And whom could the Congress choose so agreeable to 
the people as the second man in power, he who was dis-
tinctively put into his place to assume ·its great responsi-
bilities? 
Putting aside the constitutional objection, the second 
method of action by the Congress would be little, if any, 
more feasible or satisfactory than the first; and if the Con-
gress should assume to regulate the subject at all, this 
second method, delegating power to a person or body, would 
be indispensable to provide for the case of an inability 
occurring during a recess. 
If the Congress should confer the power of decision upon 
any one person the matter would be left just where the Con-
stitution leaves it; with this difference in favor of the Con-
stitution-save in the rare instance of the want of a Vice 
President, that instrument (if the view herein contended for 
be the proper one), confers the power upon one elected to 
his office by the people. On the other hand, if the power 
were committed to a body, the initiative would necessarily 
be taken by some one person; in any aspect of the matter, 
the necessity of beginning with some one person constantly 
meets us. 
Is not this fact practically the explanation of the whole 
matter as we find it in the Constitution? The beginning, in 
every conceivable view of the case, must always be by some 
individual; whether the Vice President is to decide of him-
self, whether the Congress is to be called, whether any given 
person is to exercise the power or any designated body is to 
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be convened for the purpose, that necessity can not be 
escaped. And why not leave the matter to the man chosen 
of the people as their possible ruler? nay, as the Constitution 
then stood, to the man possibly to be chosen as their ruler; 
for any one of the men voted for by the electors might be 
President, and some one of those voted for as President 
would be the Vice President. 
The decision of such a question as the existence of an 
inability must be prompt and immediately effective; of all 
questions in the world this should be free from everything 
approaching delay or halting. There should in such case be 
no interregnum, be it of how short duration soever; a thing 
abhorred of all and repugnant to every system of govern-
ment. A plural tribunal of any sort would involve danger 
of this great evil, and it needs no inspiration to conceive 
circumstances under which, with a tribunal of several to 
consider it, an inability of the President would be almost as 
great a calamity as an outbreak of treasonable hostilities. 
A single mind is the best conceivable tribunal for such a 
question and that tribunal may safely enough he the mind 
of him who is practically the choice of the whole people. 
For his right doing in so trying an emergency the Constitu-
tion rests its hope, as our entire governmental system rests 
its life, upon the earnest and patriotic intelligence of the 
American people and of each and every of them. He would 
he a rare man, indeed, who, in so responsible a moment, 
should misconceive, or, worse still, should intentionally 
disregard his high duty and the inconcealable public senti-
ment. 
Appendix II 
Disability Clauses in Colonial Charters 
The charters were usually granted to a person or persons 
and their "heires, deputyes, agents, commissioners and as-
signs." So executive power in early America transferred 
automatically by descent. As democracy grew, the lieuten-
ant governor emerged as a "deputie" rather than "heire." 
Pertinent sections of the charters and constitutions of the 
thirteen Colonies and the states of the Confederation follow: 
All page citations are to Francis N. Thorpe, American Char-
ters, Constitutions and Organic Laws (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1909). Emphasis supplied. 
CONNECTICUT: 
Council for New England, 1620: "unto which Presi-
dent, or in his Absence, to any such Person as by the 
Order of said Councill shall be thereunto appointed, 
Wee do give Authority to give Orders ...... p. 1831. 
Commission to Andros, 1688: "and upon your death 
or absence out of our said Territory unto our Leut. Gov-
ernor, to whom we do therefore by these presents give 
and grant all and singular the powers and authorityes 
aforesaid to be exercised and enjoyed by .kim in case of 
your death or absence during "our pleasure, or untill 
your arrival within our said Territory and Dominion; as 
Wee do further hereby give and grant full power and 
authority to our Leut. Governor to do and execute what-
soever he shall be by you authorized and appointed to 
do and execute in pursuance of and according to the 
powers grante to you by this Commission." p. 1869. 
Government of New Haven Colony, 1643: "the Gov-
ernor, or in his absence, the Deputy Governor, shall 
have power to summon a General! Court at any other 
time." p. 528. 
Charter of Connecticut, 1662: "That the Governor of 
the said Company for the Time being, or in his Absence 
by occasion of sickness, or otherwise by his Leave or 
Permission, the Deputy Governor, for the Time being, 
shall and may from time to Time upon an Occasions 
give Order for the assembling of the said Company, and 
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calling them together to consult and advise of the Busi-
ness and Affairs of the said Company .... " p. 531. 
DELAWARE: 
Dutch West India Company's Patent, 1621: "gov-
ernor in chief, as well as other deputy governors . ... " 
p. 60. 
Grant to William Penn, 1681: "Governor, or his 
Deputy." p. 3045. 
Frames of Government, 1682: Notice of council meet-
ing to be given by "the Governor or his Deputy" and 
". . . in this provincial Council the Governor or his 
Deputy, shall or may, always preside .... " p. 3055. 
Constitution of 1776: "And on his [the president's] 
death, inability, or absence from the State, the speaker 
of the house of assembly shall have the powers of a presi-
dent, until a new nomination is made by the general 
assembly." p. 563. 
GEORGIA: 
Proprietary Proposals, 1663: "the Governor or his 
Deputy to be one, to govern for the time aforesaid .... " 
p. 2754. 
Fundamental Constitutions, Carolina, 1669: "One 
The eldest of the lords proprietors shall be palatine; and 
upon the decease of the palatine, the eldest of the seven 
surviving proprietors shall always succeed him .... The 
palatine shall .... have power ... to make a deputy, 
who shall have the same power to all intents and pur-
poses as he himself who deputizes him .... " pp. 2772, 
2779. 
Constitution of Georgia, 1777: "Article XXIX. The 
president of the executive council, in the absence or 
sickness of the governor, shall exercise all the powers of 
the governor." p. 777. 
MARYLAND: 
Constitution of Maryland, 1776: XXXII. That upon 
the death, resignation, or removal out of this State, of 
the Governor, the first named of the Council, "for the 
time being, shall act as Governor, and qualify in the 
same manner; and shall immediately call a meeting of 
the General Assembly, giving not less than fourteen 
days notice of the meeting, at which meeting, a Governor 
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shall be appointed, in manner aforesaid, for the residue 
of the year." p. 1686. 
MASSACHUSETTS: 
Charter of Massachusetts Bay, 1629: "There shalbe 
one Governor, one Deputy Governor ... That the Gov-
ernor of the saide Company for the tyme being, or in his 
Absence by Occasion of Sicknes or otherwise, the Depu-
tie Governor for the tyme being, shall have A uthoritie 
from time to time upon all Occasions, to give order for 
the assembling of the saide Company .... (etc.)" p. 1852. 
Charter of Massachusetts Bay, 1691: " ... there shall 
be one Governour One Leivtent or Deputy Governour 
. . . when and as often as the Governour "of our said 
Province for the time being shall happen to dye or be 
displaced by us ... or be absent from his Government 
That then and in any of the said Cases the Lievtenant 
or Deputy Governour of Our said Province for the time 
being shall have full power and authority to doe and 
execute all and every sue Acts Matters and things which 
our Governour of Our said Province for the time being 
might or could by vertue of these Our Letters Patents 
lawfully doe or execute if he were personally present 
untill the returne of the Governour soe absent or Ar-
rivall or Constitucon of such other Governour as shall 
or may be appointed ... . "pp. 1877, 1884. 
Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780: "Whenever the 
chair of the governor shall be vacant, by reason of his 
death, or absence from the commonwealth, or otherwise, 
the lieutenant-governor, for the time being, shall, during 
such vacancy, perform all the duties incumbent upon 
the governor, and shall have and exercise all the powers 
and authorities, which by this "constitution the governor 
is vested with, when personally present." p. 1888. 
NEW HAMPSHIRE: 
Constitution of 1776: "that such Council appoint 
their President, and in his absence that the senior coun-
sellor preside.'' p. 2451. 
Constitution of 1784: "Whenever the chair of the 
president shall be vacant, by reason of death, absence 
for the state, or otherwise, the senior senator for the 
time being, shall, during such vacancy, have and exercise 
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all the powers and authorities which by this constitution 
the president is vested with when personally present." 
p. 245S. 
NEW JERSEY: 
Constitution of 1776: The Council shall choose a 
"Vice President, who shall act as such in the absence of 
the Governor." p. 2596. 
NEW YORK: 
Constitution of 1777: "And in the case of the im-
peachment of the governor, or his removal from office, 
death, resignation, or absence from the State, the lieu-
tenant governor shall exercise all the power and au-
thority appertaining to the office of the governor until 
another be chosen, or the governor absent or impeached 
shall return or be acquitted .... " 
NORTH CAROLINA: 
Constitution of 1776: " ... And on his death, inabil-
ity, or absence from the State, the Speaker of the Senate, 
for the time being (and in case of this death, inability, 
or absence from the State, the Speaker of the House of 
Commons) shall exercise the powers of government after 
such death, or during such absence or inability of the 
Governor (or Speaker of the Senate) or until a new nom-
ination is made by the General Assembly." p. 2792. 
PENNSYLVANIA: 
Constitution of 1776: "The president, and in his ab-
sence, the vice president with the council" shall exercise 
the executive power. p. 3087. 
See also comment under DELAWARE concerning 
the 1681 grant to William Penn, and the Frames of 
Government of 1682. 
RHODE ISLAND: 
Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 
1663: "there shall bee one Governour, one Deputie-
Governour and ten Assistants ... the Governour of the 
sayd Company, for the tyme being, or in his absence, 
by occasion of sicknesse, or otherwise, by his leave and 
permission, the Deputy-Govemour for the tyme being 
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shall and may, from tyme to tyme, upon all occasions, 
give order for the assemblyings of the sayd Company . 
. . . (etc.)" p. 3214. 
SOUTH CAROLINA: 
See the Fundamental Constitutions, Carolina, 1669 
under GEORGIA. 
Constitution of 1776: "That in the case of the death 
of the president and commander-in-chief, or his absence 
from the colony, the vice-president of the colony shall 
succeed to his office . ... " p. 3245. 
Constitution of 1778: "That in case of the impeach-
ment of the governor and commander-in-chief, or his 
removal from office, death, resignation, or absence from 
the state, the lieutenant governor shall succeed to his 
office." p. 3249. 
VIRGINIA: 
Constitution of 1776: "The Privy Council ... shall 
annually choose, out of their own members, a President, 
who, iR case of death, inability, or absence of the Gov-
ernor from the Government, shall act as Lieutenant-
Governor." p. 3817. 
Appendix Ill 
Amendment Proposed by the Nebraska 
Law Review 
Article-
Section l. If the President dies, resigns or is removed 
from office, the Vice President shall become President for 
the remainder of the term to which the President was 
elected. 
Section 2. If the President becomes unable for any rea-
son to discharge the powers and duties of his office, they 
shall devolve upon the Vice President, who shall then act as 
President until the disability of the President be removed, 
or the term of office of the President shall expire. Congress 
shall have the power to establish a procedure to determine 
the inability of the President to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office; but such procedure must be compatible 
with the maintenance of the three distinct departments of 
government, the legislative, the executive and the judicial 
and the preservation of the checks and balances between the 
coordinate branches. Congress shall provide by law for the 
case of the removal, death, resignation or inability of both 
the President and Vice President, declaring what officer 
shall then act as President; and such officer shall act accord-
ingly, until the inability be removed, or the expiration of 
the term for which both officers had been elected. 
Section 3. Article II, section 1, paragraph 6 is hereby 
repealed. 
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Appendix IV 
American Bar Association 
Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates, 
February 22, 1960 
Resolved, That the American Bar Association approves 
the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States on the subject of presidential inability, where-
by the fifth clause of Section 1 of Article II of the Constitu-
tion would be amended to read as follows: 
"In case of the removal of the President from office, or 
his death or resignation, the said office shall devolve on the 
Vice President. In case of the inability of the President to 
discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the said 
powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President, until 
the inability be removed. The Congress may by law provide 
for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both 
of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer 
shall then be President, or in the case of inability, act as 
President, and such officer shall be or act as President ac-
cordingly, until a President shall be elected or, in case of 
inability, until the inability shall be earlier removed. The 
commencement and termination of any inability shall be de-
termined by such method as Congress shall by law provide." 
Amendments with virtually identical wording were sub-
sequently adopted by the New York State Bar Association 
and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. 
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Appendix V 
A. Former President Hoover's Suggestions on a 
Method of Determining Inability 
Hon. Estes Kefauver, 
THE KEY LARGO ANGLERS CLUB 
Homestead, Fla., January 20, I 958 
Chairman, Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
MY DEAR SENATOR: I have received your kind note re-
questing my views on the proposed bills you send me. 
I assume that the question is solely the method of deter-
mining the "inability" of the President "to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office," and contained in it also the 
method of determining the "removal of disability." 
All questions of succession seem covered by article II, 
section I, paragraph 5 of the Constitution, and therefore 
legislation on this subject seems to me unnecessary. 
I. There seems to be some question as to whether rem-
edy can be found by statutory law or must be through 
constitutional amendment. The Congress will need decide 
whether the above-mentioned section in the Constitution 
would be sufficient authority for a statutory solution. 
2. It seems to me that the method of determining "in-
ability" or "recovery" requires consideration of the spirit 
of the separation of powers in the Government and certain 
traditional practices which have become fixed in our na-
tional life during the past 150 years. 
3. The President and the Vice President are elected as 
the chosen leaders of a political party with declared man-
dates, principles, solutions of issues, and promises to the 
people. 
4. The Congress, in one or both Houses, is often con-
trolled by an opposition political party, and thus by those 
who are, in practice, mostly opposed to the mandates or 
promises upon which the President and Vice President are 
elected by the people. 
5. All of which leads me to the generalization that a 
President's inability to serve or his possible restoration to 
office should be determined by the leading officials in the 
executive branch, as they are of the party having the respon-
sibilities determined by the election. 
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6. I believe that a simple amendment to the Constitution 
(or possibly statutory law) could provide for a commission 
made up from the executive branch to make the determina-
tions required. I do not suggest that the individual persons 
be named but that the departments or agencies be enum-
erated, whose chief official or head should be a member of 
such a commission. The number could well be limited to 
not less than 7 and not more than 15 such heads of depart-
ments or agencies. There could be a further provision that 
they should seek the advice of a panel of experienced physi-
cians or surgeons. 
I cannot conceive of any circumstance when such a de-
fined body of leaders from the executive branch would act 
in these circumstances otherwise than in the national in-
terest. 
Yours faithfully, 
(Signed) HERBERT HOOVER 
B. Former President Truman's Proposal 
INDEPENDENCE, Mo. 
January 16, 1958 
Hon. Estes Kefauver, 
United States Senate, 
Washington, D. C. 
DEAR EsTEs: In reply to your letter of the l 0th, I am send-
ing you a copy of an article of mine, written for the North 
American Newspaper Alliance, which covers the subject of 
a President's inability to carry on his duties. 
These are my views, and if you want to make use of the 
article, you are at liberty to do so. 
Sincerely yours, 
(Signed) HARRY TRUMAN 
(Copyright by Harry S. Truman, 1957) 
There has been an understandable reluctance to deal 
with the delicate and sensitive problem of what we are to 
do when any President becomes incapacitated and is un-
able to perform his duties. 
Our Founding Fathers did not provide for such an even-
tuality. During the 168 years of our history under the 
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Constitution, there have been only two occasions when the 
question arose of a President's ability to serve. I refer to 
James A. Garfield and Woodrow Wilson. We have been for-
tunate, indeed, that we have not had to face such a crisis 
more often. 
But the job of the President is getting to be an almost 
unendurable mental and physical burden, and we ought not 
to go on trusting to luck to see us through. 
We may find that we have waited too long to provide a 
way of meeting the situation in the event a President be-
comes incapacitated. There have been suggestions to deal 
with the matter through legislation. Others have proposed 
amending the Constitution. 
However we deal with it eventually, this is too vital a 
matter to be acted on hastily without the widest discussion 
and study. I have felt that there is always great danger in 
writing too much into the Constitution. We must have cer-
tain flexibility to meet changing conditions. We have al-
ready experienced the consequences of hastily amending the 
Constitution without adequate public discussion, as in the 
cases of the 18th and the 22d amendments. 
In response to the many letters I have received on the 
subject from all parts of the country, and the world, I am 
taking the liberty of suggesting a way to meet this problem. 
I would like to make it perfectly clear that it is not my 
intention to cast reflections on anyone, or to raise any 
doubts about the health or condition of the President. Along 
with all of our citizens, I wish him good health and a long 
life. 
But there is a growing concern about our needs to pro-
vide against the danger of a lapse in the functioning of the 
Presidency and the crises that might ensue. 
The power of the President of the United States and 
his influence on the world today have grown so great that 
his well-being is of paramount interest to people every-
where. It is no longer a matter to be decided by political 
leaders and constitutional authority. 
Even a minor indisposition of the President will set into 
motion unexpected and often unreasoning fears, such as we 
have recently witnessed. 
The framers of our Constitution drafted a brilliant and 
inspired document in which they anticipated and provided 
for nearly all of the basic developments of our democracy. 
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But who could fully foresee the role of the American Presi-
dency in the kind of a world in which we now live-a role 
which also requires the President to be available in person 
at any hour to make decisions which he alone can make and 
which cannot be put off? 
As Vice President, I found myself acutely conscious of 
this problem in a personal way when I met President Roose-
velt upon his return from Yalta. Up to that time I regarded 
the circumstances of an incapacitated President as an aca-
demic problem in history, such as was posed by Presidents 
Garfield and Wilson. 
After the first shock of seeing President Roosevelt, I 
tried to dismiss from my mind the ominous thoughts of a 
possible breakdown, counting on his ability to bounce back 
from the strains and stress of office. After Yalta, President 
Roosevelt continued to carry on with sustained energy and 
alertness-until suddenly called by death. 
From the day I succeeded to the Presidency, I have been 
thinking about the needs of an act of legislation to provide 
machinery to meet the emergency of a President's disability. 
Shortly after taking office, I considered setting up a com-
mission to study the problem and make recommendations. 
But in the midst of war and during the period of postwar 
reconstruction we were preoccupied with more immediate 
and urgent matters. 
I therefore chose instead to recommend to the Congress 
a change by statute of succession to the Presidency from the 
Cabinet to the Congress in the event the Nation was with-
out a Vice President. Up to that time the Secretary of State 
was next in order of succession. I did not think that a Cabi-
net officer-who is not elected by the people-should suc-
ceed to the Presidency, which is an elective office. The 
Speaker of the House, who is, in fact, the top-ranking elected 
public official after the President and the Vice President, is 
now under the new law next in succession. 
This, however, does not meet the problem when a Presi-
dent is unable to perform the duties of his office. 
I suggest, therefore, that the following proposal may 
provide us with a workable solution: 
1. When a President is stricken with an illness, raising 
the question of his ability to carry out the duties of his 
office, there should come into being a Committee of Seven 
composed of representatives of the three branches of the 
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Government. This Committee should consist of the Vice 
President, the Chief Justice of the United States, the Speaker 
of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. This Com-
mittee would select a board of leading medical authorities 
drawn from top medical schools of the Nation. This med-
ical board, thus chosen, would then make the necessary ex-
aminations presenting their findings to the Committee of 
Seven. Should the findings of the medical board indicate 
that the President is unable to perform his duties, and that 
he is, in fact, truly incapacitated and not merely stricken 
with a transitory illness, then the Committee of Seven 
would so inform the Congress. Congress then would have 
the right to act, and by a two-thirds vote of the full member-
ship declare the Vice President as President. 
The Vice President, designated as President, would 
thereupon serve out the full term of his predecessor. Should 
the stricken President, thus relieved, experience during this 
term a complete recovery, he would not be entitled to re· 
possess the office. 
Should the Congress be in adjournment or recess when 
a President is incapacitated, the Vice President, the Speaker, 
and Chief Justice should call a meeting of the Committee 
of Seven. This Committee, after receiving the medical find· 
ings, would have authority to call Congress into special ses· 
sion for the purpose of declaring the Vice President as 
President. 
2. When a Vice President succeeds to the Presidency and 
leaves the office of the Vice President vacant, the last elec-
toral college should be called into session by the new Presi· 
dent for the purpose of selecting and declaring a new Vice 
President. I would recommend that in every instance where 
a Vice President succeeds to an unexpired term of a Presi-
dent the electoral college be convened to choose a new Vice 
President. 
By this procedure I think we would be able to ensure 
the proper continuance of the functioning of the Presidency 
and, at the same time, protect the Nation's paramount in-
terests through the full exercise of the checks and balances 
of our free democratic institutions. 
I suggest procedure along these broad general lines could 
be enacted into law by statute. If necessary, these provisions 
could be framed into a constitutional amendment. 
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